OCTOBER TERM 2004 · DECIDED MARCH 4, 2005

277 U.S. 138 · No. 3, 4, 5 · Argued April 25, 1928

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Hamburg-American Co. v. United States

Reversed and remandedFinal ruling
World War I property seizuresenemy property lawcorporate nationalitywartime compensationshipping companies

Opinion of the Court by Justice McReynolds

The Court ruled that the government could not treat property owned by American corporations as enemy property simply because a German company owned all their stock, and reversed lower-court decisions that had dismissed the companies' claims for compensation.

Because Congress chose to judge a corporation's wartime status by where it was incorporated and did business rather than by who owned its stock, the shipping companies could pursue their claims for the seized docks, tugboats, and barges, and the case was sent back for further proceedings.

Congress did not do so; it definitely adopted the policy of disregarding stock ownership as a test of enemy character and permitted property of domestic corporations to be dealt with as non-enemy.
Justice McReynolds

The Court's central point that stockholder nationality does not determine a corporation's enemy status.

How it got here: The Court of Claims sustained demurrers dismissing the companies' petitions, reasoning the property counted as enemy property; the companies appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

The Case in Depth

What happened

Three New Jersey corporations, all of whose stock was owned by a German company, sued the United States for compensation after the government seized their docks, piers, tugboats, barges, and other vessels in New York harbor in April 1917, at the start of America's involvement in World War I. The companies argued they were entitled to payment for the property's use and value, but the government's seizure predated any formal declaration treating the property as enemy-owned.

The question before the Court

When the government seized docks, tugboats, and barges owned by New Jersey companies during World War I, could it treat that property as enemy property just because a German company owned all the companies' stock?

Why it matters

The ruling protected domestically incorporated companies from having their property treated as enemy property based solely on foreign stock ownership, preserving their right to seek compensation for wartime seizures. It also reinforced that Congress, not the courts, decides how to define 'enemy' status for wartime property seizures, shaping how future claims by foreign-owned domestic corporations would be handled.

What changes now

The cases return to the Court of Claims for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's reading of the Trading with the Enemy Act. The companies will need to amend their petitions in the tugboat and barge cases to clarify exactly what the government did and when, while the dock and pier claim can proceed as already pleaded. This is a final decision on the legal question, though further factual proceedings remain.

What this does not decide

The decision does not disturb Congress's power to treat foreign-owned property as enemy property if it chooses to legislate that way; it only holds that Congress did not do so in the Trading with the Enemy Act as written, leaving the specific factual questions about each seizure to be resolved on remand.

How the Court got there

The legal reasoning, step by step

  1. The Court noted that Congress could have made a corporation's wartime status depend on the nationality of its stockholders, as some other countries' courts had done, but the key question was what Congress actually chose to do in the Trading with the Enemy Act.
  2. The Court read the Act's definition of 'enemy' to focus on where a corporation was incorporated and where it did business, not on who owned its stock, meaning a company incorporated in the United States was not automatically an enemy just because foreign nationals owned its shares.
  3. The Court relied on its earlier decision in Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Miller, which held that a corporation's enemy status is not fixed by the nationality of its stockholders, to confirm that Congress deliberately rejected a stock-ownership test.
  4. Applying this reading, the Court concluded that the docks and piers seized from one of the companies were not enemy property, so the petition stated a valid claim for compensation covering the period of government use.
  5. For the claims involving tugboats and barges, the Court found the petitions alleged enough to show the property had been taken and used, entitling the companies to potential recovery, though the pleadings needed to be clarified through amendment to specify what actions the government had taken and when title passed.

Doctrinal impact

Laws and provisions at issue

Trading with the Enemy Act § 2

1917 federal law defining who counts as an 'enemy' for wartime property and trading restrictions.

Cases affected by this decision

Reaffirms Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Miller (266 U.S. 457)

Confirms that a corporation's enemy status is not determined by its stockholders' nationality.

Distinguishes the St. Tudno

Declines to follow this prize case's approach of treating stock ownership as the test for enemy status.

Distinguishes the Michigan

Declines to follow this prize case's approach of treating stock ownership as the test for enemy status.

Supreme Court Opinion

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Hamburg-American Co. v. United States | SCOTUS Reporter