Marinello v. United States
The Court ruled that a federal tax-obstruction law does not cover every act that interferes with the IRS's day-to-day work, such as ordinary tax-return processing. Instead, prosecutors must prove the defendant knew of, or could reasonably foresee, a specific investigation or audit that his conduct was aimed at obstructing.
The ruling narrows a broadly worded felony statute that the government had used to prosecute a wide range of tax-related misconduct, and sends the case back for further proceedings under the new, narrower standard.
How it got here: A jury convicted Marinello without being told he had to know of a specific investigation; the Second Circuit affirmed, and he asked the Supreme Court to resolve a circuit split.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Carlo Marinello ran a courier company but kept almost no business records, paid employees in cash, and did not file tax returns for years. The IRS investigated his tax activities on and off between 2004 and 2009. In 2012 the government indicted him on several tax crimes, including a felony charge under the Internal Revenue Code's "Omnibus Clause" for corruptly obstructing the administration of the tax laws.
The question before the Court
To convict someone of illegally obstructing the IRS's tax work, must prosecutors show the person knew about a specific IRS audit or investigation?
The Court's answer
No — not unless prosecutors can also show the defendant knew about, or could reasonably foresee, a specific IRS proceeding like an audit or investigation. The Court held that the Omnibus Clause's ban on obstructing the 'due administration' of the Tax Code does not reach every act that interferes with the IRS's routine, everyday work, such as processing tax returns. Instead, following its earlier interpretation of a similar obstruction-of-justice law, the Court required a 'nexus' — a real connection in time, causation, or logic — between the defendant's conduct and a targeted administrative action.
That means the government must prove both that a particular proceeding existed or was reasonably foreseeable, and that the defendant's corrupt conduct was aimed at that proceeding. Because the jury in Marinello's case was never asked to find this, his conviction was reversed and the case sent back for further proceedings under this narrower standard.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Taxpayers who make routine mistakes or omissions — failing to keep every receipt, paying a babysitter in cash, or fudging a return — cannot be charged with this felony obstruction offense unless prosecutors can tie their conduct to a specific, known or foreseeable IRS proceeding. This limits prosecutors' ability to escalate ordinary tax violations into felony obstruction charges.
What changes now
The case returns to the lower courts, where prosecutors must decide whether they can retry Marinello under the new, narrower standard — showing he knew of or could foresee a specific IRS proceeding when he acted. The decision is a final ruling on the meaning of the Omnibus Clause and will apply going forward in similar tax-obstruction prosecutions nationwide.
What this does not decide
The Court did not say exactly which kinds of IRS actions count as a 'particular administrative proceeding' beyond audits and investigations, leaving that line to be worked out case by case. It also did not decide whether Marinello's own conduct actually satisfies the new nexus-and-foreseeability standard.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Thomas
“Because the text prohibits all efforts to obstruct the due administration of the Tax Code, I respectfully dissent.”Thomas's closing statement that the statute's text covers the entire Tax Code, not just specific proceedings.
Justice Thomas argued the statute's text is not ambiguous: 'this title' plainly means the entire Tax Code, so the Omnibus Clause should cover corrupt efforts to obstruct any part of tax administration, not just specific pending or foreseeable proceedings. He rejected the majority's redundancy and fair-warning concerns, noting the 'corruptly' versus 'willfully' mens rea distinction is meaningful and that overlapping criminal provisions are common and unproblematic. He would have affirmed Marinello's conviction.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court looked to its earlier decision in United States v. Aguilar, which interpreted a similarly worded federal obstruction-of-justice statute to require a 'nexus' — a relationship in time, causation, or logic — between the defendant's conduct and a specific judicial proceeding, rather than justice administration in the abstract.
- Applying the same logic, the Court reasoned that the verbs 'obstruct' and 'impede' need an object, and 'due administration of the Tax Code' is best read as referring to specific, targeted administrative acts rather than every task involved in running the tax system.
- The Court found this reading confirmed by the statute's surrounding text, which elsewhere focuses on threats or force against identifiable IRS officers and seized property, suggesting the Omnibus Clause was meant as a catchall for that kind of targeted misconduct, not for every interaction with the tax system.
- The Court also worried that a broad reading would turn many of the Tax Code's minor misdemeanor provisions into felonies and would fail to give ordinary taxpayers fair warning that routine conduct — like underreporting a babysitter's pay — could trigger a felony prosecution.
- The Court rejected the government's argument that a 'corruptly' intent requirement would cure this overbreadth, reasoning that almost any willful tax violation could be described as done for an unlawful benefit, so that requirement would rarely narrow anything in practice.
- The Court concluded that convicting someone under the Omnibus Clause requires proof of a nexus to a particular administrative proceeding, such as an audit or investigation, and that the proceeding was pending or reasonably foreseeable when the defendant acted.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Aguilar (515 U. S. 593)
The Court applied Aguilar's requirement of a 'nexus' to a specific proceeding to this tax-obstruction statute.