OCTOBER TERM 2007 · DECIDED JUNE 26, 2008 · 5–2

554 U. S. ___ · No. 06-1457 · Argued February 19, 2008

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Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty.

AffirmedFinal ruling
energy regulationelectricity ratesFERCcontract lawutilities

Opinion of the Court by Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito

The Court ruled that federal energy regulators must presume that a freely negotiated wholesale electricity contract sets a fair price, and can only undo that price if it seriously harms the public interest — a strict standard that applies whether a seller or a buyer is complaining and regardless of the type of tariff under which the contract was formed.

The decision rejected a Ninth Circuit rule that would have made it easier to unwind these contracts, but the Court still sent the case back because it wasn't clear whether regulators had properly considered how much the contracts burdened customers over time or whether illegal market manipulation had tainted the negotiations.

Like fraud and duress, unlawful market activity that directly affects contract negotiations eliminates the premise on which the Mobile-Sierra presumption rests: that the contract rates are the product of fair, arms-length negotiations.
Justice Scalia

Explaining why proven market manipulation can defeat the presumption that a contract rate is fair.

How it got here: FERC upheld the contracts after a hearing; the Ninth Circuit granted the utilities' petitions for review and remanded with new legal standards; the sellers and FERC asked the Supreme Court to review that ruling.

The Case in Depth

What happened

During the 2000-2001 Western energy crisis, electricity prices spiked dramatically. Several western utilities, including one in Snohomish County, Washington, signed long-term contracts with power sellers like Morgan Stanley and American Electric Power, locking in rates that were very high compared to historical norms but far below the crisis-era spot market prices. After prices normalized, the utilities asked federal regulators to unwind or modify those contracts as unfair.

The question before the Court

When power companies sign long-term electricity contracts, must federal regulators presume the agreed price is fair unless it seriously hurts the public — even when a buyer, not a seller, later complains the price was too high?

Why it matters

Utilities and energy traders can rely more confidently on long-term power contracts staying in force even if market conditions later shift, which encourages this kind of price-locking deal. But utilities that signed contracts during the 2000-2001 Western energy crisis, and their ratepayers, must wait for FERC to decide on remand whether ongoing overcharges or market manipulation by sellers justify unwinding the deals.

What changes now

The case returns to FERC, which must clarify or expand its findings on two points: whether the contracts imposed an excessive ongoing burden on customers, not just an initial one, and whether unlawful market manipulation affected the contract negotiations. This is a final merits ruling on the legal standards to apply, but the practical outcome for these specific contracts awaits further agency proceedings on remand.

What this does not decide

The Court explicitly declined to rule on whether FERC's broader system of allowing 'market-based' tariffs is lawful, saying that question was not before it. It also did not decide the ultimate fate of these contracts, leaving that to FERC on remand.

Concurrences and dissents

Concurrence in part — Justice Ginsburg

Justice Ginsburg agreed only with the portion of the opinion finding two flaws in FERC's analysis, and would have preferred the Court wait for FERC to develop a fuller record on remand rather than deciding broader Mobile-Sierra questions now. She joined only Part III of the majority opinion.

Dissent — Justice Stevens

This holding finds no support in either case that lends its name to the doctrine.Stevens's central objection that the majority's presumption is not grounded in the Mobile and Sierra decisions themselves.

Justice Stevens argued the Federal Power Act draws no distinction between rates set by contract and rates set by tariff, so both should be judged only by the statute's plain just-and-reasonable standard, without any special presumption favoring contracts. He contended the majority invented the 'Mobile-Sierra presumption' from stray language in old cases and would have simply vacated and remanded for FERC to apply the ordinary statutory standard.

How the Court got there

The legal reasoning, step by step

  1. The Court applied the long-standing Mobile-Sierra presumption, which says that a rate set out in a freely negotiated wholesale power contract is presumed fair unless federal regulators find it seriously harms the public interest — a much stricter standard than typically applies to prices utilities set unilaterally.
  2. The Court rejected the idea that this presumption only kicks in after regulators get an early, presumption-free look at a contract, explaining that a prior decision requiring careful review of small-producer rate deregulation (Texaco) dealt with a different problem and did not create such a prerequisite.
  3. The Court also rejected requiring regulators to ask whether a contract was formed during a 'dysfunctional' market before applying the presumption, reasoning that parties often use long-term contracts precisely to shield themselves from market turmoil, and that punishing them for doing so would discourage such stabilizing deals.
  4. The Court held that the same tough standard applies equally when a buyer, rather than a seller, challenges a contract as too high, rejecting a looser 'zone of reasonableness' test tied to whether prices exceeded the cost of producing the electricity (marginal cost), because that would effectively erase the presumption whenever prices rose above cost.
  5. Applying this framework, the Court found two problems in the agency's own analysis: it may have only compared contract rates to pre-contract prices instead of ongoing burdens on customers, and it was unclear whether the agency had fully addressed claims that illegal market manipulation by sellers had tainted the contract negotiations, which would undercut the presumption of fairness.

Doctrinal impact

Laws and provisions at issue

Federal Power Act § 205(a)

Requires all wholesale electricity rates, whether by tariff or contract, to be just and reasonable.

Federal Power Act § 206(a)

Lets federal regulators replace an unjust or unreasonable rate, rule, or contract with a lawful one.

Cases affected by this decision

Distinguishes FPC v. Texaco Inc. (417 U. S. 380)

The Court said this case dealt with total deregulation of small producers, not the contract-rate presumption at issue here.

Reaffirms FPC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co. (350 U. S. 348)

The Court relied on and clarified this case as the source of the presumption that contract rates are fair absent public-interest harm.

Reaffirms Permian Basin Area Rate Cases (390 U. S. 747)

The Court used this case's 'unequivocal public necessity' language to describe how hard it is to override a contract rate.

Supreme Court Opinion

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Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty. | SCOTUS Reporter