Lewis v. City of Chicago
The Court ruled that Chicago firefighter applicants could sue over the city's later use of a 1996 test-score cutoff, even though they never challenged the cutoff's original adoption within the legal deadline.
Because Title VII lets workers sue over any use of a discriminatory practice, not just its adoption, employers can face fresh liability each time they apply an old policy that produces racially unequal results, even years after adopting it.
How it got here: A federal trial court ruled for the applicants after trial; the Seventh Circuit reversed as untimely; the Supreme Court agreed to review that timeliness ruling.
The Case in Depth
What happened
In 1995 Chicago tested over 26,000 firefighter applicants and sorted them into "well qualified" (89+), "qualified" (65-88), and failing scorers. Starting in 1996, the city repeatedly filled firefighter classes only from the "well qualified" pool over several years. Black applicants who scored "qualified" but were never hired sued, claiming the 89-point cutoff had an unlawful racially disparate impact under Title VII.
The question before the Court
Could Black job applicants sue Chicago over its firefighter hiring cutoff score, even though they missed the deadline to challenge the score when it was first adopted?
The Court's answer
Yes — the Court ruled that the applicants could sue over Chicago's repeated use of the 89-point cutoff score, even though no one had timely challenged the cutoff when it was first adopted in 1996. Title VII's disparate-impact provision makes it unlawful whenever an employer "uses" a practice that causes an unequal racial impact, and Chicago used its cutoff score afresh each time it picked a new class of firefighters over the following years.
The Court distinguished this from cases requiring proof of intentional discrimination, where a plaintiff must show deliberate bias occurred within the filing deadline. Because disparate-impact claims require no proof of intent, the city's repeated application of an old, unchallenged cutoff score could still generate new, timely claims — even though a separate claim about the cutoff's original 1996 adoption was now permanently barred.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Employers who adopt a hiring or promotion practice with a racially skewed effect cannot assume they are safe from lawsuits just because no one sued within the initial filing deadline. Each time they actually use that practice again, affected workers or applicants get a fresh opportunity to sue, which increases employers' long-term legal exposure over policies with lasting, unequal effects.
What changes now
The case returns to the Seventh Circuit, which must decide whether the trial court's relief needs to be trimmed because it partly rested on the very first 1996 hiring round, which fell outside even the earliest applicant's filing window. The Seventh Circuit may also need to address whether the city preserved an argument that the applicants never proved disparate impact under the correct legal theory. This is a final merits ruling on the timeliness question, not a temporary order.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether the applicants actually proved their disparate-impact claim on the merits, nor whether relief based on the very first 1996 hiring round (outside the filing window) was proper — those questions go back to the Seventh Circuit. The ruling only addresses whether the claim could be brought at all.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court first had to pinpoint exactly which 'employment practice' the applicants were challenging, since a Title VII charge is timely only if filed within 300 days of the practice being challenged.
- The applicants challenged the city's repeated use of the 89-point cutoff each time it picked a new firefighter class — conduct that (aside from the very first 1996 round) fell within the 300-day filing window, so the real question was whether that repeated use could support a disparate-impact claim at all.
- Under the statute's disparate-impact provision, a claim is established simply by showing an employer 'uses' a practice that 'causes a disparate impact' on a protected group; the Court found the city's repeated selection using the cutoff score plainly satisfied that 'use' requirement each time a new class was hired.
- The Court distinguished disparate-impact claims (which require no proof of intent) from disparate-treatment claims (which do), explaining that in intent-based cases a plaintiff must show deliberate discrimination happened within the filing window — but that requirement, drawn from cases like Ricks and Evans, does not apply to impact claims that need no intent at all.
- The Court rejected the argument that a claim challenging use of an old cutoff score was really just complaining about the 'present effect' of a one-time 1996 decision that was now legally untouchable, since the city's continued use of the score each hiring round was itself a fresh, independent act.
- Because the alleged unlawful practice was the city's repeated use of the cutoff, not merely its original 1996 adoption, the applicants' claim based on that repeated use was legally valid regardless of whether a separate, earlier claim about the 1996 adoption itself was now time-barred.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes Delaware State College v. Ricks (449 U.S. 250)
Its rule that plaintiffs must show intentional discrimination within the deadline does not apply to no-intent disparate-impact claims.
Distinguishes United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans (431 U.S. 553)
Its 'present violation' requirement was about intent-based claims and does not bar this no-intent disparate-impact claim.
Distinguishes Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (550 U.S. 618)
Ledbetter's timing rule for intentional pay discrimination does not control claims requiring no proof of intent.