OCTOBER TERM 2010 · DECIDED JUNE 20, 2011 · 5–4

564 U. S. ___ · No. 10-10 · Argued March 23, 2011

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Turner v. Rogers

Vacated and remandedFinal ruling
child supportright to counseldue processcivil contemptfamily court

Opinion of the Court by Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan

The Court ruled that a poor parent facing jail time for failing to pay child support does not automatically have a right to a government-paid lawyer at the contempt hearing, at least when the other parent is also unrepresented.

But the Court said states must still use other safeguards — like clear notice that ability to pay is the key issue, a financial-disclosure form, a chance to respond, and an explicit court finding on ability to pay — to make sure no one is wrongly jailed. Because South Carolina used none of these safeguards here, the man's jailing was unconstitutional and the case was sent back.

How it got here: A South Carolina family court jailed Turner for civil contempt; the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected his claim to a right to counsel, and he asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review that ruling.

The Case in Depth

What happened

Michael Turner repeatedly fell behind on the $51.73 weekly child support he owed for his daughter, who was in the custody of Rebecca Rogers's father. Over several years, South Carolina family courts held Turner in contempt five times and jailed him for missed payments. At his fifth hearing, neither he nor Rogers had a lawyer, and the judge sentenced him to 12 months without ever determining whether he actually had the money to pay.

The question before the Court

If a state jails a parent for failing to pay child support, does the Constitution automatically entitle that parent to a free lawyer at the hearing?

The Court's answer

No — the Due Process Clause does not automatically require the state to provide a lawyer at a civil contempt hearing over unpaid child support, even when the parent could be jailed. The Court reasoned that ability to pay is usually a fairly straightforward factual question, that giving one parent free counsel when the other parent (who is owed the money) has none could unfairly tilt the hearing, and that a lawyer isn't the only way to protect against a wrongful jailing.

Instead, the Court required states to use substitute safeguards: clear notice that ability to pay is the central issue, a form to gather financial information, a chance to respond at the hearing, and an explicit court finding on ability to pay. Because South Carolina gave Turner none of these protections and never decided whether he could pay, his 12-month jailing violated due process even without a lawyer being required.

Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →

Why it matters

Millions of parents nationwide face contempt hearings over unpaid child support, often without a lawyer on either side. This ruling means states don't have to fund attorneys for these parents, saving public money, but it forces family courts to adopt simple procedural safeguards — like financial-disclosure forms and explicit ability-to-pay findings — before jailing anyone.

What changes now

The case returns to South Carolina's courts for further proceedings consistent with the Court's ruling, meaning Turner's underlying contempt case can be reconsidered using the safeguards the Court described. More broadly, state family courts handling child-support contempt cases must now ensure they give notice about the ability-to-pay issue, use a financial disclosure process, let the parent respond, and make an explicit finding on ability to pay before jailing anyone, or risk similar due process violations.

What this does not decide

The Court explicitly did not decide whether counsel is required when a support debt is owed to the government (rather than to the other parent) or in unusually complex cases requiring a trained advocate. It also did not adopt a blanket right to counsel in all civil contempt hearings — only the narrower situation presented here.

Concurrences and dissents

Dissent — Justice Thomas

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants facing incarceration in civil contempt proceedings.The dissent's core position that no due process right to counsel exists here at all.

Justice Thomas would have affirmed, arguing the Due Process Clause never requires appointed counsel outside criminal cases or proceedings functionally like a criminal trial, and that reading it otherwise would make the Sixth Amendment's counsel guarantee superfluous. He also objected that the majority reached out to decide, on an issue raised only by the government as amicus curiae, that South Carolina's alternative safeguards were inadequate, even though neither party had presented that argument below. He additionally argued the majority's balancing test ignored the interests of children and custodial parents who depend on support payments. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined only Parts I-B and II of this opinion; Justice Scalia joined the opinion in full.

How the Court got there

The legal reasoning, step by step

  1. The Court first addressed whether the case was moot since Turner had already finished his sentence, applying the 'capable of repetition yet evading review' rule: a case stays alive if the challenged action is too short to be fully litigated before it ends, and there's a reasonable chance the same person will face it again. Because Turner kept falling behind and being jailed, the Court found both conditions met.
  2. Turning to the merits, the Court noted the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel applies only to criminal cases, and civil contempt is different from criminal contempt because a civil contemnor can always avoid or end jail simply by paying what he owes.
  3. Because no prior case gave a clear answer, the Court applied the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, a three-part framework for deciding what fairness requires in a civil proceeding: the weight of the personal interest at stake, the risk of an inaccurate decision without extra protections, and the cost of providing those protections.
  4. The Court found the personal interest — loss of physical liberty through jail — weighed heavily in favor of a right to counsel, and errors on the 'ability to pay' question could wrongly result in jailing someone who simply couldn't pay.
  5. But the Court found three countervailing considerations: ability to pay is usually a manageable factual question, providing a lawyer only to the noncustodial parent when the custodial parent has none could create an unfair imbalance and slow down needed payments, and a set of alternative safeguards — notice, a financial-disclosure form, a chance to respond, and an explicit court finding — can adequately protect against wrongful jailing without a lawyer.
  6. Weighing these factors together, the Court concluded due process does not automatically require appointed counsel in this kind of hearing, but does require the substitute safeguards; because South Carolina used none of them and never determined Turner's ability to pay, his jailing failed to meet even that lower bar.

Doctrinal impact

Laws and provisions at issue

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause

Constitutional guarantee that the government must use fair procedures before taking away someone's liberty.

Sixth Amendment right to counsel

Constitutional right to a lawyer, but only in criminal prosecutions, not civil cases.

Cases affected by this decision

Reaffirms Mathews v. Eldridge (424 U. S. 319)

The Court relied on this case's three-factor balancing test to decide what fairness requires in the contempt hearing.

Distinguishes Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty. (452 U. S. 18)

The Court read this case as not establishing counsel in every case involving possible loss of liberty.

Distinguishes In re Gault (387 U. S. 1)

The Court said this juvenile-delinquency case was as serious as a criminal trial, unlike Turner's civil contempt hearing.

Distinguishes St. Pierre v. United States (319 U. S. 41)

The Court said this mootness case does not apply because it involved a federal, not state, court order.

Distinguishes DeFunis v. Odegaard (416 U. S. 312)

The Court said this case doesn't make Turner's dispute moot because Turner, unlike DeFunis, was likely to face the same situation again.

Supreme Court Opinion

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Turner v. Rogers | SCOTUS Reporter