United States v. Kwai Fun Wong
The Court ruled that the two filing deadlines in the Federal Tort Claims Act — two years to file a claim with a federal agency, and six months to sue after the agency denies it — can be excused by a judge for a good reason, rather than being absolute cutoffs.
The decision means people who miss one of these deadlines because of circumstances beyond their control, such as court delay or government concealment of key facts, may still get their day in court, and it reinforces a broader rule limiting when Congress's silence on a deadline's nature will be read as stripping courts of power to hear a late claim.
“The time limits in the FTCA are just time limits, nothing more.”
The Court's summary conclusion that the FTCA deadlines are ordinary, tollable time limits.
How it got here: Trial courts dismissed both claims as untimely and jurisdictionally barred; the Ninth Circuit reversed both, and the government asked the Supreme Court to review.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Kwai Fun Wong sued the government over a five-day false imprisonment by immigration officials, but a court delay meant she filed her lawsuit three weeks after the six-month deadline. Marlene June sued over a highway death, alleging a defective median barrier, but presented her claim to a federal agency more than two years after the accident, having only recently learned the government allegedly hid key safety information.
The question before the Court
If someone misses one of the deadlines for suing the federal government over a personal injury, can a court still excuse the delay for a good reason?
The Court's answer
Yes — the Court ruled that both of the FTCA's filing deadlines can be excused by a judge when a claimant has a good reason for missing them, because Congress never clearly said these deadlines strip courts of the power to hear late claims. Applying its usual presumption for lawsuits against the government, the Court found the deadline provision only addresses when a claim becomes barred, not whether courts have authority to hear it, and its wording and placement in the law don't show Congress meant otherwise.
The Court rejected the government's two main arguments: that copying the Tucker Act's 'shall be forever barred' phrase made the deadline automatically jurisdictional, and that any deadline tied to the government's waiver of immunity from suit must be jurisdictional. Both arguments were foreclosed by earlier decisions. So courts may pause the clock on FTCA deadlines when fairness requires it.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
People suing the federal government for injuries — car accidents involving federal contractors, injuries caused by federal employees, and similar harms — often face confusing bureaucratic and litigation timelines. This ruling means judges can forgive a missed deadline when fairness requires it, so a paperwork delay or government concealment won't automatically end a case, though claimants must still show they diligently pursued their rights.
What changes now
The Ninth Circuit's rulings allowing both women's claims to proceed are affirmed, and the cases go back to the lower courts. In June's case specifically, the trial court must now decide, based on the facts, whether she actually qualifies for the delay to be excused because of the government's alleged concealment. This is a final merits ruling, not a temporary order.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether either claimant actually deserves to have her deadline excused — only that courts have the power to consider excusing it. In June's case, the lower court must still determine on the facts whether her delay is actually justified.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Alito
“For over 130 years, we have understood these terms as jurisdictional.”The dissent's core objection that longstanding precedent treats this exact statutory language as jurisdictional.
Justice Alito argued the FTCA deadlines are jurisdictional because Congress borrowed the exact 'shall be forever barred' language from the Tucker Act, which courts have treated as jurisdictional for over a century, and Congress is presumed to adopt the settled meaning of borrowed language. He also argued that even if not jurisdictional, the deadlines' absolute wording shows Congress meant to prohibit any equitable tolling, and would reverse.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court applied the framework from Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, which presumes that time limits on suits against the government can be paused for a good reason (equitable tolling), unless Congress clearly said otherwise.
- The Court explained that a deadline can only be treated as jurisdictional — meaning courts have no power at all to hear a late claim, no matter how good the excuse — if Congress gave a 'clear statement' that it intended that result; most deadlines, even strict-sounding ones, are not jurisdictional.
- Applying that rule, the Court found the FTCA deadline provision only talks about when a claim is barred, not about the power of courts to hear cases, and that its jurisdictional grant appears in a separate part of the law with no link back to the deadline provision.
- The Court rejected the government's argument that the phrase 'shall be forever barred' — also used in an older law called the Tucker Act, which was jurisdictional — automatically makes the FTCA deadline jurisdictional, noting that this phrase was common wording in many laws from that era and has been read as non-jurisdictional elsewhere.
- The Court also rejected the argument that any deadline attached to the government's waiver of its immunity from being sued must be jurisdictional, noting that Irwin already rejected that same argument for a different, similarly-worded law.
- Because Congress gave no clear signal that the FTCA's deadlines strip courts of power, the Court concluded the deadlines are ordinary filing deadlines that can be paused when fairness demands it.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs (498 U. S. 89)
The Court relies on Irwin's presumption that deadlines in suits against the government can usually be excused for good cause.
Distinguishes John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States (552 U. S. 130)
The Court says that case's jurisdictional ruling rested on decades of prior precedent specific to the Tucker Act, not on the wording itself.