OCTOBER TERM 2014 · DECIDED MAY 26, 2015 · 9–0

575 U. S. ___ · No. 12-1497 · Argued January 13, 2015

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Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. United States Ex Rel. Carter

Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remandedFinal ruling
whistleblower lawsuitsgovernment contractor fraudFalse Claims Actwartime fraud lawmilitary contracting

Opinion of the Court by Justice Alito

The Court ruled that a World War-era law pausing legal deadlines during wartime applies only to criminal prosecutions, not to civil whistleblower lawsuits like this one against a defense contractor accused of overbilling the military in Iraq.

The Court also held that a separate rule barring duplicate whistleblower suits only keeps a new suit out of court while an earlier related suit is still undecided — once that earlier suit is dismissed, the door reopens, so the contractor's push to permanently block the case failed.

We hold that a qui tam suit under the FCA ceases to be “pending” once it is dismissed.
Justice Alito

The Court's holding that a dismissed earlier lawsuit no longer blocks a later related suit.

How it got here: A federal trial court dismissed the whistleblower's suit as untimely and barred by an earlier pending case; the Fourth Circuit reversed both rulings, and the contractor sought Supreme Court review.

The Case in Depth

What happened

A former employee of a defense contractor providing logistics in Iraq accused the company of billing the U.S. military for water purification services that were never performed or performed improperly. He filed several successive lawsuits under the False Claims Act's whistleblower provisions after earlier versions of his case were dismissed because other similar lawsuits were pending elsewhere.

The question before the Court

When a whistleblower sues a defense contractor for fraud, does a wartime law pause the clock on civil deadlines, and does an earlier related lawsuit block a new one forever once it's dismissed?

Why it matters

Whistleblowers who sue contractors for defrauding the government during wartime can't rely on the wartime tolling law to revive stale civil claims filed too many years after the fact. At the same time, contractors facing whistleblower suits can no longer treat an abandoned or dismissed earlier lawsuit as a permanent shield against a later, more diligent suit over the same alleged fraud.

What changes now

The case returns to the lower courts. The contractor's push to permanently dismiss the whistleblower's remaining claim failed, but most of his claims are still likely untimely because the wartime tolling law does not apply to civil suits. The lower courts must now sort out which, if any, of his claims survive under the ordinary six-year deadline and other arguments he has raised.

What this does not decide

The Court did not decide which version of the wartime law (the pre- or post-2008 text) would apply, or whether 'war' in the older version requires a formal declaration of war, since its ruling that the law covers only criminal charges made those questions unnecessary to resolve.

How the Court got there

The legal reasoning, step by step

  1. The Court examined the text and history of the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act (WSLA), a law that pauses deadlines for filing legal actions involving fraud against the government during wartime, to decide whether it covers civil lawsuits as well as criminal prosecutions.
  2. The Court found that the WSLA's key term, 'offense,' is ordinarily used to mean a crime, and that Congress placed the law inside Title 18 of the federal code, the title devoted to crimes and criminal procedure, reinforcing that reading.
  3. Tracing the law's history from 1921 through 1948, the Court concluded that Congress's 1944 removal of the phrase 'now indictable' was meant to make the law apply to future wars rather than only past ones, not to secretly expand its reach to civil lawsuits.
  4. Because any lingering ambiguity in a law suspending deadlines should be resolved narrowly, in favor of finality, the Court held the WSLA suspends deadlines only for criminal charges, not civil fraud suits like this one.
  5. Turning to the separate 'first-to-file' bar, which blocks a new whistleblower suit while a related suit is 'pending,' the Court applied the ordinary dictionary meaning of pending — undecided and awaiting resolution — rather than the contractor's proposed reading that the first-filed suit blocks later suits forever.
  6. Applying that ordinary meaning, the Court concluded that once the related earlier suits had been dismissed, they were no longer pending, so they could no longer block the whistleblower's most recent complaint from proceeding.

Doctrinal impact

Laws and provisions at issue

Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act (18 U.S.C. § 3287)

Federal law that pauses deadlines for prosecuting fraud against the government during wartime.

False Claims Act first-to-file bar (31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5))

Rule blocking a new whistleblower lawsuit while a related lawsuit is still pending.

False Claims Act statute of limitations (31 U.S.C. § 3731(b))

Sets deadlines, generally six years, for filing whistleblower fraud suits against the government.

Cases affected by this decision

Reaffirms Bridges v. United States (346 U. S. 209)

The Court relied on Bridges to confirm that the wartime tolling law must be read narrowly.

Supreme Court Opinion

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Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. United States Ex Rel. Carter | SCOTUS Reporter