Fullerton v. Texas
The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error brought by a Texas man convicted of illegally trading in cotton and grain futures, holding that he had raised his constitutional objection too late in the state courts.
Because the Texas courts appeared to have rejected his rehearing request without actually ruling on his federal commerce-clause argument, the Supreme Court found it had no proper basis to review the case at all.
“We have repeatedly ruled that it is too late to raise a Federal question by a petition for rehearing in the Supreme Court of a State after that court has pronounced its final decision”
The Court's rule that federal constitutional claims must be raised before a state court's final decision, not afterward.
How it got here: A Texas trial court convicted Fullerton; the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed and denied rehearing; he then sought Supreme Court review by writ of error.
The Case in Depth
What happened
A Texas man, Fullerton, was convicted of illegally running a "bucket shop"—a business that bought and sold cotton and grain futures contracts with no real intention of ever delivering the goods. He was fined and sentenced to jail. He argued his conviction improperly punished activity that was actually interstate commerce, a matter the Constitution reserves to Congress, but he raised that argument only after losing his appeal in Texas courts.
The question before the Court
Could a man convicted of running an illegal Texas "bucket shop" get the Supreme Court to review his claim that the law violated Congress's power over interstate commerce?
Why it matters
The ruling reinforces a strict procedural rule: people convicted under state laws must raise federal constitutional objections early and clearly in state court, not as an afterthought in a rehearing petition. Anyone hoping to challenge a state conviction on federal grounds must properly preserve that argument or lose the chance to have the Supreme Court review it.
What changes now
The writ of error is dismissed, leaving Fullerton's conviction, fine, and thirty-day jail sentence in place. Because the Court never reached the merits of the interstate-commerce argument, that constitutional question remains unresolved and could potentially be raised again in a future case that properly preserves it in state court before final judgment.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether Texas's bucket-shop law actually violated Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. It decided only that Fullerton failed to properly preserve that argument in the Texas courts, so the constitutional question itself remains untouched.
Concurrences and dissents
How the Justices voted
Majority (1). Justice Fuller (author).
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court applied its settled rule that a federal constitutional argument raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing before a state's highest court usually comes too late to be reviewed here, unless the state court actually took up and decided that federal question.
- The Court examined the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' two opinions and found they addressed only whether the evidence was sufficient and whether the indictment was valid, with no discussion of the interstate-commerce argument.
- The Court explained that a state judge's certificate asserting that a federal question was considered and rejected does not, by itself, give the Supreme Court jurisdiction to review the case; the record itself must show the state court actually decided it.
- Because the record suggested the Texas court may have simply denied the rehearing petition as untimely or as a matter of discretion, rather than ruling on the merits of the commerce-clause claim, the Court concluded there was no proper record basis for review.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Mallett v. North Carolina (181 U. S. 589)
Confirms that raising a federal question only in a rehearing petition is generally too late for Supreme Court review.
Reaffirms Henkel v. Cincinnati (177 U. S. 170)
Confirms a state judge's certificate alone cannot create Supreme Court jurisdiction over a case.
Reaffirms Dibble v. Bellingham Bay Land Company (163 U. S. 63)
Further supports the rule that a certificate cannot by itself confer jurisdiction on the Court.