OCTOBER TERM 2006 · DECIDED JUNE 25, 2007 · 7–2

551 U. S. ___ · No. 06-219 · Argued March 19, 2007

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Wilkie v. Robbins

Reversed and remandedFinal ruling
property rightsgovernment harassment claimsBivens lawsuitsfederal land managementracketeering law

Opinion of the Court by Justice Souter, joined by Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito

The Supreme Court ruled that a Wyoming rancher who accused Bureau of Land Management employees of a years-long harassment campaign to pressure him into giving up an easement could not sue those employees personally for money damages, either under the Constitution or under the federal racketeering law RICO.

The decision declines to expand the narrow category of cases where people can sue federal officials directly for constitutional violations, and it holds that a law aimed at extortion does not cover government employees pushing too hard to get property for the government itself rather than for private gain.

The point is the reasonable fear that a general Bivens cure would be worse than the disease.
Justice Souter

Explaining why the Court declined to create a new damages remedy for the rancher's harassment claim.

How it got here: The district court let Robbins' RICO claim and one Fifth Amendment retaliation claim proceed over qualified-immunity objections; the Tenth Circuit affirmed, and the government sought Supreme Court review.

The Case in Depth

What happened

Frank Robbins bought a Wyoming guest ranch without knowing the prior owner had granted the government a road easement that the Bureau of Land Management had never recorded, so Robbins took the land free of it. When the Bureau's error was discovered, an official demanded that Robbins regrant the easement for free; when he refused, Robbins says agency employees spent years harassing him through trespass charges, permit cancellations, surveillance, and a failed criminal prosecution.

The question before the Court

When federal land agents pressured a Wyoming rancher for years to give up an easement for free, could he sue them personally for damages under the Constitution or federal anti-racketeering law?

Why it matters

Federal employees who aggressively enforce property, permit, or land-use rules to further a government interest — rather than for personal profit — remain shielded from personal lawsuits under this ruling. Landowners facing similar pressure tactics must rely on existing administrative appeals and specific tort or agency-review remedies rather than a broad new damages claim, leaving Congress as the body to create any additional protection.

What changes now

The case is sent back to the lower courts, but with both the Bivens claim and the RICO claim eliminated, there is little left of Robbins' suit for damages against the individual officials; the Court did not need to address the qualified-immunity defense the agency employees had raised. This is a final merits ruling on the availability of these two causes of action, not a temporary order, though any remaining state-law or administrative avenues Robbins pursued separately are unaffected.

What this does not decide

The Court did not decide whether the BLM employees actually violated Robbins' Fifth Amendment rights or committed extortion — only that Robbins had no personal-capacity damages claim to pursue those theories. It also left open whether a valid government entitlement to property would be a full defense to extortion, since it resolved the RICO claim on other grounds.

Concurrences and dissents

Concurrence — Justice Thomas

Justice Thomas agreed that Robbins had no Bivens claim but wrote separately to argue he would go further: even if the majority's reasoning logically supported a Bivens remedy here, he would not extend Bivens at all, viewing it as an outdated exercise of judicial lawmaking that should be confined strictly to its original facts.

Dissent in part — Justice Ginsburg

Justice Ginsburg agreed that Robbins' RICO claim failed but would have allowed his Fifth Amendment retaliation claim to proceed, arguing that a seven-year campaign of harassment aimed at forcing him to surrender property for free was not ordinary hard bargaining but vindictive conduct that a workable, motive-based legal test could address. She argued the majority's fear of a flood of lawsuits was overstated and inconsistent with how courts already handle similar line-drawing problems, such as in sexual harassment law.

How the Court got there

The legal reasoning, step by step

  1. The Court applied its two-step framework for deciding whether to create a new judge-made damages remedy for constitutional violations (a 'Bivens' remedy): first asking whether existing administrative or judicial avenues already give convincing reason to leave the matter alone, and if not, weighing the reasons for and against fashioning a brand-new remedy as a common-law court would.
  2. Sorting Robbins' many grievances into categories — outright torts, formal charges, unfavorable permit decisions, and miscellaneous incidents — the Court found he had some administrative or judicial avenue open for nearly every complaint, even though he did not always use it, so existing remedies did not clearly foreclose a new claim but did not obviously require one either.
  3. Moving to the second step, the Court found Robbins' claim did not fit the mold of prior retaliation cases, which ask a 'what for' question — was the government's true purpose to punish protected conduct — because everyone agreed the agents' underlying goal (getting the easement) was lawful, so Robbins was really objecting that the agents went too far, not that their purpose was illegitimate.
  4. The Court reasoned that a 'too much' standard for judging when hard bargaining crosses into unconstitutional coercion would be far less workable and predictable than a 'what for' standard, since ordinary landowners and government negotiators alike routinely enforce their rights aggressively to gain leverage.
  5. The Court concluded that recognizing this kind of claim would open the door to lawsuits across a huge range of ordinary government property-related activity, from tax settlements to safety enforcement, and decided that any such damages remedy should come from Congress rather than the courts.
  6. On the racketeering claim, the Court read the Hobbs Act's ban on extortion 'under color of official right' according to its common-law meaning, which targeted public corruption for private gain, and concluded it does not cover officials pushing hard to obtain property for the government's own benefit, so the RICO claim built on that theory also failed.

Doctrinal impact

Laws and provisions at issue

Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents doctrine

Judge-made rule allowing lawsuits for money damages against federal officials for certain constitutional violations.

Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951

Federal law criminalizing interference with commerce through robbery or extortion, including by public officials.

RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968

Federal law allowing civil suits against people who commit patterns of specified crimes through an enterprise.

Fifth Amendment Takings Clause

Constitutional rule requiring the government to pay for private property it takes for public use.

Cases affected by this decision

Reaffirms Bush v. Lucas (462 U. S. 367)

The Court relied on Bush's two-step framework for deciding whether to create a new constitutional damages remedy.

Distinguishes United States v. Green (350 U. S. 415)

The Court said Green does not support extending Hobbs Act extortion liability to acts benefiting only the government.

Supreme Court Opinion

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