Burton v. Stewart
The Supreme Court did not decide whether a 2004 sentencing decision applies retroactively to old cases, because the prisoner who raised the question had skipped a required procedural step. He filed a second federal habeas petition challenging his sentence without first asking a court of appeals for permission, as the federal habeas law requires for repeat petitions.
Because he never got that permission, the trial court never had authority to hear his second petition in the first place. The Court vacated the appeals court's ruling and sent the case back with instructions to dismiss the petition entirely, leaving the underlying retroactivity question unresolved.
“Burton twice brought claims contesting the same custody imposed by the same judgment of a state court.”
The Court's key factual finding that Burton's two habeas petitions targeted the same sentence.
How it got here: A federal trial court denied Burton's second habeas petition on the merits; the Ninth Circuit affirmed; the State's jurisdictional objection was rejected below and the Supreme Court took up the case.
The Case in Depth
What happened
A Washington jury convicted Lonnie Burton of rape, robbery, and burglary in 1994, and after resentencing proceedings, the trial court entered a final sentence in 1998 reimposing 562 months in prison. Burton filed a federal habeas petition in 1998 challenging only his convictions, and later filed a second habeas petition in 2002 challenging his sentence under a Supreme Court decision about sentencing factfinding.
The question before the Court
Could a state prisoner file a second federal habeas petition challenging his sentence without first getting court of appeals permission, just because his sentencing claims weren't ready the first time around?
Why it matters
The ruling reminds state prisoners and their lawyers that federal habeas law's gatekeeping rules for repeat petitions are strictly enforced, even when a first petition left claims unexhausted for good reason. Prisoners who file a habeas petition with only some claims ready risk losing the chance to raise later claims unless they first get a federal appeals court's permission.
What changes now
The case returns to the trial court with instructions to dismiss Burton's habeas petition entirely for lack of jurisdiction, rather than deciding his sentencing claim on the merits. The retroactivity question the Court originally agreed to answer remains unresolved. Burton could still seek permission from the court of appeals to file a proper second habeas petition raising his sentencing claim, subject to the usual gatekeeping standards.
What this does not decide
The Court explicitly did not decide whether its 2004 sentencing decision, Blakely v. Washington, announced a new rule or whether that rule applies retroactively to already-final sentences on collateral review — the question it originally agreed to hear.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- Federal habeas law requires a prisoner filing a 'second or successive' petition challenging the same custody to first get permission from a federal court of appeals before a trial court can even consider it; without that permission, the trial court has no power to hear the case at all.
- The Court found Burton's 2002 petition challenged the same 1998 sentence and the same custody as his earlier 1998 petition, meaning it was a second petition requiring appeals-court authorization that Burton never sought.
- The Court considered, without deciding, whether an exception applies when a claim was genuinely not ready to be raised earlier, and looked to its precedent on 'mixed petitions' containing both ready and not-yet-ready claims.
- That precedent gives prisoners with mixed petitions two paths: withdraw the petition entirely to finish preparing all claims, or proceed only on the ready claims and risk losing the chance to raise the others later without special permission.
- Because Burton chose to proceed on his ready claims in 1998 rather than withdrawing his petition, the Court held he could not later claim his second petition avoided the second-or-successive bar simply because those claims weren't ready the first time.
- The Court distinguished cases Burton relied on, finding none of them excused a prisoner who chose to proceed on exhausted claims while knowingly leaving other claims unexhausted.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes Martinez-Villareal (523 U. S. 637)
Doesn't help Burton because, unlike that prisoner, he never raised his claim in his first petition.
Distinguishes Slack (529 U. S. 473)
Doesn't apply because Burton's first petition wasn't dismissed for containing unexhausted claims.
Reaffirms Rose v. Lundy (455 U. S. 509)
The Court relied on this case's framework for handling petitions mixing ready and not-yet-ready claims.
Distinguishes Castro v. United States (540 U. S. 375)
Doesn't apply because Burton's case involves no relabeling of a different kind of motion as a habeas petition.