Howell v. Howell
The Court ruled that state courts cannot order a divorced veteran to make up, dollar for dollar, the drop in an ex-spouse's share of military retirement pay that results when the veteran later trades some of that pay for disability benefits.
Because federal law already blocks states from treating disability-linked retirement pay as shared property, the Court held that calling the payment 'reimbursement' or 'indemnification' instead of a property division doesn't change the outcome — federal law still controls.
How it got here: An Arizona family court ordered the veteran to make up his ex-spouse's lost share of retirement pay; the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, and he sought Supreme Court review.
The Case in Depth
What happened
John and Sandra Howell divorced in 1991 while John served in the Air Force; the decree gave Sandra half of his future military retirement pay. After John retired, he later became partially disabled and, under federal law, had to give up part of his retirement pay to receive disability benefits instead, which also reduced Sandra's share by about $125 a month.
The question before the Court
Can a state court order a veteran to pay his ex-spouse extra money to make up for retirement pay he later gave up in exchange for disability benefits?
The Court's answer
No — the Court ruled that state courts cannot order a veteran to pay his ex-spouse extra money to offset the drop in her share of his retirement pay when he later trades some of it for disability benefits. Federal law completely blocks states from treating that disability-linked portion of retirement pay as property that can be divided, and this rule applies whether the waiver happens before or after the divorce.
The Court also rejected the idea that calling the payment 'reimbursement' or 'indemnification' instead of a property division changes anything — the practical effect is the same, so it's equally blocked. Family courts can still consider the risk of a future waiver when setting spousal support, but they cannot order automatic compensation tied to the waived amount.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Divorced spouses of veterans may see their share of retirement pay shrink if the veteran later opts for disability benefits, with no automatic right to be made whole for that loss through the divorce decree. Family courts can still address the risk when setting spousal support, but they cannot simply order the veteran to cover the difference after the fact.
What changes now
The case is sent back to the Arizona courts for further proceedings consistent with the ruling, meaning the reimbursement order against John cannot stand as written. This is a final decision on the legal question, though family courts remain free going forward to account for the risk of a future disability waiver when setting spousal support amounts at the time of divorce.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether family courts can factor in the possibility of a future disability waiver when initially calculating property division or spousal support, or when later recalculating support. It left those support-related adjustments open for family courts to handle.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence in part — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas joined the entire opinion except the Court's brief reliance on 'purposes and objectives' pre-emption, a doctrine that asks whether a state law gets in the way of what Congress was trying to accomplish. He has previously argued this framework is not a legitimate basis for striking down state laws, and he noted it wasn't necessary to reach the same result here.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court applied its 1989 ruling in Mansell v. Mansell, which held that federal law completely pre-empts — that is, overrides — state laws that try to treat military retirement pay given up for disability benefits as shared community property divisible at divorce.
- The Court rejected Arizona's argument that Mansell didn't apply because the veteran's waiver there happened before the divorce while John's waiver happened years after the divorce decree; it reasoned that the spouse's share was always a contingent interest that could shrink if the veteran later chose disability benefits.
- The Court explained that Sandra's right to her share had, at most, 'vested' subject to that future contingency, and state courts cannot vest a spouse with rights to money that federal law places outside their authority to divide in the first place.
- The Court held that labeling the family court's order as 'reimbursement' or 'indemnification' rather than a division of property made no legal difference, because the order's practical effect was still to hand Sandra money tied dollar-for-dollar to the waived retirement pay.
- Applying this reasoning, the Court concluded that any order requiring a veteran to make up for a disability-related waiver — regardless of its label — stands as an obstacle to the federal scheme and is therefore pre-empted.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Mansell v. Mansell (490 U. S. 581)
The Court applied Mansell's rule that federal law bars states from dividing disability-related waived military retirement pay.
Reaffirms McCarty v. McCarty (453 U. S. 210)
The Court relied on McCarty's reasoning about federal interests to support pre-emption of state indemnification orders.