Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.
The Supreme Court ruled that a federal environmental cleanup law's contribution provision only lets a company recover cleanup costs from other polluters if it has actually been sued in a related cleanup lawsuit first.
Because the company that cleaned up the contaminated Texas sites had never been sued under the law, it could not use that contribution provision, though the Court left open whether the company might still have a different route to recover its costs.
“The natural meaning of this sentence is that contribution may only be sought subject to the specified conditions, namely, "during or following" a specified civil action.”
The Court's core reading of when a company may seek contribution under the cleanup law.
How it got here: A federal trial court ruled for Cooper; a Fifth Circuit panel affirmed, but the full Fifth Circuit reversed en banc, prompting Cooper's appeal to the Supreme Court.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Cooper Industries owned Texas aircraft-maintenance sites before selling them to Aviall Services in 1981. Both companies had contaminated the properties with hazardous substances. A state environmental agency told Aviall to clean up the sites, though it never sued or issued a formal order. Aviall spent about $5 million cleaning up and then sued Cooper to recover a share of those costs.
The question before the Court
Can a company that voluntarily cleaned up polluted property sue another polluter for a contribution toward the costs, even though no one had sued the company first?
Why it matters
Companies and property owners who voluntarily clean up contamination without being sued cannot rely on this contribution provision to make other polluters pay their share, which may discourage some voluntary cleanups or push responsible parties toward waiting for litigation before acting.
What changes now
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision allowing the contribution claim and sent the case back for further proceedings. The lower courts will now have to address, for the first time, whether the company can pursue a separate cost-recovery claim under a different section of the cleanup law, an issue the Supreme Court explicitly left open rather than deciding itself.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether the company could still recover costs under a different provision of the cleanup law (cost recovery under Section 107), nor whether any judicially implied right to contribution survived a later amendment to the statute. Those questions were left for the lower courts.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Ginsburg
“In my view, the Court unnecessarily defers decision on Aviall's entitlement to recover cleanup costs from Cooper.”Ginsburg's central objection that the Court should have resolved the cost-recovery question now.
Justice Ginsburg argued the Court should not have deferred ruling on whether the company could recover costs under the separate cost-recovery section of the law. She pointed out that all justices in an earlier case agreed that section provided a cause of action for cleanup costs, and that the company's pleading choices were shaped by then-existing appeals court precedent, so it should not be treated as having given up that claim. She would have resolved the issue now rather than sending it back.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court focused on the text of the federal cleanup law's contribution provision, which lets a party seek contribution 'during or following' a specific type of civil lawsuit against it, and asked whether that phrase is a strict requirement or just one example of when contribution is available.
- The Court read 'may' in the provision as granting permission only under the stated condition, not as leaving the door open for contribution claims at any time; reading it more broadly would make the 'during or following' language pointless, something courts try to avoid when interpreting statutes.
- The Court also noted that a separate provision allowing contribution after a settlement would be unnecessary if contribution were already available at any time, reinforcing that Congress meant these to be the specific, limited paths to contribution.
- The Court examined a nearby 'saving clause' stating that nothing in the provision diminishes any other right to seek contribution outside of a lawsuit, and concluded that this clause merely preserves other possible legal rights elsewhere in the law rather than creating a new right or expanding this provision itself.
- Applying this reading to the facts, because the company that cleaned up the property had never been sued under the relevant sections of the cleanup law, it had no valid claim under this contribution provision.
- The Court declined to decide whether the company might still have a separate cost-recovery claim under a different section of the law, since the lower courts had not addressed that question and it fell outside what was briefed.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes Key Tronic Corp. v. United States (511 U.S. 809)
The Court said this earlier case did not resolve how the two cost-recovery and contribution sections relate to each other.