Gratz v. Bollinger
The Supreme Court struck down the University of Michigan's undergraduate admissions system, which automatically gave every applicant from an underrepresented minority group one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission.
The Court said this automatic point bonus made race a decisive factor for nearly every minority applicant, rather than allowing the individualized, applicant-by-applicant review the Constitution requires when a university uses race in admissions.
“We find that the University's policy, which automatically distributes 20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single "underrepresented minority" applicant solely because of race, is not narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational diversity that respondents claim justifies their program.”
The Court's core reason for striking down the automatic point-based admissions system.
How it got here: A federal trial court upheld the university's 1999-2000 admissions system but struck down its earlier system; the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case before the Sixth Circuit ruled.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher, both white applicants, were denied admission to the University of Michigan's undergraduate college even though the university automatically admitted virtually every qualified applicant from certain minority groups. The university's admissions formulas awarded minority applicants a fixed 20-point bonus (out of 150 points, with 100 needed for likely admission) solely because of their race, without individualized review of their files.
The question before the Court
Could a public university automatically award extra admissions points to every applicant from certain racial minority groups?
The Court's answer
No — the Court ruled that the University of Michigan's undergraduate admissions system was not narrowly tailored to its diversity goal, because it automatically gave every applicant from an underrepresented minority group one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, based solely on race. That mechanical bonus made race a decisive factor for nearly every minimally qualified minority applicant, rather than one factor weighed individually alongside a person's full background and qualifications, as the Constitution requires.
The Court did not say universities can never consider race in admissions — its companion decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, issued the same day, upheld the law school's more individualized, holistic review process. The problem here was specifically the automatic, formula-driven point system, which left little room for admissions officers to weigh each applicant as an individual.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Colleges and universities that use race as a factor in admissions had to abandon rigid, formula-based point systems and instead build admissions processes that evaluate each applicant as an individual. The decision, issued alongside Grutter v. Bollinger, shaped how selective schools nationwide could design race-conscious admissions policies for years to come.
What changes now
The case was sent back to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with the ruling, meaning the university had to redesign its undergraduate admissions system to allow individualized consideration of each applicant rather than automatic point awards based on race. This is a final merits decision, not a temporary order, and it worked alongside the Court's companion ruling in Grutter v. Bollinger, which upheld the law school's more individualized approach the same day.
What this does not decide
The Court did not rule out race-conscious admissions altogether or hold that diversity can never justify considering race; that question was addressed in the companion case, Grutter v. Bollinger, decided the same day. This decision addresses only whether this particular point-based system was narrowly tailored, not the university's separate transfer-admissions policy on the merits.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor agreed the point system failed to provide meaningful individualized review, contrasting it with the law school's holistic approach upheld in Grutter. She emphasized that the mechanized selection index, not the consideration of race itself, was the constitutional problem, and that the university remained free to redesign a system that did provide individualized review.
Concurrence — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas joined the majority but reiterated his broader view, expressed in Grutter, that any use of race in higher education admissions is categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. He noted the LSA policy avoided discriminating among minority groups but still failed because it did not allow consideration of nonracial distinctions among minority applicants.
Concurrence — Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment reversing the lower court but did not join the majority's opinion. He joined most of Justice O'Connor's concurrence and Part I of Justice Ginsburg's dissent, agreeing that government may properly distinguish between policies of inclusion and exclusion when applying the Constitution's equality requirement.
Dissent — Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens argued the case should have been dismissed because neither Gratz nor Hamacher had standing to seek an injunction: both had already enrolled elsewhere before suing, and Hamacher's claimed intent to transfer could not support a challenge to the freshman admissions policy since the transfer policy differed and was never actually challenged on its merits.
Dissent — Justice Souter
Justice Souter agreed Hamacher lacked standing but also argued that, even reaching the merits, the point system was not unconstitutional. He viewed it as closer to the individualized approach approved in Grutter than to the rigid quota struck down in Bakke, since all applicants could still compete for every seat and minority status was just one weighted factor among many; Justice Ginsburg joined this reasoning in Part II.
Dissent — Justice Ginsburg
“If honesty is the best policy, surely Michigan's accurately described, fully disclosed College affirmative action program is preferable to achieving similar numbers through winks, nods, and disguises.”Ginsburg's argument that transparent race-conscious policies should not be punished more than disguised ones.
Justice Ginsburg would have upheld the admissions program, arguing the Constitution permits government to distinguish between race-conscious measures that exclude or burden minorities and those designed to include them and remedy lingering societal inequality. She warned that requiring universities to disguise race-conscious efforts as neutral criteria (like percentage plans) rewards obfuscation over the university's transparent approach; Justice Souter joined fully and Justice Breyer joined Part I.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- Because the university openly used race in admissions, the Court applied strict scrutiny — the strictest constitutional test, requiring a compelling government interest and a law narrowly tailored, or closely fitted, to achieving it.
- The Court accepted, as it held the same day in Grutter v. Bollinger, that a university's interest in a diverse student body can count as a compelling interest.
- Drawing on Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, the Court explained that narrow tailoring in this context requires truly individualized review — each applicant's race may be considered as one factor among many, but it cannot be assigned a fixed, decisive value that applies automatically to every member of a group.
- The Court found that awarding every underrepresented minority applicant an automatic 20-point bonus, regardless of that individual's other qualities, made race the decisive factor in the vast majority of cases rather than one factor considered alongside others.
- Because the small number of files later flagged for individualized review by a separate committee did not offset the automatic point system governing the vast bulk of decisions, the admissions program failed narrow tailoring even though a diversity interest could be compelling.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Bakke (438 U.S. 265)
The Court relied on Justice Powell's Bakke opinion that diversity can be compelling but requires truly individualized review of each applicant.