Leocal v. Ashcroft
The Supreme Court ruled that a drunk-driving conviction causing injury is not a "crime of violence" under federal law, because that law requires some level of intentional use of force, not just an accident.
The decision means a lawful permanent resident convicted of DUI causing injury cannot be deported as having committed an "aggravated felony" on that basis alone, resolving a split among federal appeals courts over how to treat state DUI laws that punish negligent or strict-liability conduct.
“While one may, in theory, actively employ something in an accidental manner, it is much less natural to say that a person actively employs physical force against another person by accident.”
Explaining why accidental conduct like drunk driving doesn't count as the 'use' of force.
How it got here: An immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals ordered Leocal deported; the Eleventh Circuit dismissed his appeal, and the Supreme Court agreed to review the resulting circuit split.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Josué Leocal, a Haitian citizen and lawful permanent U.S. resident, was convicted in Florida of drunk driving that caused serious injury to two people and served over two years in prison. Immigration officials sought to deport him, classifying his DUI conviction as a "crime of violence" and therefore an "aggravated felony" under federal immigration law, even though Florida's DUI statute requires no proof of intent to harm anyone.
The question before the Court
Does a DUI conviction that causes injury but requires no intent to hurt anyone count as a "crime of violence" that can get a legal immigrant deported?
The Court's answer
No — the Supreme Court ruled that a DUI conviction causing injury, like the one Florida imposed on Leocal, is not a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16, and so cannot by itself make a legal immigrant deportable as having committed an "aggravated felony." The Court read § 16's requirement of "use" of physical force to mean a purposeful or intentional act, not an accident, and Florida's DUI law required no proof of intent at all — it applied even to negligent drivers.
The Court also rejected the broader "substantial risk" provision of § 16(b) as covering DUI offenses, since that provision still requires the same active, purposeful use of force, just in the course of committing a felony like burglary. The Court left open whether a DUI law requiring proof of recklessness might qualify differently.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Legal immigrants convicted of DUI-causing-injury offenses that don't require proof of intent can no longer be automatically deported as having committed an "aggravated felony." The ruling also affects how the same statute is applied in purely criminal cases, since courts must read it the same way in both immigration and criminal contexts.
What changes now
The case is sent back to the Eleventh Circuit for further proceedings applying the Court's interpretation, which should mean Leocal's DUI conviction cannot support his removal as an aggravated felony on this ground. This is a final merits ruling that resolves the circuit split over whether DUI offenses lacking an intent requirement count as crimes of violence, affecting similar cases nationwide.
What this does not decide
The Court explicitly said it was not deciding whether a DUI or other offense that requires proof of reckless use of force against a person qualifies as a crime of violence under § 16. Its holding applies only to offenses like Florida's that require no particular mental state, such as negligence or strict liability.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court focused on the statutory definition of "crime of violence" in 18 U.S.C. § 16, which requires looking at the elements and nature of the offense itself rather than the specific facts of what happened in this case.
- Under § 16(a), an offense qualifies only if it has as an element the "use" of physical force against another person; the Court read "use" to require active, purposeful employment of force, not accidental or negligent conduct, drawing on its earlier interpretation of the same word in a different federal statute.
- Because Florida's DUI law does not require proving any mental state about using force — it punishes negligent or even strict-liability conduct — a conviction under it does not involve the kind of purposeful force that § 16(a) demands.
- Turning to § 16(b), which covers felonies that by their nature involve a substantial risk that force will be used, the Court held this provision still requires the same higher level of intent, and covers offenses like burglary where force might deliberately be used to complete the crime — not accidents like traffic injuries.
- The Court found support in a separate immigration provision where Congress listed "crime of violence" and DUI-causing-injury offenses as separate categories, showing Congress did not consider DUI offenses to already fall under the "crime of violence" definition.
- Applying the rule that ambiguous criminal statutes must be read in the defendant's favor, the Court concluded that DUI convictions lacking any intent requirement do not qualify as crimes of violence under § 16.