Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.
The Court ruled that a woman who wears a religious headscarf did not need to explicitly tell a retailer she needed a religious accommodation in order to sue for religious discrimination in hiring. It is enough to show that her employer's desire to avoid accommodating her religious practice was a motivating factor in the decision not to hire her.
The decision means job applicants don't have to spell out their need for a religious accommodation before an employer can be held liable for discriminating against them because of it, giving broader protection to religious applicants who may not realize their practice conflicts with a workplace rule.
“An employer may not make an applicant’s religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment decisions.”
The Court's core rule for when refusing to hire over a religious practice violates the law.
How it got here: A federal trial court ruled for the agency and awarded damages; the Tenth Circuit reversed and awarded the company summary judgment, prompting the Supreme Court to step in.
The Case in Depth
What happened
A retail store's assistant manager interviewed a practicing Muslim woman who wore a headscarf for religious reasons and rated her qualified for the job. Worried the headscarf conflicted with the company's "Look Policy" banning caps, the manager checked with a district manager, who directed that she not be hired. The federal agency that enforces workplace discrimination law sued on the woman's behalf.
The question before the Court
Could a clothing retailer be sued for refusing to hire a job applicant over her religious headscarf, even though she never explicitly asked for a religious accommodation?
The Court's answer
No — an applicant does not need to have explicitly told the employer she needed a religious accommodation. The Court ruled that Title VII's ban on refusing to hire someone "because of" religion is satisfied whenever the employer's desire to avoid accommodating a religious practice was a motivating factor in the decision, regardless of whether the employer had confirmed knowledge of that need.
The law's text imposes no knowledge requirement, unlike some other antidiscrimination statutes that explicitly require a "known" need for accommodation. So an employer who acts on a mere unsubstantiated suspicion that an applicant's practice is religious, and refuses to hire to avoid accommodating it, can still be liable — motive, not certainty, is what matters.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Employers can no longer assume they're safe from religious-discrimination liability just because an applicant never formally requested a religious accommodation. Companies with dress codes, grooming rules, or scheduling policies now have to think carefully about whether an applicant's religious practice — suspected or confirmed — is influencing a hiring decision, or risk a lawsuit.
What changes now
The case goes back to the Tenth Circuit for further proceedings consistent with the Court's ruling. Lower courts will need to apply the motivating-factor standard rather than a knowledge-based test, and the appeals court may address remaining questions, including whether the employer actually suspected the practice was religious and whether accommodating it would have caused undue hardship. This is a final decision on the legal standard, not merely a temporary order.
What this does not decide
The Court left open whether an employer must at least suspect that a practice is religious before liability can attach — the majority called this an unargued question it would not resolve by dictum. It also did not decide, on remand, whether the retailer actually knew or suspected the practice was religious or whether accommodating it would have caused undue hardship.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Alito
Justice Alito agreed the company should not have won summary judgment, but disagreed that the law imposes no knowledge requirement at all. He would hold that an employer cannot be liable unless it actually knew the practice was religious, arguing the majority's 'no-knowledge' theory would allow liability even against an employer with no idea the applicant held any religious belief. He also disputed the majority's suggestion that plaintiffs bear the burden of disproving an accommodation was possible, arguing the accommodation defense is the employer's burden to prove.
Dissent in part — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas agreed there are only two causes of action under the law, but argued that merely applying a neutral policy -- without treating religious and secular practices differently -- cannot count as intentional discrimination. He viewed the retailer's neutral dress-code policy as, at most, having a disparate impact rather than reflecting discriminatory intent, and would have affirmed the ruling for the retailer.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court read the antidiscrimination law's disparate-treatment provision as requiring proof that an employer failed to hire someone 'because of' a protected trait, including religious practice, and that under a companion provision this 'because of' standard is satisfied whenever the trait is a 'motivating factor' in the decision — a lower bar than requiring it to be the sole cause.
- The Court emphasized that the statute's text imposes no knowledge requirement, unlike some other antidiscrimination laws that explicitly require an employer's 'known' need for accommodation before liability attaches; motive and knowledge are separate concepts under this law.
- Applying that framework, the Court reasoned that an employer who acts to avoid accommodating a religious practice violates the law even if the employer had only an unsubstantiated suspicion, rather than actual knowledge, that an accommodation would be needed.
- The Court also rejected the retailer's argument that failure-to-accommodate claims must be brought only as disparate-impact claims (which challenge facially neutral policies without requiring proof of intent), because the statute's broad definition of 'religion' — covering all religious practice and belief — makes such claims a form of intentional discrimination.
- The Court concluded that the law gives religious practices favored treatment rather than mere neutral treatment, so an employer cannot defend a refusal to hire by pointing to an otherwise-neutral policy when that policy collided with a religious practice needing accommodation.