OCTOBER TERM 2008 · DECIDED OCTOBER 14, 2008

555 U. S. ____ · No. 07-10689

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Moore v. United States

Reversed and remandedProcedural ruling
crack cocaine sentencingfederal sentencing guidelinesjudicial discretioncriminal justice

Per curiam

The Supreme Court summarily reversed a federal appeals court that had assumed a trial judge understood he had discretion to sentence below the crack-cocaine guidelines, even though the judge said at sentencing that only Congress, not judges, could change the crack/powder disparity.

The case is sent back so the trial judge can resentence the defendant with a clear understanding, confirmed in the Court's earlier Kimbrough decision, that judges may consider the disparity between crack and powder cocaine punishments.

It isn’t the judges. It’s the lawmakers, and I have taken an oath to apply the law, and that’s what I will do in this sentencing.
Justice Per Curiam

The sentencing judge's own statement showing he believed he had no discretion over the crack/powder disparity.

How it got here: The Eighth Circuit twice affirmed Moore's sentence, including after the Supreme Court sent the case back for reconsideration in light of Kimbrough; Moore again sought Supreme Court review.

The Case in Depth

What happened

James Eric Moore was convicted of possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute and faced a sentencing range of 151 to 188 months under federal guidelines that punished crack cocaine much more harshly than powder cocaine. At sentencing, Moore asked for a lighter sentence because of this disparity, but the judge said only Congress, not judges, could change the guidelines, and sentenced him to 188 months.

The question before the Court

Did a federal appeals court wrongly assume a trial judge knew he could give a lighter crack-cocaine sentence, when the judge's own words suggested otherwise?

Why it matters

The defendant, sentenced to over 15 years for a crack-cocaine offense, gets a new sentencing hearing where the judge will know he has discretion to weigh the crack/powder disparity. The ruling also signals to appellate courts that they cannot assume a sentencing judge understood his discretion when his own statements say otherwise.

What changes now

The case returns to the Eighth Circuit, which must send it back to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. At that hearing, the trial judge will apply Kimbrough's rule that judges may consider the crack/powder cocaine disparity. The Supreme Court expressed no view on how the judge should exercise that discretion, leaving the actual sentence to be decided anew.

What this does not decide

The Court did not decide what Moore's new sentence should be or how the district court should exercise its discretion under Kimbrough. It only decided that the appeals court wrongly assumed the trial judge had understood he had that discretion in the first place.

How the Court got there

The legal reasoning, step by step

  1. The Court examined the sentencing judge's own words, in which he said 'it isn't the judges' but Congress that decides whether to change the crack/powder cocaine guidelines, and treated this as clear evidence the judge believed he lacked any discretion to depart from the disparity.
  2. The Court noted that the appeals court's first ruling had itself described the trial judge as correctly concluding, under then-existing circuit precedent, that he was not authorized to reject the crack/powder ratio -- confirming the judge had not believed he had discretion.
  3. After the Supreme Court's decision in Kimbrough v. United States established that judges may consider the crack/powder disparity even in an ordinary case, the case was sent back to the appeals court to reconsider in light of that ruling.
  4. On that second look, the appeals court instead presumed, without new briefing, that the judge had known he had discretion but simply chose not to use it -- a presumption the Court found inconsistent with the judge's actual statements at sentencing.
  5. Because the judge's comments showed he did not believe he had discretion to consider the disparity, the Court concluded the appeals court should have sent the case back for a new sentencing hearing under Kimbrough rather than assuming the judge had exercised discretion he did not think he had.

Doctrinal impact

Laws and provisions at issue

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

Federal law listing factors judges must weigh when picking a criminal sentence.

United States Sentencing Guidelines

Federal guidelines that recommend sentence ranges, including harsher ones for crack cocaine than powder cocaine.

Cases affected by this decision

Reaffirms Kimbrough v. United States (552 U. S. ___)

Confirms judges may consider the crack/powder cocaine sentencing disparity even in ordinary cases.

Supreme Court Opinion

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Moore v. United States | SCOTUS Reporter