OCTOBER TERM 2014 · DECIDED JUNE 22, 2015 · 5–4

576 U.S. ___ · No. 14-6368 · Argued April 27, 2015

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Kingsley v. Hendrickson

Vacated and remandedFinal ruling
excessive forcepretrial detentionjail conditionscivil rights lawsuitspolice and jail accountability

Opinion of the Court by Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan

The Supreme Court ruled that a pretrial detainee suing jail officers for excessive force only needs to show the force used against him was objectively unreasonable — not that the officers personally believed or realized they were using too much force.

The decision rejects a tougher standard some appeals courts had required, making it easier for people held in jail before trial (who haven't been convicted of any crime) to win excessive-force lawsuits against guards.

a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable
Justice Breyer

The Court's core holding on the legal standard for excessive-force claims by pretrial detainees.

How it got here: A federal jury ruled for the officers under a subjective-intent jury instruction; the Seventh Circuit affirmed; the Supreme Court took the case to resolve a circuit split over the correct legal standard.

The Case in Depth

What happened

Michael Kingsley was being held in a Wisconsin county jail awaiting trial when he refused to remove paper covering his cell's light fixture. Officers forcibly removed him, and during the encounter guards used a Taser on him. Kingsley sued two officers, Sergeant Stan Hendrickson and Deputy Sheriff Fritz Degner, claiming they used excessive force against him in violation of his constitutional rights.

The question before the Court

When a jail detainee who hasn't been convicted of anything sues guards for using too much force, does he have to prove the guards knew the force was excessive, or just that it actually was excessive?

The Court's answer

Neither — the Court chose a middle path. A pretrial detainee does not need to prove the officers subjectively believed or realized their force was excessive. He only needs to show the force was objectively unreasonable, judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene at the time, without 20/20 hindsight.

The Court reached this by treating pretrial detainees differently from convicted prisoners: because detainees haven't been convicted and can't be "punished" at all, the tougher malicious-and-sadistic standard used in prisoner cases doesn't apply to them. Applying this objective standard, the Court found the trial jury had been wrongly told to weigh the officers' subjective mindset, so the case goes back for further review of whether that error mattered.

Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →

Why it matters

People detained in jail awaiting trial — who are legally presumed innocent — will have an easier path to holding guards accountable for rough treatment, since they no longer must prove what was going on inside an officer's head. Jails and their lawyers will need to train and defend staff with this more lenient, plaintiff-friendly standard in mind.

What changes now

The case returns to the Seventh Circuit, which must decide whether the flawed jury instructions actually changed the trial's outcome or were harmless error. If the error was not harmless, Kingsley could get a new trial under the correct objective standard. The ruling is a final decision on the legal standard but leaves case-specific application to the lower courts.

What this does not decide

The Court did not decide whether pretrial detainees can instead bring these claims under the Fourth Amendment, did not resolve whether this objective standard should also apply to convicted prisoners' excessive-force claims, and left the harmless-error question for the Seventh Circuit to sort out on remand.

Concurrences and dissents

Dissent — Justice Scalia

Today's majority overlooks this in its tender-hearted desire to tortify the Fourteenth Amendment.Scalia's closing criticism that the majority is turning due process into ordinary tort law.

Justice Scalia argued that due process liability for pretrial detainees should turn on whether officers actually intended to punish the detainee, following Bell v. Wolfish, not on whether the force was merely objectively excessive. He reasoned that inferring punitive intent from a mismatch between force and need makes sense for deliberate jail policies but not for split-second use-of-force decisions, and he accused the majority of improperly expanding due process into general tort law.

Dissent — Justice Alito

Justice Alito would have dismissed the case entirely without deciding the standard, arguing the Court should first resolve whether pretrial detainees can bring excessive-force claims under the Fourth Amendment instead of the Due Process Clause, since that question could make the due process issue unnecessary.

How the Court got there

The legal reasoning, step by step

  1. The Court separated two different mental-state questions: whether the officers meant to do the physical acts they did, and whether that force, once done on purpose, counted as 'excessive.' Only the second question was in dispute, since the officers admitted they intentionally used the force at issue.
  2. Because negligent or accidental harm can never violate due process, the Court held that a detainee must still show the officers acted purposefully or knowingly (not accidentally) in applying force — but that requirement was already satisfied here.
  3. For deciding whether that intentional force crossed the line into being 'excessive,' the Court held the test is purely objective: whether a reasonable officer in the same situation, considering what was actually known at the time (not hindsight), would view the force as unreasonable.
  4. The Court found this objective approach consistent with its 1979 decision in Bell v. Wolfish, which allowed detainees to challenge jail conditions using objective evidence about whether a policy was reasonably related to a legitimate, non-punishing purpose, without requiring proof of what jail officials subjectively intended.
  5. The Court distinguished the tougher 'malicious and sadistic' standard used for convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment, reasoning that pretrial detainees—who haven't been convicted of anything—cannot be 'punished' at all, so a different, less prisoner-restrictive due process framework applies to them.
  6. Applying the objective test, the Court concluded the trial judge's instructions were flawed because they required the jury to find the officers 'recklessly disregarded' Kingsley's safety and rights, which improperly asked jurors to weigh the officers' subjective state of mind rather than judging the force by objective reasonableness alone.

Doctrinal impact

Laws and provisions at issue

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause

Constitutional provision barring the government from depriving people of liberty without fair process, applied here to jail force.

42 U.S.C. § 1983

Federal law letting people sue government officials for violating their constitutional rights.

Cases affected by this decision

Reaffirms Bell v. Wolfish (441 U.S. 520)

The Court relies on Bell's objective approach to conditions-of-confinement claims to support an objective excessive-force standard.

Supreme Court Opinion

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Kingsley v. Hendrickson | SCOTUS Reporter