Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran
The Supreme Court ruled that a federal law allowing victims of terrorism to seize a foreign government's property to collect on a court judgment does not, by itself, strip that property of its usual legal protection from seizure.
Instead, the victims must first show the property loses its protection under some other, separate part of the law -- meaning a family holding a judgment against Iran could not automatically go after an ancient artifact collection housed at a university without meeting that separate requirement.
“Section 1610(g) serves to identify property that will be available for attachment and execution in satisfaction of a §1605A judgment, but it does not in itself divest property of immunity.”
The Court's core holding on what the disputed provision does and does not do.
How it got here: A federal trial court ruled the antiquities collection remained legally protected from seizure; the Seventh Circuit affirmed, and the victims asked the Supreme Court to resolve a circuit split.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Americans hurt or bereaved by a 1997 Hamas suicide bombing in Jerusalem sued Iran, which they said helped fund the attack, and won a $71.5 million default judgment. When Iran did not pay, the victims tried to seize a collection of about 30,000 ancient clay tablets, known as the Persepolis Collection, that Iran had loaned decades earlier to the University of Chicago for research.
The question before the Court
Could terror-attack victims use a federal law about seizing property tied to a court judgment to grab a Persian antiquities collection from a Chicago museum, just because Iran was found liable?
Why it matters
People who win court judgments against foreign governments for terrorism-related harms will need to find a specific legal hook elsewhere in the law -- like showing the property was used for commercial business -- before they can seize that government's property, making it harder to collect on judgments using items like the ancient tablet collection at issue here.
What changes now
The ruling is final on the legal question of how this provision works, but it does not end the underlying dispute over the Persepolis Collection itself. The case could continue in the lower courts if the victims try to show the collection loses its protection under some other specific part of the law, such as the commercial-activity exception, though the Court's opinion casts doubt on whether that showing can be made here.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether the Persepolis Collection is or is not protected under any other specific provision of the law, such as the commercial-activity exception -- only that the broad provision the victims relied on could not by itself strip the collection's protection.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court examined the specific phrase 'as provided in this section' in the statute the victims relied on, and concluded it most naturally means the whole surrounding law section, not a standalone rule.
- The Court compared this provision to other parts of the same law that use clear, strong language like 'shall not be immune' or 'notwithstanding any other provision of law' when Congress actually intends to strip property of its usual legal protection -- language missing from the provision at issue.
- Applying the rule that a law should be read so every part of it has a purpose, the Court reasoned that if the provision worked as the victims claimed, it would make several other, more specific provisions in the same law pointless, since victims could always skip straight to the broader one.
- The Court found this reading also fit with the historical pattern of the law generally removing legal protection from a foreign government's property mainly when that property was tied to commercial business activity.
- Because the victims had not shown that the ancient tablet collection was stripped of its protection under any of those other, more specific parts of the law, the Court concluded the general provision alone could not be used to seize it.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Abrogates First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec) (462 U. S. 611)
The 2008 provision replaces the multi-factor test from this case for deciding when a state agency's assets can satisfy a judgment against the state.
Distinguishes Bank Markazi v. Peterson (578 U. S. ___)
The Court said this prior footnote about the provision's scope was consistent with, not evidence against, its narrower reading.