Presley v. Georgia
The Supreme Court summarily reversed a Georgia cocaine-trafficking conviction, ruling that the trial judge violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial by clearing the courtroom during jury selection without first considering ways to keep the courtroom open.
The decision confirms that the constitutional right to a public trial covers the jury-selection stage, not just the trial itself, and that judges must think through alternatives to closing the courtroom even if no one suggests any.
“the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding”
The Court's core holding that judges must weigh alternatives before closing a courtroom.
How it got here: Presley was convicted and appealed; Georgia's appellate courts upheld the closure, and Presley asked the Supreme Court to review that ruling.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Eric Presley was tried for cocaine trafficking in a Georgia state court. Before jury selection began, the judge told Presley's uncle, the only member of the public present, that he had to leave the courtroom and the entire floor because prospective jurors needed the seating. Presley's lawyer objected and asked for some accommodation, but the judge said there was no room and no real need for the uncle to be there during jury selection.
The question before the Court
Could a trial court bar the public, including the defendant's uncle, from jury selection just to make room for prospective jurors, without first considering other options?
The Court's answer
No — the Court ruled that a trial judge cannot exclude the public, including a defendant's family member, from jury selection without first considering reasonable alternatives to closing the courtroom. The Sixth Amendment's public trial right extends to jury voir dire, not just to the trial itself, and that right belongs to the defendant regardless of whether the courtroom is crowded.
The trial judge here closed the courtroom because there wasn't enough seating for both jurors and the public, but never considered options like reserving seats or splitting up the jury panel. Because courts must weigh such alternatives on their own, even without a request from either side, that failure alone made the closure unconstitutional — regardless of whether the judge's crowding concern was otherwise legitimate.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Trial judges across the country routinely face space and security concerns during jury selection. This ruling tells them they cannot simply exclude family members or other spectators for convenience; they must actively consider less restrictive options first, giving defendants and the public a stronger, more concrete safeguard for open courtrooms.
What changes now
The case goes back to the Georgia courts for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion, meaning the Georgia courts must reconsider Presley's conviction in light of the ruling that the courtroom closure during jury selection was unconstitutional. This is a final decision on the legal question of when courts must consider alternatives to closing voir dire, though it leaves open whether the trial court actually had an overriding interest justifying any closure.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether the trial court actually had a valid overriding interest that could have justified closing voir dire in some form; it resolved the case solely on the judge's failure to consider any alternatives, leaving that separate question unaddressed.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, argued the Court should not have decided these questions by summary disposition without full briefing and argument. He contended that neither Waller nor Press-Enterprise I actually established that the Sixth Amendment covers jury voir dire, nor that trial courts must raise alternatives to closure on their own without a party's request. He would have left these open questions for a case argued on the merits.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court explained that the Sixth Amendment's public trial guarantee belongs to the accused, while a related but separate right of public and press access flows from the First Amendment; both apply to state courts through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
- Relying on its 1984 decisions in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (holding the First Amendment requires open voir dire) and Waller v. Georgia (holding the Sixth Amendment's public trial right extends beyond the trial itself to a pretrial suppression hearing), the Court concluded these rulings together settle that the Sixth Amendment public trial right also covers jury voir dire.
- The Court then applied the four-part test from Waller for closing any part of a criminal trial: the party seeking closure must show an overriding interest likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary, the court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and the court must make specific findings supporting closure.
- Applying that test, the Court found the trial judge never considered any alternative to removing the public — such as reserving seats, splitting up the jury panel, or instructing jurors not to talk to spectators — even though the judge did not need a proffer from the defense to consider such options on his own.
- Because a court must weigh alternatives to closure regardless of whether a party requests them, the trial judge's failure to consider any alternative meant the closure could not be justified, regardless of whether an overriding interest existed.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Waller v. Georgia (467 U. S. 39)
The Court relies on Waller's four-part test and its requirement that courts consider alternatives to closure.
Reaffirms Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside Cty. (Press-Enterprise I) (464 U. S. 501)
The Court extends Press-Enterprise I's alternatives-to-closure requirement from the First Amendment to the Sixth Amendment context.