OCTOBER TERM 2014 · DECIDED APRIL 29, 2015 · 9–0

575 U. S. ___ · No. 13-1019 · Argued January 13, 2015

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MacH Mining, LLC v. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n

Vacated and remandedFinal ruling
employment discriminationEEOCworkplace rightsagency oversightTitle VII

Opinion of the Court by Justice Kagan

The Court ruled that federal courts can review whether the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission genuinely tried to resolve a discrimination charge through informal settlement talks before filing a lawsuit against an employer.

But the Court said that review must stay narrow, checking only whether the agency gave the employer notice of the allegations and a chance to discuss fixing the problem — not second-guessing how the agency negotiated.

We hold that a court may review whether the EEOC satisfied its statutory obligation to attempt conciliation before filing suit.
Justice Kagan

The Court's central holding that EEOC conciliation efforts are subject to judicial review.

How it got here: A federal trial court said it could review the EEOC's conciliation efforts but let the EEOC immediately appeal; the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding conciliation was unreviewable.

The Case in Depth

What happened

The EEOC found reasonable cause to believe Mach Mining, a coal company, had refused to hire a woman and other female applicants because of their sex. Before suing, the agency sent two letters saying it would try, and later that it had tried and failed, to resolve the matter informally. Mach Mining argued the EEOC never conciliated in good faith.

The question before the Court

Can a court check whether the federal agency that enforces workplace discrimination law actually tried to settle a case before suing, and if so, how closely?

The Court's answer

Yes — courts can review whether the EEOC genuinely tried to resolve a discrimination charge informally before suing, but that review is narrow. A court only checks whether the agency told the employer what it was accused of and gave the employer a real chance to discuss fixing the problem; courts cannot second-guess the agency's negotiating tactics, offers, or timing.

A sworn statement from the EEOC describing these steps will normally be enough to prove compliance. Only if the employer produces concrete evidence contradicting that statement does a court need to hold a limited factual hearing, and even then the only available remedy is ordering the EEOC to go back and try conciliation properly — not dismissing the discrimination case outright.

Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →

Why it matters

Employers facing EEOC discrimination lawsuits now have a limited but real way to challenge the agency's pre-suit efforts, while the EEOC keeps broad freedom to decide how it negotiates and when to give up. A sworn statement from the agency will usually be enough proof, so most cases won't get bogged down litigating the conciliation process itself.

What changes now

The case goes back to the lower courts, which will apply the narrow review standard the Court laid out: the EEOC must show it gave Mach Mining notice of the specific allegations and a chance to discuss resolving them. If Mach Mining offers concrete evidence the EEOC skipped that step, a court will need to resolve that limited factual dispute before the discrimination lawsuit can proceed.

What this does not decide

The Court did not decide whether the EEOC actually conciliated in good faith with Mach Mining, and it did not adopt any detailed code of conduct for how the EEOC must negotiate. It only set the narrow legal standard courts should use, leaving the factual question for the lower courts.

How the Court got there

The legal reasoning, step by step

  1. The Court began with a strong presumption that Congress intends for courts to be able to review what federal agencies do, a presumption that can be overcome only when a law's wording or structure shows Congress wanted an agency to police itself.
  2. Because Title VII uses mandatory language requiring the EEOC to 'endeavor' to conciliate before suing, and makes that endeavor a legal precondition to filing a lawsuit, the Court treated it as the kind of enforceable prerequisite courts routinely check in other contexts, like requiring a timely charge or a right-to-sue letter.
  3. The Court rejected the government's claim that the law gave courts no workable yardstick, reasoning that the statutory words describing conciliation—communication about the specific alleged unlawful practice—supply a concrete, limited standard: did the agency tell the employer what it was accused of and give it a chance to talk it through.
  4. Turning to how strict that review should be, the Court rejected the EEOC's proposal to accept its own letters at face value, since that would let the agency's word substitute for actual proof of compliance.
  5. The Court also rejected the employer's proposal to borrow the labor-law 'good faith bargaining' standard, explaining that Title VII cares about stopping discrimination, not about policing a bargaining process, and that a deep dive into negotiating tactics would violate the law's promise that conciliation talks stay confidential.
  6. The Court settled on a narrow standard: the EEOC must show it told the employer the specific allegations and tried to give the employer a chance to fix the problem, which a sworn agency affidavit will usually satisfy unless the employer offers concrete contrary evidence.

Doctrinal impact

Laws and provisions at issue

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)

Requires the EEOC to try informal conciliation with an employer before suing over discrimination.

Supreme Court Opinion

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MacH Mining, LLC v. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n | SCOTUS Reporter