Perdue v. Kenny A. Ex Rel. Winn
The Supreme Court ruled that federal civil-rights attorney's fees, normally calculated by multiplying hours worked by a reasonable hourly rate, can occasionally be increased for outstanding performance, but only in rare and exceptional circumstances backed by specific proof.
Because the trial judge here raised a Georgia foster-care case's fee award by 75% without clearly explaining why, the Court sent the case back for a properly justified calculation, tightening the rules future judges must follow before adding any bonus to a fee award.
“[A] reasonable attorney’s fee is one that is adequate to attract competent counsel, but that does not produce windfalls to attorneys”
The Court's core principle for what a reasonable civil-rights attorney's fee should look like.
How it got here: A federal trial court awarded a fee including a 75% enhancement; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed based on circuit precedent; the state officials asked the Supreme Court to review the enhancement.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Children in Georgia's foster-care system and their advocates sued state officials, alleging the foster-care system in counties near Atlanta violated their constitutional and legal rights. The case ended in a consent decree requiring reforms, leaving only the question of how much the plaintiffs' attorneys should be paid in fees under a federal civil-rights fee-shifting law after their years of work on the case.
The question before the Court
Can a court boost a civil rights lawyer's fee award above the standard hours-times-rate calculation just because the lawyers did an outstanding job and got great results?
Why it matters
The ruling limits how much extra money civil-rights lawyers can collect on top of their normal hourly-rate fee, which in cases like this one is ultimately paid by state and local taxpayers. Governments facing civil-rights lawsuits gain more predictability about their potential fee exposure, while lawyers face a higher bar to win any bonus above the standard calculation.
What changes now
The case returns to the trial court, which may try again to justify an enhanced fee if it can point to specific, objective evidence tying any bonus to one of the narrow categories the Court identified, rather than general impressions about the lawyers' skill. This is a final ruling on the legal standard for fee enhancements, though the exact dollar amount of fees in this case remains unresolved pending further proceedings.
What this does not decide
The Court did not rule that all fee enhancements are barred, nor did it decide what the correct fee amount should be in this case. It left open the possibility that the trial court could justify a bonus on remand if supported by specific, objective evidence fitting one of the narrow categories described.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy joined the majority in full but added that lawyers and judges naturally tend to see their own cases as extraordinary because they are immersed in them. He cautioned that despite this natural tendency, truly extraordinary cases warranting a fee enhancement are presented only in the rarest circumstances.
Concurrence — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas agreed with the Court's approach and outcome, tracing how the Court's fee-enhancement cases have moved along what he called a 'decisional arc' bending against enhancements. He emphasized that the lodestar calculation will almost always already capture everything relevant about an attorney's performance, so enhancements should be nearly unavailable.
Dissent — Justice Breyer
“If this is not an exceptional case, what is?”Breyer's rhetorical challenge defending the trial judge's fee enhancement as justified.
Justice Breyer agreed that fee enhancements are sometimes permitted, but objected that the majority went beyond the question the Court agreed to decide by also evaluating whether this specific case qualified for one. He argued the trial judge, who personally observed eight years of litigation and an extraordinary settlement benefiting thousands of foster children, did not abuse his discretion in awarding the enhancement, and would have affirmed the lower courts.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court explained that the standard method for figuring a reasonable attorney's fee — called the lodestar, meaning hours worked multiplied by a market hourly rate — carries a strong presumption that it already produces a reasonable fee, so departures from it require a strong justification.
- Because most performance-related factors, like skill and case difficulty, are already supposed to be reflected in the hourly rate or the number of hours billed, the Court held that using those same factors again to add a bonus on top of the lodestar would amount to double-counting.
- The Court identified only a few narrow situations where a bonus might be justified: when the hourly rate itself fails to capture an attorney's true market value, when there are extraordinary out-of-pocket expenses over an unusually long case, or when there is exceptional delay in getting paid — and in each situation the party seeking the bonus must provide specific, objective evidence, not just impressions.
- Applying that framework to the trial judge's 75% increase, the Court found the judge never explained why 75% was the right number instead of some other percentage, never tied the bonus to concrete proof about the attorney's market rate, and improperly relied on the fact that the lawyers' fee depended on winning the case — a factor the Court's prior decisions had already ruled out.
- Because the trial judge's enhancement rested on general praise for the lawyers rather than a reviewable, evidence-based calculation, the Court concluded the increase could not stand as awarded.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Burlington v. Dague (505 U. S. 557)
The Court relied on Dague's rule that a lawyer's fee cannot be increased just because payment depended on winning.
Reaffirms Blum v. Stenson (465 U. S. 886)
The Court leaned on Blum's holding that attorney skill is normally already reflected in the hourly rate, not a separate bonus.
Reaffirms Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air (478 U. S. 546)
The Court reaffirmed this case's rule that fee-shifting laws aim to attract competent lawyers, not enrich them.