Berghuis v. Smith
The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that a federal appeals court was wrong to grant habeas relief to a Michigan man convicted by an all-white jury, because no Supreme Court precedent clearly established that his jury pool's racial makeup violated his Sixth Amendment rights.
The decision underscores how narrow federal habeas review of state convictions is: even if reasonable judges could disagree about a fair-cross-section claim, that disagreement alone is not enough to override a state court's reasonable conclusion.
How it got here: Michigan's Supreme Court rejected Smith's jury claim; a federal district court agreed, but the Sixth Circuit reversed and granted habeas relief, prompting the State's appeal to the Supreme Court.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Diapolis Smith, an African-American man, was convicted of second-degree murder by an all-white jury in Kent County, Michigan, in 1993. At the time, African-Americans made up about 7.28% of the county's jury-eligible population but only about 6% of the jury pool, and at most three of the 60-100 venire members were Black. Smith argued the county's method of assigning jurors first to local district courts before the county circuit court caused this underrepresentation.
The question before the Court
Could a federal court free a Michigan murder defendant on habeas grounds because too few African-Americans showed up on his jury pool?
The Court's answer
No — the Court ruled that Smith could not win federal habeas relief because no Supreme Court precedent clearly established that Kent County's jury-selection practices violated his right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. Under the strict habeas standard, a state court's reasonable-but-debatable decision isn't enough to justify federal intervention; the state court's rejection of Smith's claim was not unreasonable.
Smith's evidence fell short at every stage: he didn't show the county's juror-assignment order caused a meaningful racial disparity, the shift in numbers after the county changed policy was minor, and no case law recognized the other factors (hardship excuses, mail notices, police non-enforcement) as grounds for a systematic-exclusion claim. The Michigan Supreme Court's ruling therefore stood.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
The ruling limits when federal courts can second-guess state courts on jury-composition challenges under habeas law, making it harder for defendants to win federal relief on fair-cross-section claims unless Supreme Court precedent squarely covers their situation. It also leaves unresolved which statistical test courts should use to measure jury underrepresentation.
What changes now
The case returns to the lower courts for further proceedings consistent with the Court's ruling, effectively ending Smith's chance at habeas relief on this claim absent new evidence. The decision leaves open which statistical test courts should use to measure jury underrepresentation and whether social and economic factors can ever support a fair-cross-section claim — questions the Court expressly declined to resolve.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide which statistical method (absolute disparity, comparative disparity, or standard deviation) is the right way to measure jury underrepresentation, nor whether social and economic factors affecting who serves on juries can ever count as systematic exclusion. It ruled only that no clearly established precedent required relief here.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas agreed with the outcome but questioned whether the fair-cross-section requirement really belongs under the Sixth Amendment at all, arguing it seems to rest more on a mix of Due Process and Equal Protection principles and is hard to square with the Amendment's text and history. He said he would be willing to reconsider the Court's fair-cross-section precedents in an appropriate case, but noted neither party asked the Court to do so here.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court applied the federal habeas standard under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which lets federal courts override a state court's decision only if it was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent — not merely if the federal court would have decided differently.
- The Court reviewed the three-part test from Duren v. Missouri for proving a jury lacks a fair cross section: showing a distinctive group, showing that group is underrepresented in jury pools, and showing that underrepresentation stems from systematic exclusion built into the jury-selection process.
- The Court found that no prior decision specifies which statistical method — absolute disparity, comparative disparity, or standard deviation — must be used to measure underrepresentation, so the state court's choice of approach could not be an unreasonable application of clearly established law.
- Applying that framework to the facts, the Court found Smith's evidence weak: he never showed the county's assignment order caused a meaningful disparity, and the modest drop in comparative disparity (from 18% to 15.1%) after the county changed its policy was too small to prove the earlier method caused the underrepresentation.
- The Court also rejected Smith's argument that a laundry list of other jury-selection features (hardship excuses, mail notices, police non-enforcement of summonses) could establish systematic exclusion, finding no clearly established precedent treats such factors as constitutionally significant on their own.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes Duren v. Missouri (439 U.S. 357)
The Court found Smith's case factually weaker than Duren's, so Duren did not clearly require relief here.