Brosseau v. Haugen
The Supreme Court summarily ruled that a Washington police officer who shot a fleeing suspect in the back could not be sued, because no clearly established law at the time told her that shooting him was unconstitutional.
Without deciding whether the shooting itself violated the Fourth Amendment, the Court found the legal rules for using deadly force against a fleeing driver were too unsettled in 1999 to strip the officer of qualified immunity, reversing a Ninth Circuit ruling that had let the lawsuit go forward.
“The cases by no means "clearly establish" that Brosseau's conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.”
The Court's bottom-line conclusion that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity.
How it got here: A federal trial court granted the officer summary judgment on qualified immunity; the Ninth Circuit reversed; the officer asked the Supreme Court to review both rulings.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Officer Rochelle Brosseau shot Kenneth Haugen in the back as he tried to drive away after a standoff involving a stolen-tools dispute, a police chase, and a struggle at his Jeep. Haugen survived, pleaded guilty to eluding police, and then sued Brosseau under a federal civil-rights law, claiming the shooting was excessive force that violated his constitutional rights.
The question before the Court
Could a police officer be sued for shooting a fleeing suspect in the back, even though no prior court decision had clearly said that kind of shooting was unconstitutional?
Why it matters
Police officers facing split-second decisions about fleeing suspects gain reassurance that they won't face personal liability unless existing case law had already made clear their specific conduct was unlawful. The ruling makes it harder for people injured by police force to sue individual officers unless a closely similar precedent already existed, reinforcing how demanding the qualified immunity defense can be.
What changes now
The case returns to the lower courts, but because the Supreme Court found the officer entitled to qualified immunity, that ruling effectively ends Haugen's federal excessive-force claim against her personally, absent further proceedings on issues not addressed here. The Court did not decide whether the shooting was constitutional, and Haugen's separate state-law and city/department claims remain unaffected by this ruling.
What this does not decide
The Court explicitly declined to decide whether Officer Brosseau's shooting actually violated the Fourth Amendment. It ruled only that, whatever the answer, the law was not clear enough at the time to deny her qualified immunity, leaving the underlying constitutional question unresolved.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer joined the Court's opinion but urged reconsidering the Saucier rule requiring courts to decide the constitutional question before the qualified immunity question. He argued this rigid sequencing forces unnecessary rulings on hard constitutional issues and can even insulate constitutional decisions from meaningful review.
Dissent — Justice Stevens
“Under the Fourth Amendment, it was objectively unreasonable for Officer Brosseau to use deadly force against Kenneth Haugen in an attempt to prevent his escape.”Stevens's view that the shooting itself was unconstitutional, unlike the majority's silence on that question.
Justice Stevens argued the shooting was clearly unconstitutional under Tennessee v. Garner because Haugen posed only a speculative risk of an accidental collision, not a real threat of serious harm. He believed whether a reasonable officer could have thought otherwise was a genuinely factual question that should go to a jury, not be resolved by summary reversal without full briefing or argument.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court applied the two-step framework from Saucier v. Katz for qualified immunity claims: first asking whether the facts show a constitutional violation, then asking whether the violated right was clearly established at the time.
- The Court set aside the first question entirely, expressing no view on whether the shooting itself violated the Fourth Amendment's ban on excessive force, and focused only on whether the law was clearly established.
- The Court explained that 'clearly established' requires more than a general rule like the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard from Graham v. Connor and Tennessee v. Garner — the specific conduct at issue must have been placed beyond debate by case law addressing a similar situation.
- Reviewing the handful of relevant appellate cases on shooting fleeing drivers, the Court found they pointed in different directions: some upheld shootings of dangerous fleeing drivers, one found a shooting of a fleeing driver questionable, and none closely matched the facts here.
- Because those cases showed the law occupied a 'hazy border between excessive and acceptable force' rather than a settled rule, the Court concluded a reasonable officer in Brosseau's position would not have known her specific conduct was unlawful.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Saucier v. Katz (533 U.S. 194)
The Court relies on and applies Saucier's two-step qualified immunity framework without disturbing it.
Reaffirms Tennessee v. Garner (471 U.S. 1)
The Court treats Garner's deadly-force standard as governing law but finds it too general to resolve this specific case.
Reaffirms Graham v. Connor (490 U.S. 386)
The Court reaffirms Graham's objective-reasonableness test as the general Fourth Amendment excessive-force standard.