Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.

Background

Aviall bought four aircraft‑engine maintenance sites from Cooper and later discovered contamination from petroleum and other hazardous substances. The Texas commission warned Aviall to clean up the sites; Aviall performed remediation under state supervision, incurred roughly $5 million in costs, and sued Cooper in federal court. Aviall originally pleaded both a cost‑recovery claim and a contribution claim under federal cleanup law, then combined them and relied on §113(f)(1) for contribution.

Reasoning

The Court addressed whether a private party that has not been sued under the federal cleanup statutes §106 or §107(a) can seek contribution under §113(f)(1). The majority read the statute’s phrase “during or following any civil action” to limit §113(f)(1) to cases tied to a pending or concluded §106 or §107(a) action (or to settlements under a separate provision). The saving clause does not itself create a standalone contribution right, the Court said, and other parts of the statute (including limitations periods) reinforce that reading. Because Aviall was never subject to a §106 or §107(a) civil action, the Court held Aviall had no §113(f)(1) claim and reversed the Fifth Circuit.

Real world impact

The decision means companies or owners who voluntarily clean contaminated property cannot rely on §113(f)(1) to shift cleanup costs unless they are sued or fit the settlement pathway. The Court left open whether such parties can recover under §107 or by an implied contribution cause of action, and it remanded those questions for lower courts to address, so further litigation is likely.

Dissents or concurrances

Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justice Stevens) dissented, arguing the Court should have resolved whether §107 allows cost recovery by a potentially responsible party and would not have deferred that question.