OCTOBER TERM 2013 · DECIDED JUNE 19, 2014 · 9–0

573 U. S. ___ · No. 13-298 · Argued March 31, 2014

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Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l

AffirmedFinal ruling
software patentspatent lawtechnology lawbusiness method patentsintellectual property

Opinion of the Court by Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Alito

The Court ruled that a company could not patent its computer-based method for helping two parties safely settle financial trades, because the underlying idea — using a neutral middleman to make sure both sides pay up — is an abstract idea that merely running it on an ordinary computer cannot make patentable.

The decision applies the Court's two-step framework for weeding out patents on abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomena, and it has broad consequences for the software industry: many patents that simply dress up everyday business methods in computer language are now vulnerable to being struck down.

Stating an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same deficient result.
Justice Thomas

The Court's core reasoning for why adding a generic computer does not make an abstract idea patentable.

How it got here: A federal trial court ruled Alice's patents invalid as abstract ideas; the full Federal Circuit affirmed in a fractured en banc decision, and Alice sought Supreme Court review.

The Case in Depth

What happened

Alice Corporation owned patents covering a computerized system that used a third-party intermediary to reduce the risk that one side of a financial trade would fail to pay. CLS Bank, which runs a global currency-trading network, sued for a court ruling that Alice's patents were invalid or not infringed, and Alice countersued claiming CLS Bank infringed its patents.

The question before the Court

Could a company patent a computer-run method for reducing the risk that one side of a financial trade won't pay up, just by having a generic computer carry it out?

Why it matters

Businesses and inventors that hold or want software patents now face a tougher test: describing an old business or organizational idea and adding 'on a computer' is not enough to get or keep a patent. This makes it easier to challenge broad software patents in court, which affects tech companies, patent licensors, and startups facing infringement lawsuits.

What changes now

This is a final merits ruling, not a remand for further factfinding on the abstract-idea question. It leaves the Federal Circuit's finding that all of Alice's patent claims are invalid in place. The decision immediately became a widely cited test for lower courts and the Patent Office in deciding whether other software-related patents claim abstract ideas dressed up in computer language.

What this does not decide

The Court did not attempt to define the exact boundaries of what counts as an 'abstract idea,' saying it was enough to note this case was not meaningfully different from its earlier risk-hedging case. It also did not hold that all software or computer-implemented inventions are unpatentable — only that generic computer implementation of an abstract idea is not enough.

Concurrences and dissents

Concurrence — Justice Sotomayor

Justice Sotomayor joined the Court's opinion in full but wrote separately to reiterate her longstanding view, first expressed in Bilski, that a claim describing nothing more than a method of doing business is not eligible for a patent at all, regardless of the two-step abstract-idea analysis. She agreed the method claims here were also drawn to an abstract idea.

How the Court got there

The legal reasoning, step by step

  1. The Court applied the two-step framework from its earlier Mayo decision (the 2012 case setting out how to screen patents for abstract ideas, laws of nature, or natural phenomena): first ask whether the patent claims target one of those ineligible concepts, then ask whether anything else in the claims turns that concept into a genuine invention.
  2. At step one, the Court found the patents were aimed at the abstract idea of 'intermediated settlement' — using a neutral go-between to make sure both sides of a trade can pay — reasoning that this is a basic, long-used way of doing business, much like the risk-hedging idea the Court had already labeled abstract in its earlier Bilski decision.
  3. At step two, the Court looked for an 'inventive concept' — something added to the abstract idea that amounts to significantly more than the idea itself — and found none, because the patents just called for a generic computer to keep records, get data, adjust balances, and send instructions, all functions computers already routinely perform.
  4. The Court explained that stating an abstract idea and simply adding 'apply it with a computer' does not supply that missing ingredient, since it does not improve how the computer works or improve any other technology.
  5. Applying the same reasoning to the patents' computer-system and software-medium claims, the Court found they merely restated the same abstract idea using generic computer hardware, so allowing them to stand would let clever drafting alone decide what counts as patentable.

Doctrinal impact

Laws and provisions at issue

35 U.S.C. § 101

Federal patent law provision defining what kinds of inventions can be patented.

Cases affected by this decision

Reaffirms Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. (566 U. S. ___)

The Court applies and extends Mayo's two-step framework for screening patents on abstract ideas to computer-implemented business methods.

Reaffirms Bilski v. Kappos (561 U. S. 593)

The Court treats Bilski's finding that risk hedging is an unpatentable abstract idea as controlling here.

Distinguishes Diamond v. Diehr (450 U. S. 175)

The Court says Diehr's rubber-curing patent was eligible because it improved a technological process, unlike Alice's claims.

Supreme Court Opinion

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