Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm'n
The Court upheld Arizona's independent redistricting commission, ruling that the Constitution's Elections Clause allows a state's voters — not just its elected legislature — to control how congressional districts are drawn.
The decision preserves a tool several states use to fight partisan gerrymandering, while four justices dissented, warning that the ruling rewrites the Constitution's text by treating 'the Legislature' as meaning 'the people.'
“The Elections Clause, however, is not reasonably read to disarm States from adopting modes of legislation that place the lead rein in the people’s hands.”
The majority's core reasoning for why voters can control redistricting through an initiative-created commission.
How it got here: A three-judge federal district court found the Legislature had standing to sue but ruled against it on the merits; the Legislature appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
The Case in Depth
What happened
In 2000, Arizona voters passed Proposition 106, amending the state constitution to strip the Arizona Legislature of redistricting power and give it instead to a new, independent commission (the AIRC). After the 2010 census, the AIRC adopted a congressional map. The Arizona Legislature sued, arguing that the Constitution requires "the Legislature" itself, not a commission created by voters, to draw congressional districts.
The question before the Court
Could Arizona voters strip the state legislature of its power to draw congressional districts and hand that job to an independent commission created by ballot initiative?
Why it matters
States that let voters make laws by ballot initiative can keep using independent commissions, not just elected lawmakers, to draw congressional lines. That matters directly for Arizona, California, and other states with similar commissions, and it protects a leading tool aimed at reducing self-interested map-drawing by incumbent politicians.
What changes now
This is a final merits decision, not a temporary order. The judgment of the district court is affirmed, so Arizona's independent commission keeps its authority to draw congressional districts going forward. The ruling also gives legal cover to similar commissions and initiative-based election laws in other states, though the four dissenting justices signaled they view the reasoning as vulnerable to future challenge.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether Arizona's commission is functioning free of partisan influence, or resolve broader disputes about how well the commission does its job — it addressed only whether the commission's existence is constitutional. It also did not decide the constitutionality of every state election law adopted by initiative, only that such laws are not automatically barred by the Elections Clause.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Roberts
Chief Justice Roberts argued that 'the Legislature' in the Elections Clause has always meant a state's elected representative body, not the people as a whole, pointing to seventeen other constitutional provisions using the term and to the Seventeenth Amendment's history. He would have held that voters can supplement the legislature's role in redistricting but cannot cut it out entirely, and separately argued the federal statute the majority relied on does not apply and would raise serious constitutional problems if it did.
Dissent — Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia argued the Court had no business deciding the case at all, contending that disputes between a government body and another part of the same government over their respective powers are not the kind of 'case' or 'controversy' federal courts have historically resolved. He also joined Chief Justice Roberts's reasoning on the merits, calling the majority's interpretation of 'Legislature' outrageously wrong.
Dissent — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas argued the majority's praise for direct democracy was inconsistent with the Court's past willingness to strike down other state ballot initiatives on other subjects. He agreed with Justice Scalia that the Arizona Legislature lacked standing to sue and would have dismissed the case on that basis rather than reach the merits.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court first asked whether the Legislature had suffered a real, concrete harm that federal courts could address — a threshold requirement called standing. It found that Arizona's constitution would completely block any competing redistricting plan the Legislature tried to pass, which was enough of an injury to let the case go forward.
- Turning to the merits, the Court reviewed its own precedents holding that redistricting is a lawmaking function that must follow whatever process a state has set up for making laws — including a voter referendum (Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, a 1916 case) or a governor's veto (Smiley v. Holm, a 1932 case).
- The Court then read a federal statute, 2 U.S.C. §2a(c), which lets a state's own redistricting procedure control unless the state hasn't 'redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof.' The Court found Congress deliberately swapped in that broad phrase in 1911 to respect however a state chooses to make its laws, including by initiative.
- Examining founding-era dictionaries and the history of the Elections Clause, the Court concluded the Clause's main purpose was to let Congress override bad state election rules, not to dictate which part of state government — legislature alone, or legislature plus the people — gets to write those rules in the first place.
- Because Arizona's constitution treats voter initiatives as equal in lawmaking power to the elected legislature, the Court concluded the people of Arizona could use that same lawmaking power to create the commission and take congressional redistricting out of the legislature's hands.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant (241 U.S. 565)
Relied on as establishing that a state referendum is part of the lawmaking process for redistricting.
Reaffirms Smiley v. Holm (285 U.S. 355)
Relied on as establishing that a governor's veto is part of a state's redistricting process.
Distinguishes Raines v. Byrd (521 U.S. 811)
Court found this case did not bar standing because the Legislature, unlike individual lawmakers there, sued as an institution.