Kerry v. Din
Headline: Court limits citizens’ procedural claims when a spouse’s visa is denied under the terrorism bar, allowing the Government to deny visas with a broad statutory explanation and sending the case back for further proceedings.
Holding: The Court held that denying a spouse a visa under the terrorism bar does not deprive the citizen spouse of life, liberty, or property, so no constitutional procedural notice is required.
- Lets government deny spousal visas under terrorism grounds with limited explanation.
- Limits courts from probing consular visa denials absent evidence of bad faith.
- Reaffirms statute’s exemption from ordinary notice for terrorism-related visa denials.
Summary
Background
Fauzia Din is a U.S. citizen who sought an immigrant visa for her husband, Kanishka Berashk, an Afghan who formerly worked for the Taliban government. A U.S. consular officer in Islamabad denied his visa and cited the immigration terrorism bar, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B), but offered no detailed explanation. Din sued, arguing the lack of explanation deprived her of a constitutional right to live in the United States with her spouse. The District Court dismissed her suit, the Ninth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court agreed to review the case.
Reasoning
The central question was whether the visa denial deprived Din of “life, liberty, or property” so that the Constitution required more procedural notice. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court said historical and legal tradition do not treat a consular visa denial as depriving the citizen spouse of such constitutional interests, so no constitutional process was owed. The Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision and remanded. Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, declined to decide whether a protected liberty interest exists but concluded that even assuming it did, the Government’s citation of the terrorism statute satisfied the limited review required by prior cases like Kleindienst v. Mandel.
Real world impact
The decision permits the Government to deny an alien spouse’s visa under the terrorism bar while giving only a statutory citation in some cases, and it limits courts’ ability to probe such denials absent a credible showing of bad faith. The statute itself exempts terrorism denials from the usual statutory notice requirement, and the Court sent the case back for further proceedings rather than resolving every factual or procedural question finally.
Dissents or concurrances
Justice Breyer dissented, arguing Din has a liberty interest in living with her spouse in the United States and that the Government’s vague explanation was constitutionally inadequate; Justice Kennedy’s concurrence argued the cited statutory ground was a facially legitimate and bona fide reason.
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