OCTOBER TERM 2015 · DECIDED JUNE 27, 2016 · 6–2

579 U. S. ___ · No. 14-10154 · Argued February 29, 2016

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Voisine v. United States

AffirmedFinal ruling
gun rightsdomestic violencecriminal lawSecond Amendmentfederal gun ban

Opinion of the Court by Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito

The Court ruled that people convicted of reckless (not just intentional) misdemeanor domestic assault can still be barred from owning guns under the federal domestic-violence gun ban.

The decision keeps the federal firearms ban broadly effective across the many states, including Maine, whose ordinary assault laws cover reckless conduct, closing off an argument that could have let a large share of domestic-violence offenders keep their guns.

How it got here: A federal district court rejected their argument and the First Circuit affirmed twice, including after a remand for reconsideration in light of an earlier related ruling.

The Case in Depth

What happened

Stephen Voisine and William Armstrong each pleaded guilty to misdemeanor domestic assault under Maine law, which covers conduct done "intentionally, knowingly or recklessly." Years later, each was found to possess firearms and was prosecuted under a federal law barring gun possession by people with domestic-violence misdemeanor convictions. Both argued their prior convictions might have rested only on reckless conduct, which they said should not count.

The question before the Court

Can a misdemeanor assault conviction based on reckless — rather than intentional or knowing — conduct still count as a "domestic violence" crime that strips someone of the right to own a gun?

The Court's answer

Yes — the Court ruled that a misdemeanor domestic assault conviction based on reckless conduct still counts as a disqualifying crime under the federal gun ban. The Court read the statute's phrase "use of physical force" to require only a voluntary act, not any particular level of intent about the harm that results, so recklessly causing injury still qualifies as "using" force.

The Court also pointed to history: most states already defined ordinary misdemeanor assault to include reckless conduct when Congress passed the ban in 1996, so excluding reckless convictions would have made the law ineffective across most of the country, including in Maine, where Voisine and Armstrong were convicted.

Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →

Why it matters

People convicted of misdemeanor domestic assault in the roughly 35 states whose assault laws include reckless conduct will continue to lose their right to own guns under federal law. Prosecutors and background-check systems can keep treating those convictions as disqualifying, without needing to prove the abuser acted knowingly or intentionally.

What changes now

This is a final merits decision affirming Voisine's and Armstrong's convictions for illegal gun possession. The ruling settles a circuit split, meaning reckless misdemeanor domestic-assault convictions will now trigger the federal firearms ban nationwide. No further proceedings are anticipated in this case, though the decision will guide how prosecutors and courts treat similar convictions going forward.

What this does not decide

The Court expressly said its ruling does not resolve whether a separate, similarly worded federal statute (18 U.S.C. §16) also covers reckless conduct, since that provision's context and purpose may differ. The decision also does not address the Second Amendment issue Justice Thomas raised, since the majority resolved the case purely on statutory grounds.

Concurrences and dissents

Dissent — Justice Thomas

Justice Thomas argued that 'use of physical force' has always meant an intentional act designed to cause harm, so purely reckless conduct — like texting while driving and causing an injury — should not count. He also warned that reading the law this broadly raises serious Second Amendment concerns, since it strips gun rights for life based on minor, non-violent reckless conduct. He would have reversed the convictions or sent the case back to determine whether Maine's law could be split into separate offenses.

How the Court got there

The legal reasoning, step by step

  1. The Court examined the ordinary meaning of the word "use" in the statutory phrase "use of physical force," concluding that it requires only a voluntary act of applying force, not a specific level of intent about the resulting harm.
  2. The Court distinguished reckless conduct — consciously disregarding a known risk of harm — from a true accident, reasoning that recklessness still reflects a deliberate decision to create danger and therefore counts as a deliberate use of force.
  3. The Court found that its earlier decision in Leocal v. Ashcroft, which excluded purely accidental conduct from a similar 'use of force' definition, did not require excluding reckless conduct too, since recklessness is not an accident.
  4. The Court looked to the historical backdrop against which Congress legislated, noting that a large majority of states already defined ordinary misdemeanor assault to include reckless conduct when Congress passed the gun-ban statute in 1996.
  5. The Court reasoned that reading the law to exclude reckless conduct would make the federal gun ban ineffective in the many states, including Maine, whose assault laws combine intentional, knowing, and reckless conduct into one single crime.
  6. Based on the statutory text and this historical context, the Court concluded that Congress meant to include reckless domestic assault convictions within the federal firearms ban.

Doctrinal impact

Laws and provisions at issue

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)

Federal law banning gun possession by people convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence crimes.

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)

Federal law defining what counts as a 'misdemeanor crime of domestic violence' for the gun ban.

Cases affected by this decision

Reaffirms United States v. Castleman (572 U. S. ___)

The Court builds on Castleman's holding that knowing or intentional domestic assault qualifies, extending the same logic to reckless assault.

Distinguishes Leocal v. Ashcroft (543 U. S. 1)

The Court said Leocal's exclusion of accidents from 'use of force' does not also exclude reckless conduct.

Supreme Court Opinion

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