Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy
The Court ruled that a federal special-education law's fee-shifting provision lets winning parents recover attorneys' fees, but not the cost of hiring educational experts or consultants.
Because Congress passed the law using its power to attach strings to money it gives the states, any such financial obligation had to be spelled out clearly, and the Court found the law's text and history did not clearly impose that particular cost on school districts.
“Thus, the text of 20 U. S. C. §1415(i)(3)(B) does not authorize an award of any additional expert fees, and it certainly fails to provide the clear notice that is required under the Spending Clause.”
The Court's core reasoning that the fee-shifting provision does not cover expert fees.
How it got here: The Murphys won reimbursement for their son's tuition, then sought consultant fees; a federal trial court partly granted this, the Second Circuit affirmed, and the school board asked the Supreme Court to resolve a circuit split.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Pearl and Theodore Murphy sued their local school board under a federal special-education law to force it to pay for their son Joseph's private-school tuition, and they won. They then asked to be reimbursed for $29,350 in fees paid to Marilyn Arons, an educational consultant who helped them throughout the proceedings, arguing the law's fee provision covered such costs.
The question before the Court
When a special-education law lets courts award parents who win their case "reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs," does that also let them recover money paid to an educational consultant or expert?
The Court's answer
No — the Court ruled that the IDEA's fee-shifting provision, which lets courts award "reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs" to parents who win special-education cases, does not let parents also recover fees paid to educational consultants or experts. Because Congress enacted the law using its spending power, any financial obligation on states had to be spelled out clearly, and the word "costs" is a specific legal term that traditionally excludes expert fees.
The Court found this confirmed by two earlier rulings interpreting nearly identical language to exclude expert fees, and rejected the argument that a congressional committee report showed a different intent, since that report could not substitute for clear statutory text. Parents can still recover attorneys' fees, just not consultant or expert costs.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Parents of children with disabilities who win special-education disputes often rely on paid consultants to build their case, but after this ruling they cannot get reimbursed for those consultant or expert fees from the school district, even though they can recover lawyers' fees. That makes it more expensive for families to challenge school decisions using outside experts.
What changes now
The Second Circuit's ruling allowing the Murphys to recover their consultant's fees is reversed, and the case goes back to the lower courts to be handled consistent with this decision, meaning the Murphys cannot recover those fees. This is a final merits ruling that settles a split among federal appeals courts, so parents nationwide pursuing special-education cases can no longer recover expert or consultant fees under this provision unless Congress amends the law.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether states could ever choose to reimburse parents for expert fees on their own, or whether Congress could rewrite the law to explicitly cover such costs. It also left in place parents' right to recover attorneys' fees and did not touch other IDEA protections like private-school tuition reimbursement.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence in part — Justice Ginsburg
Justice Ginsburg agreed with the outcome and with the Court's reading of the law's text and prior cases, but disagreed with relying on a Spending Clause 'clear notice' requirement here. She argued that requirement applies to new programmatic obligations on states, not to disputes over remedies like fee awards, and noted IDEA also rests on Fourteenth Amendment authority.
Dissent — Justice Souter
Justice Souter joined Justice Breyer's dissent and wrote separately to stress the importance of a related provision requiring a government study of fee awards, which he thought supported reading the Conference Report as reflecting Congress's true intent to include expert fees.
Dissent — Justice Breyer
“I can find no good reason for this Court to interpret the language of this statute as meaning the precise opposite of what Congress told us it intended.”Breyer's objection to reading the law against Congress's stated intent in the Conference Report.
Justice Breyer argued that Congress clearly intended 'costs' to include expert fees, pointing to a Conference Committee Report adopted without objection by both houses and to the law's purpose of ensuring a genuinely free and appropriate education. He would have read the statute in light of this legislative history rather than treating 'costs' as an unambiguous term of art, and warned the ruling leaves many parents unable to afford the experts needed to challenge school districts.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- Because Congress passed the special-education law using its power to give money to states in exchange for following certain rules (the Spending Clause), any financial condition attached to that money must be spelled out clearly enough that a state official reviewing the law would understand it before accepting the funds.
- The Court read the law's actual words: it lets courts award 'reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs,' not 'costs' generally and not 'expenses.' 'Costs' is a specific legal term that traditionally does not include expert fees, and using it instead of a broader word like 'expenses' signaled Congress did not intend to cover every kind of expense parents might incur.
- The Court found this reading reinforced by two earlier decisions, Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons (a 1987 case interpreting a nearly identical costs provision in the federal rules) and West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey (a 1991 case interpreting almost identical wording in a civil-rights fee-shifting statute), both of which held that 'costs' does not include expert witness fees absent explicit statutory language saying so.
- The Court rejected the argument that a footnote in Casey and a Conference Committee Report meant Congress intended to include expert fees, explaining that the footnote only said the word 'attorneys' fees' alone does not normally cover expert costs, not that the committee report supplied the clear notice the Spending Clause requires.
- The Court concluded that unwritten legislative history could not substitute for clear statutory text when the text itself, along with the rest of the law's structure, pointed the other way, so the law does not authorize recovering expert or consultant fees.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc. (482 U. S. 437)
The Court relied on this case's rule that 'costs' means only what a specific cost statute lists, not open-ended expenses.
Reaffirms West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey (499 U. S. 83)
The Court treated this case's holding that similar wording excludes expert fees as directly controlling here.
Reaffirms Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman (451 U. S. 1)
The Court applied this case's rule that conditions on federal funding to states must be stated unambiguously.