Matal v. Tam
The Supreme Court struck down a federal law that let the Patent and Trademark Office refuse to register trademarks it considered disparaging to any group of people. The Court ruled unanimously that the law violated the First Amendment because it let the government punish speech simply for expressing an offensive viewpoint.
The decision cleared the way for an Asian-American rock band called The Slants to register its name, which members had chosen to reclaim a slur, and it signaled that similar bans on offensive trademarks -- including sports team names -- could no longer be enforced.
How it got here: The Patent and Trademark Office and its appeals board denied registration; Tam sued, and the en banc Federal Circuit ruled the law unconstitutional, prompting the government's appeal to the Supreme Court.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Simon Tam, lead singer of the Asian-American rock band "The Slants," tried to register the band's name as a federal trademark. He chose the name, a slur for Asian people, to "reclaim" it and drain its power to hurt. The Patent and Trademark Office refused, citing a law barring registration of marks that disparage people, saying many people would find the name offensive.
The question before the Court
Could the government refuse to register a band's trademark, "The Slants," just because officials thought the name might be seen as offensive to Asian-Americans?
Why it matters
Businesses, bands, and advocacy groups can no longer be denied trademark registration just because a government examiner thinks their name or slogan might offend someone. The ruling also affected other pending disputes over supposedly offensive trademarks, including a well-known professional football team's name, by taking away the government's power to screen out offensive viewpoints.
What changes now
This is a final merits decision, not a temporary order. With the disparagement clause struck down, the Patent and Trademark Office can no longer refuse trademark registrations on the ground that they disparage people, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols. The ruling also cleared the legal obstacle facing other disputed trademarks, including a professional football team's name, that had been denied or challenged under the same provision.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether trademarks in general count as commercial speech subject to relaxed First Amendment scrutiny, nor did it adopt a general framework for analyzing all free-speech challenges to trademark law. It also left open whether other Lanham Act provisions, like those addressing confusing or misleading marks, would survive similar challenges.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence in part — Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy agreed the law was unconstitutional but wrote separately to explain in more depth why it amounted to viewpoint discrimination, the most serious kind of speech restriction. He argued the government's own justifications -- that the law applied evenhandedly and depended on audience reaction rather than the speaker's intent -- did not escape that problem, and that this viewpoint-discrimination conclusion made it unnecessary to resolve other questions the majority also addressed, like whether trademarks are commercial speech.
Concurrence in part — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion except for the part addressing Tam's statutory argument, saying the Court should not have reached an issue Tam never raised below. He also reiterated his long-standing view that government restrictions on truthful speech to suppress its message should always face the strictest constitutional test, regardless of whether the speech is commercial.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court first read the disparagement law's text and found it plainly covered marks disparaging groups of people, not just specific named individuals, rejecting Tam's narrower reading of the word 'persons.'
- The Court then asked whether trademarks registered by the government count as the government's own speech, which would exempt them from First Amendment limits on discrimination based on viewpoint. It concluded trademarks are private speech because the government does not create, edit, or endorse the marks it registers -- it simply approves them if they meet neutral rules.
- The Court rejected the idea that trademark registration is like a cash subsidy program (where the government can choose which viewpoints to fund), because registration mainly involves paying fees to the government rather than receiving government money.
- The Court also rejected a proposed 'government program' doctrine that would treat trademark registration like limited forums where some content rules are allowed, explaining that even in those settings, singling out messages because they might offend still counts as viewpoint discrimination -- the most forbidden kind of speech restriction.
- Finally, applying the more lenient commercial-speech test from Central Hudson as a fallback, the Court found the disparagement law still failed because it was not narrowly tailored: it swept in far more speech, including harmless political slogans, than needed to serve any government interest in policing commerce.