OCTOBER TERM 2013 · DECIDED JUNE 30, 2014 · 5–4

573 U. S. ___ · No. 13-354 (with 13-356) · Argued March 25, 2014

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Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.

Affirmed in No. 13-354; reversed and remanded in No. 13-356Final ruling
contraceptive mandatereligious libertyAffordable Care Actcorporate rightsRFRA

Opinion of the Court by Justice Alito

The Court ruled that closely held, for-profit corporations owned by families with sincere religious objections to certain contraceptives cannot be forced by a federal regulation to cover those methods in their employees' health plans.

The 5-4 decision extended religious-liberty protections under a federal statute to corporations for the first time, reshaping how the government's healthcare mandate applies to employers with religious objections, while HHS was left to find another way to ensure coverage.

If these consequences do not amount to a substantial burden, it is hard to see what would.
Justice Alito

Explaining why the severe financial penalties for noncompliance counted as a substantial burden on religious exercise.

How it got here: Lower courts split: the Tenth Circuit sided with Hobby Lobby granting relief, while the Third Circuit rejected Conestoga's claim; the Supreme Court took both cases together to resolve the conflict.

The Case in Depth

What happened

The Green family, who own Hobby Lobby and Mardel, and the Hahn family, who own Conestoga Wood Specialties, are devout Christians who believe life begins at conception. They objected to a federal rule requiring their companies' health plans to cover four FDA-approved contraceptive methods they consider akin to abortion, and sued to block enforcement of that requirement against their businesses.

The question before the Court

Could the federal government require closely held, family-owned corporations with religious objections to cover certain contraceptives in their employee health plans?

The Court's answer

No — the Court ruled that the federal contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely held corporations like Hobby Lobby and Conestoga, violated a federal law called the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The Court held that RFRA's protections extend to closely held for-profit corporations because protecting a corporation's religious exercise really protects the people who own and run it.

The Court assumed the government had a compelling interest in ensuring women's access to contraception, but found the mandate was not the least restrictive way to achieve that interest. Because HHS had already created a workaround for religious nonprofits — letting insurers provide the coverage separately — the Court said a similar arrangement could apply to these companies without forcing them to violate their religious beliefs.

Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →

Why it matters

Employees of closely held companies whose owners object on religious grounds may not automatically get no-cost coverage for certain contraceptives directly from their employer's plan unless the government or insurers arrange an alternative. The ruling also opens the door for other closely held businesses to seek religious exemptions from federal mandates, raising questions about how far such exemptions can extend.

What changes now

The ruling is a final decision on the merits, though the Third Circuit case involving Conestoga was sent back for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. HHS had to develop or extend an accommodation—similar to the one already used for religious nonprofits—to cover employees of objecting closely held companies without forcing the companies to pay for the contraceptives directly. Litigation over the adequacy of that accommodation continued in later cases.

What this does not decide

The Court stressed its holding is narrow: it does not decide whether other insurance mandates, like those for vaccinations or blood transfusions, must yield to religious objections, does not address publicly traded corporations, and does not shield employers who might cloak illegal discrimination as religious practice.

Concurrences and dissents

Concurrence — Justice Kennedy

Justice Kennedy joined the majority in full but wrote separately to emphasize that the decision is narrow. He stressed that the case turns on the availability of an existing, workable accommodation—already used for religious nonprofits—that lets the government achieve its aim without forcing employers to violate their faith, so RFRA does not require creating an entirely new government program.

Dissent — Justice Ginsburg

In a decision of startling breadth, the Court holds that commercial enterprises, including corporations, along with partnerships and sole proprietorships, can opt out of any law (saving only tax laws) they judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious beliefs.Ginsburg's central objection that the ruling opens the door to broad religion-based opt-outs from federal law.

Justice Ginsburg argued that for-profit corporations cannot exercise religion under RFRA, that the mandate's burden on the companies is too indirect to count as 'substantial' since employees independently decide whether to use contraception, and that granting this exemption lets employers impose their religious beliefs on employees who do not share them. She would have upheld the mandate.

Dissent — Justice Breyer

Justices Breyer and Kagan agreed the contraceptive mandate survives scrutiny under RFRA and would have ruled against the companies, but they declined to decide the threshold question of whether for-profit corporations or their owners may bring RFRA claims at all, finding it unnecessary to resolve that issue to reach their result.

How the Court got there

The legal reasoning, step by step

  1. The Court first asked whether a federal law called the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which bars the government from substantially burdening a person's religious exercise without a compelling reason and the least restrictive method, even applies to for-profit corporations. Relying on the Dictionary Act's broad definition of 'person,' and noting the government already conceded nonprofit corporations qualify, the Court found no principled way to include nonprofits but exclude for-profit corporations like Hobby Lobby.
  2. The Court reasoned that protecting a corporation's religious exercise really protects the human owners who run it, so closely held companies controlled by a single family can assert RFRA claims on behalf of those owners.
  3. Turning to whether the mandate imposed a 'substantial burden,' the Court pointed to the severe financial penalties the companies faced—tens of millions of dollars a year—for refusing to comply, concluding this plainly qualified as a substantial burden on the owners' religious exercise.
  4. The Court assumed, without deciding, that the government had a compelling interest in ensuring cost-free access to contraception, then asked whether the mandate was the 'least restrictive means' of achieving that interest—the most stringent test under RFRA.
  5. Because HHS had already built a workaround for religious nonprofit organizations, letting insurers provide contraceptive coverage separately without the employer's involvement, the Court concluded that extending this same accommodation to closely held for-profit companies would serve the government's goal without forcing the owners to violate their faith.
  6. The Court distinguished United States v. Lee, a prior tax case upholding Social Security taxes despite a religious objection, explaining that case turned on the unique need for a uniform national tax system with no workable alternative—unlike here, where an alternative already existed.

Doctrinal impact

Laws and provisions at issue

Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)

Federal law barring the government from substantially burdening religious exercise without a compelling reason and least restrictive means.

Affordable Care Act § 300gg-13(a)(4)

Requires employer health plans to cover women's preventive care, including contraception, without cost sharing.

Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1

General federal law defining 'person' to include corporations unless context indicates otherwise.

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)

Amended RFRA's definition of 'exercise of religion' to be broader and untethered from First Amendment case law.

Cases affected by this decision

Reaffirms City of Boerne v. Flores (521 U. S. 507)

The Court relied on City of Boerne's description of RFRA's least-restrictive-means test as exceptionally demanding.

Distinguishes United States v. Lee (455 U. S. 252)

The Court said Lee's tax ruling doesn't control here because a less restrictive alternative exists for the contraceptive mandate.

Supreme Court Opinion

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