OCTOBER TERM 2010 · DECIDED JUNE 13, 2011 · 5–4

564 U. S. ___ · No. 09-525 · Argued December 7, 2010

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Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders

ReversedFinal ruling
securities fraudmutual fundsinvestor lawsuitscorporate liabilitySEC rules

Opinion of the Court by Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito

The Court ruled that a mutual fund's outside investment adviser could not be sued by stockholders for false statements in the fund's prospectuses, because the legally separate mutual fund - not the adviser - was the one that actually "made" the statements.

The decision narrows who can be sued directly under securities fraud rules, holding that only the entity with final say over a statement's content can be held liable in a private lawsuit, even when a closely affiliated company helped write it.

For purposes of Rule 10b–5, the maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate it.
Justice Thomas

The majority's core test for who can be sued for making a false statement.

How it got here: A federal trial court dismissed the stockholders' complaint; the Fourth Circuit reversed and revived it; the companies asked the Supreme Court to review that reversal.

The Case in Depth

What happened

Janus Capital Group created a family of mutual funds organized as the separate Janus Investment Fund, which hired Janus Capital Group's subsidiary, Janus Capital Management, as its investment adviser. After New York's attorney general alleged secret deals permitting harmful "market timing" trading in the funds despite prospectus language suggesting the funds discouraged it, Janus Capital Group's stock price dropped sharply, and stockholders sued the parent company and the adviser for securities fraud.

The question before the Court

When a mutual fund's prospectus contains false statements, can investors sue the fund's outside investment-management company for making those statements?

The Court's answer

No — the Court ruled that the investment adviser could not be sued because it did not itself "make" the false statements; the mutual fund did. The Court held that for securities-fraud purposes, the "maker" of a statement is whoever has ultimate authority over its content and whether and how to communicate it, not merely whoever helps draft or influence it.

Because the mutual fund's board of trustees retained final say over the prospectuses, and the corporate line between the fund and its adviser was maintained, the adviser's assistance in preparing the documents did not make it liable, even though the two companies were closely linked. Any broadening of that liability, the Court said, is a job for Congress, not the courts.

Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →

Why it matters

Investors who lose money after relying on false statements in a mutual fund's prospectus generally cannot sue the fund's outside investment adviser directly, even if that adviser drafted the misleading language, unless the adviser had final authority over what was said. This makes it harder for shareholders to hold advisory firms accountable in court for problems like undisclosed market timing.

What changes now

This is a final merits decision, not a remand for further factfinding on the "maker" question itself; the Fourth Circuit's judgment reviving the stockholders' suit is reversed, leaving the stockholders without a viable claim against the investment adviser under this theory. The ruling continues to shape how private securities-fraud suits are framed against affiliated companies, entities, and advisers going forward, since only the party with ultimate authority over a statement can be sued for making it.

What this does not decide

The Court did not decide whether Congress's separate "control person" liability provision could reach the parent company, nor whether an adviser could be liable under a different, unaddressed provision covering the use of innocent intermediaries. It also left open whether statements to entities like securities analysts could count as "public" statements.

Concurrences and dissents

Dissent — Justice Breyer

Justice Breyer argued that ordinary English and prior case law do not limit "make" to only the entity with final, ultimate authority over a statement; people routinely "make" statements whose content others control. He argued Central Bank addressed only secondary liability for aiders and abettors, not primary liability, and that Stoneridge did not support the majority's rule either. Given the close relationship between the adviser and the fund, and allegations that the adviser drafted the false language and may have hidden facts from the fund's board, he would have let the claim against the adviser proceed.

How the Court got there

The legal reasoning, step by step

  1. The Court read the phrase "to make any untrue statement" in the securities fraud rule as equivalent to "to state," and held that only the person or entity with ultimate authority over a statement's content and its communication can be its "maker" for liability purposes.
  2. The Court grounded this rule in an earlier decision holding that private lawsuits under this rule cannot be brought against those who merely give substantial assistance to a false statement without actually making it themselves (aiders and abettors) — only the government can sue such helpers.
  3. Applying that distinction, the Court reasoned that treating anyone who helps shape a statement's content as its "maker" would erase the line between primary wrongdoers and mere helpers, making the aider-and-abettor category nearly meaningless.
  4. The Court also rejected a broader definition of "make" as "create," reasoning that this would let private plaintiffs sue anyone who supplies false information that someone else later incorporates into a public statement, a result the Court found inconsistent with its prior refusal to let investors sue business partners whose undisclosed deceptive conduct was later reflected in another company's statements.
  5. The Court declined to treat the close working relationship between the investment adviser and the fund as erasing their separate corporate identities, noting that the two remained legally distinct entities with an independently constituted board, and that expanding liability based on such relationships was a task for Congress rather than the courts.
  6. Applying its rule to the facts, the Court found that only the mutual fund itself had the statutory obligation to file the prospectuses and the ultimate authority over their content, so the adviser's involvement in drafting them did not make it a maker of the statements.

Doctrinal impact

Laws and provisions at issue

SEC Rule 10b-5

A federal rule banning false or misleading statements made in connection with buying or selling securities.

Securities Exchange Act § 10(b)

The federal statute authorizing the SEC to write rules against securities fraud, including Rule 10b-5.

Securities Exchange Act § 20(a)

A statute making people who control a wrongdoer liable for that wrongdoer's securities law violations.

Cases affected by this decision

Reaffirms Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A. (511 U. S. 164)

The Court relied on this case's rule against private suits against aiders and abettors as the basis for its narrow definition of who "makes" a statement.

Reaffirms Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. (552 U. S. 148)

The Court treated this case's rejection of liability for undisclosed deceptive conduct as supporting its new rule on who counts as a statement's maker.

Supreme Court Opinion

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Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders | SCOTUS Reporter