Grutter v. Bollinger
The Supreme Court upheld the University of Michigan Law School's practice of considering race as one factor among many in admissions, ruling that a school's interest in the educational benefits of a diverse student body can be compelling enough to justify limited use of race.
The 5-4 decision preserved affirmative action in higher education admissions nationwide, but the Court said such race-conscious programs must be flexible, individualized, and not open-ended -- expressing hope that racial preferences would no longer be necessary within 25 years.
How it got here: A federal trial court ruled the Law School's admissions policy unconstitutional; the en banc Sixth Circuit reversed; Grutter asked the Supreme Court to review that reversal.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Barbara Grutter, a white Michigan resident with a 3.8 GPA and 161 LSAT score, was rejected by the University of Michigan Law School in 1997. The school's admissions policy sought "a critical mass" of underrepresented minority students -- African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans -- to obtain the educational benefits of a diverse student body, while also considering many other individual traits and experiences. Grutter sued, claiming the school's use of race as a factor cost her admission and violated her right to equal treatment.
The question before the Court
Could a public law school consider race as one factor among many in deciding which applicants to admit, in order to build a diverse student body?
The Court's answer
Yes -- the Court ruled that a public law school could consider an applicant's race as one factor among many, because obtaining the educational benefits that come from a diverse student body is a compelling interest that can justify limited, carefully designed use of race in admissions. The Law School's program passed muster because it treated race as a flexible "plus" factor within a holistic review of each applicant's full file, rather than reserving seats or applying a fixed formula.
The Court also required that such programs stay tailored to their goal: schools must seriously consider workable race-neutral alternatives, avoid anything resembling a quota, and periodically revisit whether racial preferences remain necessary. The majority expressed hope that this kind of race-conscious admissions program would no longer be needed roughly 25 years after the decision.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Colleges and professional schools across the country can continue weighing race alongside grades, test scores, and other qualities when building a class, as long as they avoid quotas and evaluate each applicant individually. Rejected applicants who believe race cost them a seat retain a path to challenge programs that operate more like numerical targets than individualized review.
What changes now
The Sixth Circuit's judgment upholding the Law School's admissions policy stands, so the school may continue considering race as one factor among many. This is a final merits ruling, not a temporary order, and it set the framework other colleges and universities have used to design admissions programs. The Court's own opinion anticipated that racial preferences of this kind would no longer be needed roughly 25 years from the decision.
What this does not decide
The Court did not approve quotas, rigid point systems, or race-based decisions untethered from individualized review of each applicant -- a companion case decided the same day, Gratz v. Bollinger, struck down a point-based undergraduate admissions system on those grounds. The ruling also does not address whether other institutions' specific admissions programs meet the same standard.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Ginsburg
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, agreed with the majority but stressed that international human-rights treaties similarly treat affirmative action as temporary. She noted that lower courts had been divided on the use of race in admissions for much of the 25 years since Bakke, and that persistent school segregation and racial bias make it uncertain, though hopeful, that preferences can end within a generation.
Dissent in part — Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, joined the Chief Justice's dissent and most of Justice Thomas's opinion, calling the Law School's 'critical mass' justification a sham covering proportional racial admissions. He warned the decision would spawn years of confusing litigation over whether schools' racial preferences fit within Grutter or the companion Gratz ruling.
Dissent in part — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia as to most of his opinion, argued the Law School's real interest was preserving elite status, not diversity, and that this does not meet the high bar for using race. He agreed only that the majority's 25-year sunset confirms the practice is unlawful, arguing it is actually unconstitutional now, not just eventually, and criticized the harm and stigma he believes racial preferences inflict on their intended beneficiaries.
Dissent — Justice Rehnquist
“Stripped of its "critical mass" veil, the Law School's program is revealed as a naked effort to achieve racial balancing.”The dissent's core objection that the admissions program was really a disguised quota.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, argued the Law School's admissions data show the program was not really about achieving a flexible critical mass but about matching each minority group's admission rate to its share of applicants -- effectively unconstitutional racial balancing dressed up in different language. He would have held the program failed narrow tailoring both for this reason and because it had no genuine time limit.
Dissent — Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy agreed that diversity could in principle justify some use of race under Justice Powell's Bakke framework, but argued the majority failed to actually apply strict scrutiny to how the Law School implemented its program. He pointed to the school's steady, narrow range of minority enrollment and its reliance on daily tracking reports as evidence that individualized review gave way to an unstated quota.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- Because the Law School's policy treated applicants differently based on race, the Court applied strict scrutiny -- the toughest test in constitutional law, requiring the government to show both a compelling reason for using race and a tightly tailored program.
- The Court held that a school's judgment that student body diversity produces real educational benefits -- like breaking down racial stereotypes and preparing students for a diverse workforce -- can itself be a compelling interest, giving some deference to the school's own academic judgment about its educational mission.
- Applying the narrow-tailoring half of strict scrutiny, the Court asked whether the program treated race as a flexible 'plus' factor in a holistic review of each applicant, rather than as a rigid quota that walls off certain seats or automatically boosts an applicant's chances.
- The Court found the Law School's program used race flexibly alongside many other individual factors, considered race-neutral alternatives like lotteries or lower admissions standards, and rejected them because they would sacrifice both diversity and academic quality.
- Because race-based programs must eventually end, the Court concluded the Law School's program was lawful now but added that it expected racial preferences of this kind would no longer be necessary in about 25 years.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke (438 U.S. 265)
The Court endorsed Justice Powell's Bakke view that student diversity can be a compelling interest justifying limited use of race.