Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States
The Supreme Court ruled that a railroad's right of way across a Wyoming family's land was only an easement, so when the railroad abandoned the tracks, the land became fully the family's, free of any government claim.
The decision rejected the government's argument that it kept an automatic right to reclaim thousands of miles of old railroad corridors nationwide, a position the government itself had argued against decades earlier and won on.
“The Government loses that argument today, in large part because it won when it argued the opposite before this Court more than 70 years ago”
Explaining why the government's current position contradicts its own winning argument decades earlier.
How it got here: A federal trial court granted summary judgment for the government and quieted title in its favor; the Tenth Circuit affirmed; the Brandts asked the Supreme Court to review.
The Case in Depth
What happened
In 1976 the federal government gave the Brandt family full ownership of an 83-acre Wyoming parcel, subject to a railroad's existing right of way that had crossed the land since 1908. Decades later the railroad tore up its tracks and abandoned the corridor. The government then sued to declare the right of way abandoned and claim the strip of land for itself, rather than let it pass to the Brandts.
The question before the Court
When a railroad abandons a right of way it got from the government back in 1908 under an 1875 law, does the strip of land go back to the government, or to the family that now owns the land underneath it?
The Court's answer
The land goes to the family. The Court held that an 1875-Act railroad right of way is a simple easement — a limited right to use the land, not ownership of it — so when the railroad stopped using and abandoned the corridor, the easement simply disappeared and the underlying landowner's title became unburdened, just as with any other easement under ordinary property law.
The Court reached this result largely because the government itself had convinced the Court, more than seventy years earlier in a different case, that the 1875 Act granted only an easement and nothing more. Having won that argument once, the government could not now claim the opposite — that it secretly kept a reversionary interest — simply because the outcome now favored the government instead of the railroad.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Landowners across the country whose property sits under old, abandoned 1875-Act railroad corridors gain clear title to those strips rather than having to fight the government for them. The ruling also complicates federal efforts to convert former rail corridors into public recreational trails, since the government may no longer control land it thought it still owned.
What changes now
This is a final merits decision resolving the property-law question, though the case is sent back to the lower court for proceedings consistent with the ruling. The Brandt family's separate compensation claim, which had been stayed in the Court of Federal Claims pending this decision, can now proceed. The decision governs other pending disputes over abandoned 1875-Act rights of way nationwide, including trail-conversion litigation the dissent warned about.
What this does not decide
The ruling addresses only rights of way granted under the specific 1875 Act, not rights of way created under earlier pre-1871 statutes (which the Court has held conveyed more than an easement) or under later statutes like the 1988 National Trails System Improvements Act, which the Court noted took a different approach going forward.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Sotomayor
“By changing course today, the Court undermines the legality of thousands of miles of former rights of way that the public now enjoys as means of transportation and recreation.”Warning about the practical fallout for converted rail-trail corridors nationwide.
Justice Sotomayor argued the majority misread Great Northern, which she said only held that an 1875-Act right of way didn't include underground mineral rights, not that it wasn't a defeasible fee with an implied reversionary interest as earlier cases (Townsend and Stringham) had held. She argued railroad rights of way are sui generis property interests not governed by ordinary common-law easement rules, and warned the ruling could undermine thousands of miles of former rail corridors now used as public trails, potentially costing taxpayers heavily in resulting litigation.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court first asked what kind of legal interest the 1875 Act gave to railroads when it granted them rights of way — full ownership (a fee), or merely a right to use the land (an easement) — because that answer decides what happens when the right is abandoned.
- The Court relied heavily on its own earlier decision, Great Northern Railway Co. v. United States (1942), in which the government had argued and won on the position that the 1875 Act 'clearly grants only an easement, and not a fee,' distinguishing it from earlier, pre-1871 laws that did convey more than an easement.
- Under ordinary property law, an easement is a nonpossessory right to use someone else's land, and it is a well-settled principle that when the easement's holder abandons its use, the easement simply disappears, leaving the underlying landowner with full, unencumbered title.
- The Court rejected the government's newer argument that Great Northern's 'easement' label should be confined to disputes over underground minerals, finding nothing in the statute's text supporting that narrower reading and finding the government's position squarely at odds with its own prior argument.
- The Court also found that later statutes concerning forfeited or abandoned rights of way did not create or preserve any government interest in 1875 Act rights of way; those statutes only govern how existing government interests, where they exist, are distributed, and cannot retroactively grant the government something it had never received.
- Applying the easement rule to this right of way, the Court concluded that once the railroad tore up its tracks and abandoned the corridor, the easement across the family's land ceased to exist and their title became free of it.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Great Northern Railway Co. v. United States (315 U.S. 262)
The Court leaned on this 1942 case's holding that 1875 Act rights of way are mere easements, not fees.
Distinguishes Rio Grande Western R. Co. v. Stringham (239 U.S. 44)
The Court said this case's 'limited fee' language about 1875 Act rights of way was already rejected by Great Northern.
Distinguishes Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Townsend (190 U.S. 267)
The Court said this case, about pre-1871 land grants, does not control the different 1875 Act at issue here.