Robers v. United States

2014-05-05
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Headline: Court affirms that restitution is cut by money lenders actually get from selling collateral, not by the collateral’s value when lenders took title, affecting fraud defendants and bank recoveries.

Holding: The Court held that the phrase “any part of the property … returned” means the money the victim lost, so restitution is reduced by proceeds from selling collateral, not by the collateral’s value when the victim took title.

Real World Impact:
  • Reduces restitution by money received from sale of collateral, not collateral’s value at transfer.
  • Defendants may owe more if collateral falls in value before sale.
  • Courts can delay restitution or credit collateral under other statutory provisions.
Topics: fraud and restitution, mortgage collateral, sentencing calculations, victim compensation

Summary

Background

Benjamin Robers, acting as a straw buyer, submitted fraudulent mortgage applications to two banks. The banks lent about $470,000, took mortgages, foreclosed when Robers defaulted, and took title in 2006. They later sold one house for about $120,000 (2007) and the other for about $160,000 (2008) during a falling market. Robers was convicted in 2010 and the sentencing court ordered about $220,000 in restitution.

Reasoning

The Court addressed whether a victim “returned” part of the property when a lender took title to collateral. It held that the phrase refers to the money the victim lost, so a part of the property is “returned” only when the collateral is sold and the victim actually receives money. The Court relied on the statute’s repeated use of “the property,” the fungibility of money, and administrative ease of valuing money. The Court rejected arguments based on state mortgage law, proximate-cause concerns about market swings, and the rule of lenity, and noted other statutory provisions let courts postpone or credit restitution to avoid unfair windfalls.

Real world impact

Sentencing courts must reduce restitution by the proceeds victims actually receive from selling collateral, not by the collateral’s value when title transferred. The ruling affirms the Seventh Circuit’s calculation and resolves differing approaches in the courts of appeals. The decision affects fraud defendants, lenders recovering loans, and how courts may postpone or structure restitution orders.

Dissents or concurrances

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, emphasized that if a victim intentionally holds collateral rather than selling it, the victim bears later declines in value and the defendant is not responsible; a defendant may try to show an unreasonable delay in sale to break the causal chain.

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