OCTOBER TERM 2009 · DECIDED JUNE 24, 2010 · 9–0

561 U.S. ___ · No. 08-876 · Argued December 8, 2009

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Black v. United States

Vacated and remandedFinal ruling
white-collar crimemail fraudjury instructionshonest services fraudcriminal procedure

Opinion of the Court by Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Roberts, Stevens, Breyer, Alito, and Sotomayor

The Court ruled that former newspaper executives did not give up their right to challenge flawed jury instructions on 'honest services' fraud just because they opposed the government's request for a special verdict form asking the jury to specify which fraud theory it relied on.

Because the Court had already ruled in a companion case that the honest-services fraud law only covers bribes and kickbacks, the instructions given to this jury were wrong, and the case goes back to the lower courts to sort out what that means for these convictions.

How it got here: A jury convicted the defendants; the Seventh Circuit affirmed, ruling the defendants had forfeited their instructional challenge by opposing special verdict forms; the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

The Case in Depth

What happened

Conrad Black and two other executives of Hollinger International, a publicly held newspaper company, were charged with mail fraud for allegedly stealing millions through bogus fees and for depriving the company of their 'honest services' by hiding those payments. At trial the government pursued both theories; the jury convicted on general verdicts without specifying which theory it relied on. The defendants had objected to the honest-services instructions but opposed a special verdict form that would have separated the two theories.

The question before the Court

If executives object to jury instructions but then oppose the government's request for a special verdict form, do they lose the right to challenge those instructions on appeal?

The Court's answer

No — the executives did not forfeit their right to challenge the flawed jury instructions. The Court held that timely objecting to jury instructions under Criminal Rule 30(d) is enough to preserve the issue for appeal; defendants do not also have to request or agree to a special verdict form breaking down which fraud theory the jury relied on. The Seventh Circuit had invented an unwritten forfeiture rule with no basis in any statute or Criminal Rule, and it punished the defendants without any advance notice that resisting the government's verdict-form request could cost them their appeal.

Because a companion decision, Skilling v. United States, had already narrowed the honest-services fraud law to bribery and kickback schemes only, the instructions actually given to this jury were incorrect. The case now returns to the lower courts to decide whether that error was harmless.

Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →

Why it matters

Criminal defendants who timely object to jury instructions do not have to also request or agree to special verdict forms to preserve their appeal rights. This protects defendants from losing valid legal challenges based on strategic decisions about how a jury reports its verdict, and it prevents prosecutors from using verdict-form requests as a trap that forfeits a defendant's objections.

What changes now

The Supreme Court's ruling vacates the Seventh Circuit's judgment and sends the case back for further proceedings. The lower courts must now decide whether the erroneous honest-services instructions were harmless error, and address a separate argument about spillover prejudice affecting one defendant's obstruction-of-justice conviction — questions the Supreme Court expressly left open.

What this does not decide

The Court did not decide whether the flawed jury instructions actually affected the outcome of the trial (harmless-error analysis) or whether evidence from the fraud counts improperly influenced the obstruction-of-justice conviction. Both questions were left for the lower courts to resolve on remand.

Concurrences and dissents

Concurrence — Justice Scalia

Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, agreed with the outcome but objected to the majority's reliance on Advisory Committee Notes to interpret Rule 30(d), calling the Notes non-authoritative when the rule's text is clear. He also argued the jury instructions were flawed not because they misapplied Skilling's bribes-or-kickbacks limit, but because the honest-services statute itself, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, is unconstitutionally vague and should never have gone to the jury at all.

Concurrence — Justice Kennedy

Justice Kennedy joined the Court's opinion except for its statement that the honest-services statute covers only bribes and kickbacks. He argued that the statute is unconstitutionally vague even under that narrower reading, and that convicting someone under any version of the honest-services theory would violate due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.

How the Court got there

The legal reasoning, step by step

  1. The Court first noted that a companion case decided the same day, Skilling v. United States, held that the honest-services fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, covers only schemes involving bribes or kickbacks — a narrower reading than the trial court used here, meaning the jury instructions given in this case did not match the correct legal standard.
  2. The Court then turned to whether the defendants had given up their right to challenge those flawed instructions. It observed that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contain no provision allowing special verdict forms in jury trials, unlike the civil rules, which counsels caution before treating a party's resistance to such forms as a waiver.
  3. The Court found that Criminal Rule 30(d) sets the actual requirement for preserving an objection to jury instructions: a party must object with specifics before the jury retires to deliberate, which the defendants undisputedly did.
  4. The Court concluded that the Seventh Circuit had effectively invented a new forfeiture rule not found in any statute or Criminal Rule, letting prosecutors trigger forfeiture merely by requesting a special verdict form the defendants opposed.
  5. Applying Criminal Rule 57(b), which forbids sanctioning a party for violating a requirement not found in federal law or the rules unless the party had actual notice of it beforehand, the Court held the defendants could not have forfeited their objection since no such notice was given.

Doctrinal impact

Laws and provisions at issue

18 U.S.C. § 1346

Federal law defining mail fraud to include schemes depriving someone of honest services.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(d)

Rule requiring a party to specifically object to jury instructions before the jury deliberates.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57(b)

Rule barring sanctions for violating requirements not in federal law unless the party had notice.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49

Civil rule allowing special verdict forms and written jury questions, unlike the criminal rules.

Cases affected by this decision

Reaffirms Skilling v. United States

The Court applies Skilling's holding that honest-services fraud covers only bribes or kickbacks to find the jury instructions here incorrect.

Reaffirms Yates v. United States (354 U.S. 298)

The Court relies on Yates' rule that a general verdict may be set aside when it is impossible to tell which theory the jury relied on.

Supreme Court Opinion

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Black v. United States | SCOTUS Reporter