Davis v. Federal Election Commission
The Court struck down the "Millionaire's Amendment," a federal election-law provision that let a candidate's opponent accept bigger contributions and unlimited party spending once the candidate spent more than $350,000 of personal money on the race.
The ruling means Congress cannot penalize a candidate's use of personal wealth by handing the opponent fundraising advantages, reinforcing that spending one's own money on a political campaign is closely guarded First Amendment activity.
“We have never upheld the constitutionality of a law that imposes different contribution limits for candidates who are competing against each other, and we agree with Davis that this scheme impermissibly burdens his First Amendment right to spend his own money for campaign speech.”
The core holding that asymmetrical contribution limits triggered by personal spending violate the First Amendment.
How it got here: A three-judge federal district court rejected Davis's constitutional challenge and granted summary judgment to the FEC; Davis took a direct appeal to the Supreme Court under BCRA's expedited-review provision.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Jack Davis, a Democratic candidate for a New York House seat, spent over a million dollars of his own money in both his 2004 and 2006 campaigns against the incumbent. Under BCRA's "Millionaire's Amendment," once his personal spending passed $350,000, his opponent became eligible for triple the normal contribution limits and unlimited party spending, and Davis had to file disclosures about his personal expenditures.
The question before the Court
Could Congress let a self-funding congressional candidate's opponent raise money under looser rules just because the candidate spent a lot of his own cash on the race?
The Court's answer
No — the Court ruled that Congress could not give a self-funding candidate's opponent access to higher contribution limits and unlimited party spending simply because the self-funder spent more than $350,000 of his own money. Because the burden fell only on candidates who exercised their First Amendment right to spend personal funds, and only after they crossed that threshold, the law had to survive the strictest constitutional test, requiring a compelling government reason.
The Court found no such reason: preventing corruption did not apply, since personal spending actually reduces corruption risk, and "leveling electoral opportunities" between wealthy and non-wealthy candidates was not a legitimate government interest under its precedents. Because the increased-limits scheme was unconstitutional, the disclosure rules built around it fell too.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Wealthy, self-funding candidates for federal office no longer have to worry that spending their own money will trigger special fundraising boosts for their opponents. The decision also signals to Congress that using campaign-finance rules to shrink the advantages of personal wealth is not, by itself, an acceptable justification for burdening a candidate's spending.
What changes now
The judgment against Davis is reversed, and the case returns to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the Court's holding that both the increased contribution limits and the related disclosure requirements are unconstitutional. This is a final merits ruling, not a temporary order, so the "Millionaire's Amendment" provisions at issue can no longer be enforced against self-funding House candidates.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide Davis's separate claim that the law also violated the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee, since it resolved the case entirely on First Amendment grounds. It also did not revisit or overrule Buckley v. Valeo's distinction between expenditure and contribution limits, an issue Justice Ginsburg specifically declined to reach.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent in part — Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens agreed the Court had jurisdiction but would have upheld the Millionaire's Amendment entirely. He argued Congress may legitimately limit or offset campaign spending to reduce the political influence of personal wealth, that the provision burdens no one's speech because it only amplifies an opponent's voice, and that Buckley's rejection of expenditure limits was itself wrongly decided.
Dissent in part — Justice Ginsburg
Justice Ginsburg agreed on standing and mootness and agreed the provisions were consistent with Buckley, joining only the jurisdictional portion of Stevens's opinion. Unlike Stevens, she declined to join his broader argument for revisiting Buckley's distinction between expenditure and contribution limits, noting the FEC had not asked the Court to overrule Buckley and the issue was unbriefed.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court first asked whether §319(a)'s higher contribution limits would raise any constitutional problem if they applied to every candidate equally, and concluded they would not, because Congress has no constitutional obligation to limit contributions at all.
- Because §319(a) instead raised limits only for a self-funding candidate's opponent, and only once the self-funder crossed a spending threshold, the Court treated the law as burdening the self-funder's right—recognized in Buckley v. Valeo, the 1976 decision governing campaign-finance limits—to spend unlimited personal funds on his own campaign speech.
- The Court reasoned that Buckley already rejected anti-corruption as a justification for restricting personal-fund spending, since a candidate who spends his own money relies less on outside contributions and therefore poses less corruption risk, not more.
- Applying the compelling-interest test required for a substantial burden on a fundamental right, the Court rejected the government's claim that "leveling electoral opportunities" between wealthy and non-wealthy candidates was a legitimate interest, warning that recognizing it would let Congress judge which candidate strengths should count, intruding on voters' own authority to weigh candidates.
- The Court distinguished this scheme from Buckley's approval of voluntary public financing conditioned on expenditure limits, noting that in Buckley a candidate could dodge the burden entirely by declining public funds, whereas here a self-funder had no way to exercise his spending right without triggering his opponent's expanded limits.
- Having found the contribution scheme in §319(a) unconstitutional, the Court concluded that §319(b)'s disclosure requirements, which existed only to administer that scheme, lost their justification along with it.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes Buckley v. Valeo (424 U. S. 1)
The Court said Buckley's approval of public-financing expenditure conditions does not apply because this law leaves no way to avoid the burden.