Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez
The Court ruled that a company cannot moot a lawsuit simply by offering the plaintiff a settlement he refuses to accept — an unaccepted offer, the Court held, is a legal nullity that leaves the case exactly where it started.
The Court also rejected the company's claim that it inherited the Navy's immunity from suit merely because it was working under a government contract, holding that a contractor which violates both the law and its own government instructions gets no such shield.
How it got here: The trial court rejected Campbell's mootness argument but granted it summary judgment on immunity grounds; the Ninth Circuit reversed on immunity, and the Supreme Court took the case to resolve a circuit split.
The Case in Depth
What happened
The Navy hired advertising firm Campbell-Ewald to run a recruiting text-message campaign aimed at young adults who had agreed to receive such messages. A subcontractor sent the message to over 100,000 people, including Jose Gomez, who says he never consented and was outside the target age range. Gomez sued Campbell on behalf of a nationwide class, alleging the unsolicited text violated a federal law restricting automated telephone marketing.
The question before the Court
Could a marketing company end a customer's class-action lawsuit by offering to pay his individual claim in full before he sought class certification, and could it dodge liability by claiming it was just following the Navy's orders?
Why it matters
This closes off a common defense tactic in class-action litigation known as 'picking off' the lead plaintiff — companies can no longer try to short-circuit class claims by dangling an unaccepted payoff at the named plaintiff before certification. It also limits how far private contractors doing government work can hide behind the government's own immunity from lawsuits.
What changes now
The case goes back to the lower courts, where Gomez's individual and class claims can proceed since neither the settlement offer nor the immunity defense knocked the case out of court. The class-certification process, which had been on hold, can now move forward. The Court explicitly left open whether the outcome would differ if a company actually deposited full payment into an account and a court entered judgment for the plaintiff on that amount.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide what happens if a company actually pays the full amount owed — say, by depositing funds in an account payable to the plaintiff — rather than merely offering to pay. It expressly reserved that question for a future case where the facts actually present it.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas agreed the case wasn't moot but rejected the majority's contract-law reasoning. He would have looked instead to the historical common-law rules governing formal 'tenders' of payment, which required actually producing the money, not just offering it, and required no denial of liability — none of which the company did here.
Dissent — Justice Roberts
“The Court today takes that important responsibility away from the federal courts and hands it to the plaintiff.”Roberts's objection that the ruling lets plaintiffs, not courts, decide when a case is truly over.
Chief Justice Roberts argued the case was moot because the company had offered to fully satisfy Gomez's claim, leaving no real dispute for a court to resolve regardless of whether Gomez accepted. He read prior cases as holding that a defendant can unilaterally moot a claim by offering complete relief, with or without the plaintiff's agreement.
Dissent — Justice Alito
Justice Alito joined the Chief Justice's dissent but wrote separately to stress that mootness should depend on whether it is 'absolutely clear' the company would actually pay what it offered. He agreed the case was moot here because there was no real doubt Campbell could and would pay the modest sum involved.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court began with the constitutional requirement that a live dispute exist at every stage of a case, not just when it's filed — a case becomes 'moot' only when a court can no longer grant any real relief to either side.
- Applying ordinary contract principles, the Court reasoned that an offer to settle, once rejected, is a legal nullity with no continuing effect — just like any other rejected contract offer, it leaves the parties exactly as adverse as before.
- The Court found nothing in Rule 68 (the procedural rule governing formal settlement offers) suggesting that a rejected offer strips a court of the power to hear the case; the rule's only real consequence for a plaintiff who does no better at trial is paying certain costs.
- The Court distinguished older railroad tax cases the company relied on, explaining those cases involved an actual, unconditional deposit of the full amount owed under state law that extinguished the debt — not a mere unaccepted offer.
- Turning to the immunity question, the Court explained that federal contractors, unlike the government itself, get no absolute immunity; they are shielded only when they simply carried out valid government instructions.
- Because the summary-judgment record showed the Navy had authorized text messages only to people who had opted in, and the company may have sent messages beyond that authorization, the contractor could not claim the government's immunity.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Limits Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co. (309 U. S. 18)
Clarifies that contractors only get the government's immunity when they stick to validly authorized government instructions.
Distinguishes California v. San Pablo & Tulare R. Co. (149 U. S. 308)
Says that case involved an actual full payment extinguishing a debt, unlike a mere unaccepted settlement offer.