Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
The Supreme Court struck down decades-old limits on corporate and union spending in elections, ruling that the government cannot ban corporations from using their own money to pay for political ads and films simply because the speaker is a corporation.
In doing so, the Court overruled its own 1990 precedent and the part of a 2003 ruling that had upheld similar restrictions, opening the door for corporations and unions to spend unlimited amounts from their general treasuries on ads supporting or opposing candidates, while leaving disclosure and disclaimer rules in place.
“The First Amendment does not permit laws that force speakers to retain a campaign finance attorney, conduct demographic marketing research, or seek declaratory rulings before discussing the most salient political issues of our day.”
Explaining why a narrow statutory fix could not save the law from constitutional problems.
How it got here: A three-judge federal district court denied a preliminary injunction and granted summary judgment to the Federal Election Commission, upholding the spending ban; Citizens United appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Citizens United, a nonprofit advocacy corporation, produced a 90-minute film sharply critical of then-Senator Hillary Clinton during her 2008 presidential primary campaign and wanted to offer it on video-on-demand and advertise it on television. Because the group had accepted some funding from for-profit corporations, federal law barred it from paying for this with its general treasury funds so close to the primary election.
The question before the Court
Could the government ban a nonprofit corporation from using its own treasury money to pay for and air a political film critical of a presidential candidate right before a primary election?
The Court's answer
No — the Court ruled that the government could not ban Citizens United, or any corporation or union, from spending its own general treasury funds on political films or ads, even ones that name and criticize a candidate close to an election. It held that the First Amendment forbids restricting political speech based solely on the speaker's identity as a corporation, and found none of the government's justifications — preventing distortion of elections, corruption, or protecting shareholders — compelling enough to support the ban.
To reach that conclusion, the Court overruled its 1990 decision in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and the part of its 2003 decision in McConnell v. FEC that relied on Austin. It did, however, leave in place BCRA's separate disclosure and disclaimer requirements, meaning corporations and groups must still identify who paid for election-related ads.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Corporations, unions, and advocacy groups can now spend unlimited amounts of their own money on ads praising or attacking candidates right up to an election, reshaping how campaigns are funded and amplifying the voice of well-resourced organizations in political races, while voters still learn who paid for the ads through disclosure requirements the Court left intact.
What changes now
This is a final decision on the merits, not a temporary order. The case was sent back for further proceedings consistent with the ruling, but the core legal question — whether corporations and unions can be banned from independent election spending — has been resolved. Federal and state bans like BCRA §203 can no longer be enforced, though disclosure and disclaimer requirements for election-related ads remain in effect.
What this does not decide
The ruling does not disturb existing limits on direct contributions to candidates, and it does not decide whether Congress could restrict political spending by foreign-controlled corporations. It also leaves BCRA's disclosure and disclaimer requirements in place, rejecting Citizens United's separate challenge to those rules.
Concurrences and dissents
How the Justices voted
Majority (1). Justice Kennedy (author).
Separate writings (4). Justice Roberts (author of a concurrence).
Concurrence — Justice Roberts
Chief Justice Roberts joined the majority in full but wrote separately to explain why deciding the broader constitutional question was consistent with judicial restraint. He argued the Court had no valid narrower ground available and that stare decisis should give way here because Austin was poorly reasoned, inconsistent with earlier cases, and defended by the government using rationales it never actually relied on. Read the full concurrence →
Concurrence — Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia wrote to rebut the dissent's originalist argument, contending that the First Amendment's text draws no distinction based on whether a speaker is a corporation, and that historical evidence does not support excluding corporate speech from constitutional protection. Read the full concurrence →
Dissent in part — Justice Stevens
“The conceit that corporations must be treated identically to natural persons in the political sphere is not only inaccurate but also inadequate to justify the Court’s disposition of this case.”Stevens's central objection to treating corporate and individual political speech as equivalent.
Justice Stevens argued the majority should not have reached the constitutional question at all, since Citizens United had abandoned its facial challenge below and narrower grounds existed to decide the case. He contended corporations are not members of the political community and that longstanding restrictions on corporate electioneering guard against corruption, distortion of elections, and coerced shareholder speech, so Austin and McConnell should have been upheld.
Dissent in part — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas agreed with overturning the corporate spending ban but argued the Court did not go far enough, contending that BCRA's disclosure and disclaimer requirements also violate the First Amendment because forced disclosure of donors can expose them to threats, harassment, and retaliation, as shown by real-world examples involving a California ballot measure.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court first considered whether Citizens United's claims could be resolved on narrower grounds, including whether the film counted as a covered 'electioneering communication' and whether it met the 'functional equivalent of express advocacy' test from an earlier case — a test asking whether a message is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation except as an appeal to vote for or against a candidate. The Court found the film covered and equivalent to express advocacy, foreclosing these narrower paths.
- Having rejected the narrower arguments, the Court concluded it was necessary to reach the broader constitutional question of whether corporations may be barred from independent election spending based solely on their corporate identity.
- Because the law directly restricted political speech, the Court applied strict scrutiny — the most demanding constitutional test, requiring the government to show a compelling interest and a restriction narrowly tailored to it.
- The Court rejected the 'antidistortion' rationale from its 1990 Austin decision, which held that corporations' wealth could be regulated to prevent it from distorting elections, reasoning that the First Amendment does not allow speech restrictions based on a speaker's identity or financial resources.
- The Court also rejected the government's anticorruption and shareholder-protection justifications, reasoning that independent expenditures — spending not coordinated with a candidate — carry little risk of the quid-pro-quo corruption that justifies limits on direct campaign contributions.
- Concluding that no sufficient governmental interest survived and that the precedent was poorly reasoned and inconsistent with earlier rulings, the Court held that stare decisis, the practice of following prior decisions, did not require preserving Austin, and it overruled Austin and the part of a later case that had relied on it, while separately upholding BCRA's disclosure and disclaimer requirements under a lower standard requiring only a substantial relation to an important informational interest.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Overrules Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (494 U. S. 652)
The Court overruled Austin's holding that political speech could be banned based on a speaker's corporate identity.
Overrules McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n (540 U. S. 93)
The Court overruled the part of McConnell that had upheld BCRA's ban on corporate election spending.
Reaffirms Buckley v. Valeo (424 U. S. 1)
The Court relied on Buckley's rejection of limits on independent political expenditures as still good law.
Reaffirms Bellotti (435 U. S. 765)
The Court reaffirmed Bellotti's principle that corporate political speech is protected regardless of speaker identity.