Carcieri v. Salazar
Headline: Federal ruling limits Interior Secretary’s trust-land power by saying “now under Federal jurisdiction” means 1934, blocking certain trust acquisitions and affecting tribes recognized after 1934.
Holding:
- Limits Interior’s authority to take land into trust for tribes not under federal jurisdiction in 1934.
- May halt or reverse post-1934 trust acquisitions and pending applications.
- Gives states and towns stronger defenses against new tribal trust claims.
Summary
Background
The dispute involves the State of Rhode Island, the town of Charlestown, the Narragansett Indian Tribe, and the Secretary of the Interior. The Narragansett were federally recognized in 1983 and sought to have a 31‑acre parcel the Tribe purchased placed in trust in 1998 so the land would be held by the United States for the Tribe. The State and town challenged that decision, arguing the Secretary lacked authority under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA).
Reasoning
The central question was whether the IRA’s definition phrase “now under Federal jurisdiction” refers to the time Congress enacted the law in 1934 or to the time the Secretary accepts land into trust. The Court examined ordinary meaning, the IRA’s text and parallel phrases like “now or hereafter,” and early Executive interpretation. It concluded the phrase unambiguously refers to tribes under federal jurisdiction in 1934, and therefore the Secretary lacked authority to accept the 31‑acre parcel into trust for the Narragansett.
Real world impact
The ruling restricts the Secretary’s ability to take land into trust for tribes that were not under federal jurisdiction in 1934, affecting tribes recognized after that date and pending trust applications. It may halt or undo some trust acquisitions and make it harder for later‑recognized tribes to expand land bases through §465. States and local governments arguing against trust status for recent acquisitions may gain new legal defenses. The Court left other statutory issues and narrow exceptions for later resolution.
Dissents or concurrances
Justice Breyer joined the judgment but noted linguistic ambiguity and that later recognition might reflect earlier federal relations. Justice Souter would have allowed the Secretary and Tribe a chance to argue historic federal “jurisdiction” facts on remand. Justice Stevens dissented, arguing the Secretary lawfully could take land into trust for a recognized tribe and would have affirmed.
Opinions in this case:
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