Buck v. Davis
The Supreme Court ruled that a Texas death-row inmate's lawyer was constitutionally ineffective for calling an expert witness who testified that the inmate was statistically more likely to commit future violence because he is Black, and that a federal appeals court had wrongly denied him permission even to appeal that claim.
The decision sends the case back so the inmate can finally get a hearing on whether his sentence should be undone, and it reinforces that lower courts cannot decide the merits of a case while pretending only to screen whether an appeal is debatable.
How it got here: State courts and a federal district court rejected Buck's ineffective-assistance claim as defaulted; the Fifth Circuit denied him permission to appeal a later motion to reopen that judgment.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Duane Buck was convicted of capital murder in Texas. During sentencing, his own defense lawyer called a psychologist who testified, consistent with his written report, that Buck was statistically more likely to be violent in the future because he is Black. The jury, required to find future dangerousness before imposing death, sentenced Buck to death. Years later, Texas confessed error in five similar cases involving the same psychologist but not Buck's.
The question before the Court
Could a death-row inmate reopen his federal appeal after his own lawyer had put on expert testimony that his race made him more likely to be violent?
The Court's answer
Yes — the Court ruled that Buck's trial lawyer performed unconstitutionally poorly by introducing expert testimony linking Buck's race to future violence, and that this likely affected the jury's death sentence. The Court also held that the federal appeals court had improperly decided the underlying merits of Buck's case while claiming only to screen whether he deserved permission to appeal at all.
Because the trial court's refusal to reopen the case rested on treating this racial testimony as unimportant, and because Texas had treated nearly identical cases very differently, the Court found the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to reopen the earlier judgment. The case now goes back so Buck can actually litigate his claim on the merits, rather than remaining permanently barred by an old procedural default.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
The ruling gives a man sentenced to death a chance to have his sentence reconsidered after race was used against him at his own trial, by his own lawyer. It also clarifies for lower courts how to handle requests to appeal in habeas cases, preventing judges from using a preliminary screening step to secretly rule on the merits.
What changes now
The case returns to the lower federal courts, where Buck's ineffective-assistance claim can now be considered on its merits, along with the separate requirement that his state postconviction lawyer was also constitutionally inadequate for failing to raise the claim earlier. This is a final merits ruling on the certificate-of-appealability and Rule 60(b)(6) questions, but it does not guarantee Buck will ultimately win a new sentencing hearing.
What this does not decide
The Court stressed its ruling turns on an unusual combination of facts — a capital case, testimony explicitly tying race to dangerousness, and Texas's own admission that nearly identical testimony was improper elsewhere — and does not decide that Buck will ultimately win resentencing, only that he may now litigate the claim.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, argued the Fifth Circuit correctly denied permission to appeal because finding a claim non-debatable necessarily means finding it meritless. He argued the racial testimony was not prejudicial given overwhelming evidence of the crime's brutality and Buck's lack of remorse, and that Texas had good reason to treat Buck's case differently since his own lawyer, not the prosecution, introduced the testimony. He also emphasized that finality interests weighed against reopening an eight-year-old judgment, and stressed the decision announces no new legal principles.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court explained that a request for permission to appeal a habeas denial (a certificate of appealability) requires only a threshold showing that reasonable judges could disagree with the lower court's ruling — not a full decision on whether the claim actually wins.
- The Fifth Circuit had instead resolved the underlying dispute first and then used that merits conclusion to deny permission to appeal, which the Court held improperly skips the preliminary screening step Congress set up.
- Turning to the ineffective-assistance claim itself, the Court applied the two-part test from Strickland v. Washington: first, whether the lawyer's performance fell below a reasonable professional standard, and second, whether that failure likely changed the outcome.
- The Court found no competent lawyer would put on evidence suggesting his own client deserved death partly because of his race, satisfying the first Strickland prong.
- On the second prong, the Court reasoned that because the jury's death-eligibility decision required a speculative prediction about future violence, and because the race-based testimony came from a court-appointed expert, it was reasonably likely that at least one juror was swayed by it, satisfying the prejudice requirement.
- Finally, applying the 'extraordinary circumstances' standard for reopening a final judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), the Court concluded that the demonstrated prejudice from race-based testimony, combined with Texas's admission of error in nearly identical cases, made the trial court's refusal to reopen the case an abuse of discretion.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Limits Coleman v. Thompson (501 U.S. 722)
Later decisions Martinez and Trevino modified Coleman's rule barring review of defaulted ineffective-assistance claims, opening a path for Buck's claim.