Premo v. Moore
The Supreme Court ruled that a state court reasonably found a defense lawyer's advice to accept a plea deal, without first trying to suppress a confession, was not ineffective assistance of counsel.
The decision reinforces how much deference federal habeas courts must give to state courts reviewing plea-bargain decisions, making it harder for defendants to undo old guilty pleas by second-guessing their lawyers' strategic choices years later.
“Plea bargains are the result of complex negotiations suffused with uncertainty, and defense attorneys must make careful strategic choices in balancing opportunities and risks.”
The majority explains why plea-stage legal advice deserves substantial deference.
How it got here: A federal district court denied Moore's habeas petition, the Ninth Circuit reversed and granted relief, and the state asked the Supreme Court to review that reversal.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Randy Moore and two accomplices beat and killed Kenneth Rogers, then confessed to relatives who later spoke to police. On his lawyer's advice, Moore pleaded no contest to felony murder rather than risk a capital charge, without his lawyer first trying to suppress his police confession. Moore later argued in state and federal court that this legal advice amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.
The question before the Court
If a defense lawyer skips a suppression motion and advises a client to plead guilty, can a federal court later say that was ineffective assistance under habeas review?
Why it matters
People who pleaded guilty on their lawyer's advice will find it harder to reopen their cases years later by second-guessing that advice in federal court. The ruling also reassures prosecutors that plea deals they strike will not easily be unwound, which affects how readily they offer favorable deals in the first place.
What changes now
The Ninth Circuit's grant of habeas relief is reversed, and the case is sent back for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion, meaning Moore's guilty plea and conviction stand. This is a final merits decision on the federal habeas question, though it does not foreclose other avenues Moore might pursue in state court, if any remain.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether the lawyer's advice was actually the best possible strategy — only that the state court's finding that it was constitutionally adequate was not unreasonable under the deferential federal habeas standard. It also did not extend Fulminante's rule about confession evidence into the ineffective-assistance context.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Ginsburg
Justice Ginsburg agreed with the outcome but on narrower grounds. She focused only on the prejudice element of Strickland, noting that Moore's own counsel confirmed at oral argument that Moore never said he would have rejected the plea and gone to trial had he been better informed. Because Moore could not show that necessary fact, she concurred in the judgment without addressing the broader deference analysis in the majority opinion.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- Under the federal habeas statute, a state court's decision can only be overturned if it unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court law, not merely if a federal court would have decided differently — a highly deferential standard.
- The controlling law here is the Strickland test for ineffective assistance, which requires showing both that the lawyer's performance was deficient and that the deficiency likely changed the outcome (prejudice).
- The Court held that a state court could reasonably find the lawyer's performance adequate, since he explained that seeking suppression would have been pointless given an independent, admissible confession from two other witnesses, and plea-stage strategic choices deserve substantial deference.
- The Court also held that a prior case about an involuntary confession violating the Fifth Amendment, Arizona v. Fulminante, does not supply a rule for judging lawyers' Sixth Amendment performance or prejudice, so the state court's decision could not be 'contrary to' that case.
- On the second Strickland element, the Court found the state court could reasonably conclude Moore was not prejudiced, because the case against him remained strong and the plea secured him a much lighter sentence than the death penalty or life without parole he otherwise risked.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes Arizona v. Fulminante (499 U.S. 279)
The Court said this Fifth Amendment confession case has nothing to do with judging lawyers' Sixth Amendment performance or prejudice.
Reaffirms Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668)
The Court applied Strickland's two-part test for ineffective assistance as the controlling standard.
Reaffirms Hill v. Lockhart (474 U.S. 52)
The Court relied on Hill's rule for showing prejudice when a guilty plea followed allegedly bad legal advice.
Distinguishes Kimmelman v. Morrison (477 U.S. 365)
The Court said this case, involving a bench trial, did not set the prejudice standard for plea-bargain cases.