Tennessee v. Lane
The Supreme Court ruled that states can be sued for money damages under the disability-rights law's requirement that courthouses and court proceedings be accessible, because that requirement enforces the constitutional right to access the courts.
The decision means people with disabilities who are shut out of courthouses or court proceedings can sue their state government for damages, at least in this narrow context, even though the Court left open whether other parts of the law reach that far.
“Congress' § 5 power is not, however, unlimited.”
The majority acknowledges limits on Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment even while upholding this law.
How it got here: A federal trial court refused to dismiss the suit on immunity grounds; the Sixth Circuit affirmed; Tennessee asked the Supreme Court to review the immunity question.
The Case in Depth
What happened
George Lane, a paraplegic, was forced to crawl up two flights of stairs to reach a courtroom for a criminal hearing, and was later arrested for refusing to crawl again or be carried. Beverly Jones, a paraplegic court reporter, said she lost work because she couldn't access several county courthouses. Both sued Tennessee and several counties under a federal disability-rights law.
The question before the Court
Could Congress make states pay money damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act for failing to make courthouses accessible to people with disabilities?
The Court's answer
Yes — the Court ruled that Congress validly stripped states of their usual immunity from lawsuits, at least for the part of the disability-rights law requiring accessible courts. Congress had documented widespread exclusion of disabled people from courthouses and court proceedings, and the law's accommodation requirement was a reasonable, limited response to that problem, tied directly to the constitutional right of access to the courts.
The Court did not decide whether the law's other applications—like accessibility at parks or voting booths—also override state immunity; it addressed only the courthouse-access context. Four justices dissented, arguing Congress never actually documented real constitutional violations by states in this area, so the law went beyond what the Constitution requires and improperly rewrote the states' legal obligations.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
People with disabilities gain a real financial remedy when a state court system fails to accommodate them, rather than just the ability to ask a court to order fixes going forward. States and counties running courthouses now have a stronger incentive to ensure ramps, elevators, and other accommodations are in place, since noncompliance can mean paying damages.
What changes now
The ruling is a final decision on the merits, resolving that Tennessee cannot claim immunity from Lane and Jones's damages suit over courthouse access. The case, as it had been in a preliminary posture, can now proceed toward trial or settlement on the underlying discrimination claims. The decision leaves open whether other parts of the disability-rights law—covering things like voting booths or recreational facilities—also strip states of immunity, since the Court decided only the courthouse-access question.
What this does not decide
The Court expressly limited its ruling to the class of cases involving access to judicial services, not the law's application to other government activities like voting booths, hockey rinks, or other public programs. It also did not decide whether the law's employment-discrimination title validly abrogates state immunity, since that was resolved differently in an earlier case.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Souter
Justice Souter joined the majority but flagged reservations he'd expressed before about the Court's approach to state immunity and Section 5 power generally. He added that if the Court had looked even more broadly at the historical record, as the dissent urged, the evidence would only reinforce the case for congressional action, pointing to old Supreme Court decisions that upheld forced sterilization and exclusion of disabled children from school.
Concurrence — Justice Ginsburg
Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the disability-rights law aims to secure equal citizenship for people with disabilities through reasonable accommodation, not just formal equal treatment. She argued it would be impractical to require Congress to formally accuse each state of constitutional violations before acting under its enforcement power, since lawmakers are naturally reluctant to condemn their own states.
Dissent — Justice Rehnquist
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued the majority's ruling cannot be squared with an earlier decision striking down the law's employment provisions, because Congress never identified real evidence that states were denying disabled people constitutional rights of court access specifically. He contended the record consisted of vague, anecdotal evidence about physical inaccessibility, not proof of actual due process violations, and that the law's sweeping accommodation requirements go far beyond what the Constitution demands.
Dissent — Justice Scalia
“Requiring access for disabled persons to all public buildings cannot remotely be considered a means of "enforcing" the Fourteenth Amendment.”Scalia's core objection that the law goes far beyond enforcing any actual constitutional violation.
Justice Scalia argued the Court should abandon its flexible 'congruence and proportionality' test entirely as too malleable and instead limit Congress's enforcement power to measures that closely track actual constitutional violations, with broader deference reserved specifically for laws targeting racial discrimination. Under his preferred approach, the disability-rights law's broad accommodation mandate would not qualify as valid enforcement legislation.
Dissent — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas joined the Chief Justice's dissent in full, agreeing Congress lacked evidence of a pattern of due-process violations and that the law reaches far beyond courthouse access. He wrote separately only to note he was not relying on the earlier Hibbs decision, which he continues to believe was wrongly decided.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court applied its three-step framework from a prior case (City of Boerne) for deciding whether a federal civil-rights law validly strips states of their usual immunity from lawsuits: first identify the constitutional right Congress was enforcing, then look at the history of constitutional violations Congress had before it, then ask whether the law's remedy is 'congruent and proportional'—reasonably matched—to that problem.
- The Court identified that the disability-rights law's courthouse-access requirement enforces the Due Process Clause's guarantee that people get a meaningful chance to be heard and participate in court proceedings, a right with a long pedigree in the Court's own cases.
- Reviewing the record Congress had compiled—reports finding most public buildings inaccessible, congressional testimony about physically inaccessible courthouses, judicial decisions documenting exclusion of disabled people from juries and courtrooms—the Court found ample evidence of a pattern of unconstitutional treatment in the administration of justice.
- The Court held that it did not need to evaluate the disability-rights law as a whole, but could uphold it just 'as applied' to the class of cases involving court access, since Congress had power to reach at least that category of conduct.
- Weighing the law's actual requirement—reasonable, flexible modifications rather than mandatory identical treatment, with exceptions for undue financial or administrative burdens—against the seriousness of denying court access, the Court concluded the remedy was appropriately tailored and did not rewrite the Constitution's own requirements.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett (531 U. S. 356)
The Court distinguished this case, which barred damages suits under the law's employment title, from the court-access context here.
Reaffirms City of Boerne v. Flores (521 U. S. 507)
The Court relied on and applied this case's 'congruence and proportionality' test for valid enforcement legislation.
Reaffirms Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs (538 U. S. 721)
The Court relied on this recent decision upholding a family-leave law as a model for validating prophylactic legislation.