Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
The Court ruled that a federal statute letting district courts help gather evidence for foreign proceedings can cover a company's antitrust complaint pending before European Union regulators, even though the complaining company isn't a formal party and no formal case is yet pending.
The decision rejects several limits companies had argued should apply -- that only official litigants can seek U.S. help, that a foreign case must already be pending, and that the evidence must be something the foreign body could have ordered on its own -- while leaving district courts free to deny such requests case by case.
“We caution, however, that § 1782(a) authorizes, but does not require, a federal district court to provide judicial assistance to foreign or international tribunals or to "interested person[s]" in proceedings abroad.”
The Court clarifies that district courts have discretion, not an obligation, to grant this kind of discovery help.
How it got here: A federal district court denied AMD's discovery request; the Ninth Circuit reversed and sent the case back; Intel asked the Supreme Court to review that reversal.
The Case in Depth
What happened
AMD and Intel are worldwide competitors in making computer microprocessors. AMD filed an antitrust complaint with the European Commission's competition arm, accusing Intel of abusing its dominant market position through rebates, exclusive deals, and pricing practices. To support that complaint, AMD asked a U.S. federal court to order Intel to turn over documents Intel had produced in an earlier, separate lawsuit in Alabama.
The question before the Court
Could a U.S. federal court order Intel to hand over documents so AMD could use them in an antitrust complaint AMD had filed with European Union regulators, even though AMD wasn't a formal litigant there?
The Court's answer
Yes — the Court ruled that AMD could use the federal discovery statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a), to seek Intel's documents for use in AMD's antitrust complaint before the European Commission, even though AMD was only a complainant rather than a formal litigant, and even though the Commission's investigation hadn't yet reached a formal adjudicative stage. The Court rejected each of the categorical limits Intel proposed: complainants with real participation rights count as 'interested persons,' the European Commission counts as a 'tribunal' when it acts as a first-instance decisionmaker subject to court review, a foreign proceeding need only be reasonably contemplated rather than pending, and there's no requirement that the evidence be discoverable under the foreign tribunal's own rules.
This doesn't mean AMD automatically gets the documents. The Court emphasized that district courts retain discretion to grant or deny such requests based on practical factors, including whether the evidence-holder is already part of the foreign proceeding and whether the foreign body actually wants the assistance, and sent the case back for that discretionary decision.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Companies and individuals involved in investigations or complaints before foreign regulators, agencies, or international bodies now have a clearer path to seek evidence located in the United States, even before a formal legal case begins abroad. Businesses facing overseas antitrust or regulatory scrutiny may see more discovery requests filed against them in U.S. courts as a result.
What changes now
The case returns to the district court, which must now decide, using the discretionary factors the Court laid out, whether to actually grant AMD's request for Intel's documents. This is a final ruling on the legal questions about the discovery statute's scope, but it is not the last word on whether AMD gets the specific documents it wants -- that determination is left for further proceedings below.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether AMD should actually receive the documents it requested. It held only that the district court has legal authority to consider the request; whether granting it is appropriate, given concerns like confidentiality and the European Commission's own preferences, remains for the district court to resolve on remand.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia agreed with the outcome because the statute's text alone compels it, but objected to the majority's heavy reliance on Senate Committee Report language. He argued that legislative history reflects only a committee's views, not the full Congress or the President who signed the bill, and that courts should rely on the statute's words rather than potentially selective or contradicted committee commentary.
Dissent — Justice Breyer
“That is why I believe the statute, while granting district courts broad authority to order discovery, nonetheless must be read as subject to some categorical limits, at least at the outer bounds”Breyer's core objection that the majority's reading lacks needed limiting principles.
Justice Breyer argued the majority read the statute more broadly than Congress likely intended, warning it could let private parties abroad use costly, time-consuming U.S. discovery to pressure competitors or foreign regulators who don't even want the assistance. He would have adopted two categorical limits: courts should defer to a foreign body's own view of whether it counts as a 'tribunal,' and should deny discovery unavailable under both foreign and analogous domestic law absent a special showing of need. Applying those limits, he would have dismissed AMD's request entirely.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court read the discovery statute's text first, noting it lets a district court assist 'any interested person,' a phrase broader than 'litigant,' since a statute's caption cannot narrow language the text itself makes plain.
- Because a complainant who triggers a European Commission investigation can submit evidence and later seek court review of the Commission's decision, the Court found such a complainant has enough of a stake to count as an 'interested person' under the statute.
- The Court examined the statute's history, noting Congress in 1964 replaced 'judicial proceeding' with 'tribunal' specifically to extend assistance to administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, so the European Commission qualifies as a tribunal when it acts as a first-instance decisionmaker whose rulings are reviewable in court.
- The Court found Congress had deliberately deleted the word 'pending' from the statute in 1964, so a foreign proceeding need only be within reasonable contemplation, not already underway or imminent, for a discovery request to be valid.
- Applying ordinary rules against reading unstated conditions into a statute, the Court declined to add a requirement that the sought evidence be something discoverable under the foreign tribunal's own rules, since the statute's text imposes no such limit and Congress could have written one in if intended.
- Having found no categorical bar to AMD's request, the Court identified discretionary factors -- such as whether the evidence-holder is already a participant in the foreign proceeding, the foreign tribunal's receptivity to U.S. assistance, and whether a request is unduly intrusive -- for the district court to weigh in deciding whether to actually grant the request.