Ware v. Hylton
The Supreme Court ruled that a Revolutionary War-era Virginia law letting debtors pay off debts owed to British creditors through a state loan office could not shield those debtors once the 1783 peace treaty with Britain took effect.
The decision established that the peace treaty, and later the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, overrode any conflicting state law, meaning the debtor had to pay the British creditor again despite having already paid Virginia.
How it got here: The Circuit Court for the District of Virginia sustained a demurrer favoring the debtor based on the Virginia law defense, and the British creditor brought a writ of error to the Supreme Court.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Before the Revolutionary War, Virginia debtors Hylton and Eppes owed a debt on a bond to British merchants Farrell and Jones. During the war, Virginia's 1777 law let citizens discharge debts owed to British subjects by paying money into a state loan office instead of the creditor. Hylton paid part of the debt this way in 1780. After the war ended, the British creditors sued to recover the full debt, arguing the 1783 peace treaty entitled them to be paid regardless of the wartime payment.
The question before the Court
Could a Virginia law letting Revolutionary War debtors pay off British debts through a state loan office still block a British merchant from collecting the money after the 1783 peace treaty with Britain took effect?
The Court's answer
No — Virginia's 1777 law and the debtor's payment into the state loan office could not shield the debtor from paying the British creditor again, because the 1783 peace treaty guaranteed that creditors "on either side" would meet "no lawful impediment" to recovering pre-war debts in full. Several justices agreed Virginia, as a sovereign state, had the power to redirect wartime debts owed to enemy subjects, and that the loan-office law had validly discharged debtors like Hylton at the time.
But once the peace treaty took effect, and especially once the Constitution made treaties the supreme law of the land, that earlier discharge no longer counted as a valid defense. Justice Iredell disagreed about exactly when the treaty's force kicked in, but the Court as a whole ruled the debt had to be paid in full, this time to the original British creditor.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
The ruling meant Americans who had paid wartime debts into state treasuries under laws like Virginia's could be forced to pay their British creditors again, exposing them to double liability with only an uncertain claim against the state for reimbursement. It also cemented the principle that federal treaties override conflicting state laws, a rule that has shaped American federalism ever since.
What changes now
The Supreme Court's ruling resolved the legal question and reversed the Circuit Court, ordering judgment for the British creditor. The case was sent back to the Circuit Court of Virginia for a jury inquiry to determine the exact amount still owed, since only part of the underlying debt had previously been quantified. The decision does not itself order Virginia to reimburse affected debtors, leaving that question open for later proceedings or legislative action.
What this does not decide
The decision does not resolve whether Virginia itself owed compensation to debtors like Hylton for money the state had already collected and kept. Several justices suggested the state was obligated in fairness to indemnify such debtors, but that question was left for another forum, not decided by this judgment.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Paterson
Justice Paterson avoided deciding whether Virginia had authority under the law of nations to confiscate British debts, finding it unnecessary. He focused solely on the treaty's plain language, concluding that its sweeping terms covering 'creditors on either side' and 'no lawful impediment' repealed the Virginia act and nullified the payment made under it, entitling the British creditor to recover in full.
Concurrence — Justice Wilson
Justice Wilson gave a brief, concise opinion agreeing Virginia retained sovereign power to pass the sequestration law, but held that even if valid, the peace treaty's broad language extending to debts 'heretofore contracted' annulled the confiscation and the discharge regardless, requiring reversal.
Concurrence — Justice Cushing
Justice Cushing agreed the Virginia act created only a conditional, non-confiscatory discharge, but concluded the treaty's supremacy as the law of the land nullified that discharge from its inception, obligating the original debtor to pay the British creditor while suggesting Virginia was in turn bound to indemnify the debtor.
Dissent in part — Justice Iredell
Justice Iredell, who had decided this case below and therefore did not formally vote per the Court's recusal practice, read his earlier Circuit Court reasoning for the record. He concluded the debtor's payment into the loan office had fully and validly discharged the debt at the time it was made, and that the treaty alone, absent a repeal of the state law by Virginia, could not retroactively revive the creditor's claim before the Constitution made treaties supreme law.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court first asked whether Virginia, as a sovereign state before the Constitution existed, had the power to confiscate or redirect debts owed by its citizens to British subjects during the war; most justices concluded Virginia held this power as an independent sovereign, since Congress lacked exclusive authority over such matters before the Articles of Confederation.
- The Court then examined the 1777 Virginia law itself, finding that it let debtors pay their debts into a state loan office in exchange for a certificate and a formal discharge from the governor and council, which operated as a legal payment extinguishing the debt as between the original creditor and debtor.
- Turning to Article 4 of the peace treaty - the provision guaranteeing that creditors 'on either side' would face 'no lawful impediment' to recovering the full value of debts 'heretofore contracted' - most justices read this sweeping language as nullifying any state law or discharge standing between a British creditor and repayment of a pre-war debt.
- Because the Constitution's Supremacy Clause makes treaties equal in force to the Constitution itself and binding on state judges regardless of contrary state law, several justices concluded the treaty operated on its own force to strip away the Virginia law's protection without any further act of Congress or the state legislature.
- Justice Iredell took a narrower view on timing, reasoning that before the Constitution's ratification a treaty provision of this kind could only take effect through an actual repeal of the state law by the state itself, so the discharge remained a valid bar until such a repeal occurred.
- Applying the majority's reading of the treaty's plain language to the facts, the Court concluded that the discharge Hylton received for money paid into Virginia's loan office did not bar the British creditor's claim, so the debt remained fully recoverable against the original debtor.