Cox, Georgia Secretary of State v. Larios
The Supreme Court summarily affirmed a lower court ruling that struck down Georgia's state House and Senate district maps, finding the small population differences between districts were used to protect Democratic incumbents and target Republicans for defeat rather than for any neutral map-drawing reason.
The decision confirms that even population deviations under 10% -- long treated as presumptively lawful -- can violate the Constitution's one-person, one-vote guarantee when the real purpose is partisan or incumbent-protection manipulation rather than a legitimate districting goal.
How it got here: A three-judge federal district court in Georgia struck down the maps as unconstitutional, and the Georgia Secretary of State appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
The Case in Depth
What happened
After the 2000 census, Georgia's legislature redrew its state House and Senate districts. A group of voters sued, arguing the new maps -- while keeping population deviations under 10% -- were deliberately drawn to underpopulate Democratic-held districts, overpopulate Republican-held ones, and pair Republican incumbents against each other to reduce their numbers.
The question before the Court
Did Georgia's legislature violate the one-person, one-vote rule by drawing state legislative districts with small population differences mainly to protect Democratic incumbents and unseat Republicans?
Why it matters
State legislators drawing districts can no longer assume that keeping population differences under 10% automatically insulates their maps from challenge. Lawmakers must be able to point to a genuine, neutral reason -- not incumbent protection or partisan advantage -- for any population imbalance, which affects how every state redraws districts after each census.
What changes now
The affirmance is final on the merits, leaving the lower court's ruling against Georgia's maps in place; Georgia had to adopt new legislative districts. The decision does not resolve broader partisan-gerrymandering doctrine, since the plaintiffs did not appeal the rejection of their separate partisan-gerrymandering claim, leaving that question for future cases.
What this does not decide
The Court did not adopt a general standard for partisan-gerrymandering claims or hold that all small population deviations are suspect. It left undisturbed the lower court's separate rejection of a stand-alone partisan-gerrymandering claim, which the challengers did not appeal, so that issue remains unresolved.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Stevens
“Drawing district lines that have no neutral justification in order to place two incumbents of the opposite party in the same district is probative of the same impermissible intent as the "uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure" that defined the boundary of Tuskegee, Alabama, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot”Stevens compares Georgia's incumbent-pairing tactics to a historic racial gerrymander.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, agreed with affirming the judgment but wrote separately to argue that the district court's findings also showed an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, even though that claim was not before the Court. He argued the evidence would have satisfied either the racial-gerrymandering standard or Justice Powell's proposed test from Bandemer, and predicted courts would eventually develop workable standards to strike down blatant partisan gerrymanders.
Dissent — Justice Scalia
“It is not obvious to me that a legislature goes too far when it stays within the 10% disparity in population our cases allow.”Scalia argues the map should be presumed valid because it stayed under the traditional 10% deviation threshold.
Justice Scalia argued the Court should not have summarily affirmed but instead set the case for full argument, because Georgia's map stayed within the traditional 10% population-deviation safe harbor and the question whether such maps can still be struck down for partisan motive was novel and unresolved. He warned that allowing challenges based on political motive within the safe harbor would invite politically motivated litigation over minor population differences.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court measured the maps against the one-person, one-vote principle under the Equal Protection Clause, which requires that legislative districts be roughly equal in population unless deviations serve a legitimate, neutral state policy.
- The district court's factual findings showed the population differences were not explained by traditional map-drawing goals like compactness, keeping counties whole, or preserving prior district cores.
- Instead, the evidence showed the deviations tracked a deliberate strategy of underpopulating Democratic-leaning districts and overpopulating and pairing Republican-held districts to help Democratic incumbents and defeat Republican ones.
- Because favoring particular regions or protecting incumbents (as opposed to incumbency generally) are not legitimate justifications for population deviations, the Court held these reasons could not save the maps from an equal-protection challenge.
- The Court declined the State's request to treat any deviation under 10% as automatically immune from scrutiny, concluding that even small deviations can be struck down when the record shows they were engineered for improper partisan or incumbent-protection purposes.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Reynolds v. Sims (377 U.S. 533)
Relies on its rule that population deviations must serve a rational, non-regional state policy.
Reaffirms Gaffney v. Cummings (412 U.S. 735)
Uses its warning that districting cannot invidiously minimize a political group's voting strength.
Distinguishes Davis v. Bandemer (478 U.S. 109)
Notes the lower court's separate partisan-gerrymandering ruling under Bandemer was not appealed or addressed here.