Schuette v. BAMN
The Court upheld a Michigan constitutional amendment, approved by voters, that bars public universities from considering race in admissions decisions. A plurality found nothing in the Constitution or the Court's precedents that stops voters themselves from deciding to end race-based preferences in university admissions.
The ruling rejected a lower court's view that a 1982 busing case required special judicial protection whenever voters change decision-making authority on a racial matter, and instead treated the case as one about who gets to decide the affirmative-action debate -- the courts or the voters -- rather than about the underlying wisdom of the policy itself.
“This case is not about the constitutionality, or the merits, of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education.”
Kennedy frames the case as being about who decides the affirmative-action debate, not the policy's merits.
How it got here: A federal trial court upheld the amendment; the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed, and Michigan's Attorney General sought Supreme Court review.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Michigan's public university admissions programs once allowed race to be considered as one factor among many. After the Supreme Court's 2003 rulings on University of Michigan admissions, Michigan voters passed Proposal 2 in 2006, amending the state constitution to bar public universities from granting preferences based on race, sex, or similar categories. A coalition of students, faculty, and civil-rights groups sued to block the amendment as it applied to admissions.
The question before the Court
Could Michigan voters amend their state constitution to ban public universities from using race as a factor in admissions?
Why it matters
The decision lets Michigan and other states keep bans on race-conscious admissions in place through the ballot box rather than the courts, reshaping how advocates on both sides of the affirmative-action debate must pursue their goals -- through voter campaigns and elected boards rather than lawsuits grounded in a political-process theory.
What changes now
The ruling is a final decision on the merits, reversing the Sixth Circuit and leaving Michigan's admissions ban in place. Similar bans in other states, including California's, remain undisturbed. Colleges and universities in states with such bans must continue pursuing race-neutral alternatives, and the broader legal and political debate over race-conscious admissions continues through elections and ballot initiatives rather than further litigation over this particular amendment.
What this does not decide
The plurality stressed this case is not about whether race-conscious admissions policies are themselves constitutional or wise -- that question was addressed elsewhere, including in Grutter v. Bollinger. The decision only concerns whether voters may choose, through the political process, to prohibit such policies; it leaves the underlying debate over the merits of affirmative action to voters and future cases.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Roberts
Chief Justice Roberts wrote separately to respond directly to the dissent, arguing that disagreeing with race-conscious admissions policies is not the same as refusing to take race seriously or as denying the reality of racial slights and stereotypes. He suggested that people can reach different conclusions about racial preferences in good faith.
Concurrence — Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, agreed the amendment should stand but argued the Court should go further and overrule the political-process doctrine from Hunter and Seattle entirely, calling it unworkable and inconsistent with equal-protection law. He argued the only relevant question is whether a law reflects discriminatory purpose, and a law requiring equal treatment cannot violate equal protection.
Concurrence — Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer agreed the amendment was constitutional but reasoned that Hunter and Seattle simply did not apply here, because this case involved moving decision-making from unelected administrators to voters rather than shifting power between elected political levels, which he saw as a meaningfully different situation.
Dissent — Justice Sotomayor
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, argued the plurality wrongly discarded the political-process doctrine, which she said protects minorities from having the rules of political engagement rigged against them after they've achieved success. She contended Michigan's amendment did exactly that by singling out race-conscious admissions policies for a uniquely burdensome path to change, and would have affirmed the Sixth Circuit.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The plurality traced the origins of the 'political-process doctrine' through Reitman v. Mulkey and Hunter v. Erickson, cases where voters restructured government decision-making in ways that inflicted a specific, demonstrated injury on racial minorities, such as blocking fair-housing protections.
- It reviewed Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, where the Court struck down a voter initiative that ended school busing, reasoning that Seattle was best understood as a case involving that same kind of specific racial injury, not as announcing a freestanding rule about moving decision-making authority to a different level of government.
- The plurality concluded that Seattle's broader language -- asking courts to decide which policies serve a racially defined group's 'interest' -- went beyond what was needed to decide that case and would require judges to sort citizens into racial categories and guess at their political interests, raising its own equal-protection problems.
- Applying that narrower reading, the plurality found no comparable specific injury here: Michigan's amendment did not target or disadvantage minorities the way the housing and busing measures had, but instead let voters decide, through ordinary democratic processes, whether to continue race-based admissions preferences.
- Because voters retain the general authority to set policy through constitutional amendment and no specific racial injury was shown, the plurality held that courts have no basis in the Constitution or precedent to set aside Michigan's amendment.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Limits Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 (458 U. S. 457)
The plurality narrowed Seattle to cases involving a specific, demonstrated racial injury, rejecting its broader political-process rationale.
Distinguishes Hunter v. Erickson (393 U. S. 385)
The Court said Hunter involved a real, targeted injury to minorities that is not present in Michigan's admissions amendment.