United States v. American Library Assn., Inc.
The Supreme Court upheld a federal law requiring public libraries to install internet filtering software as a condition of receiving certain federal funding for internet access, reversing a lower court that had struck the law down.
The Court found that filtering software does not violate library patrons' free speech rights, in part because adults can ask a librarian to unblock a site or disable the filter, so Congress can attach the filtering requirement to its funding programs without inducing an unconstitutional practice.
“A library's need to exercise judgment in making collection decisions depends on its traditional role in identifying suitable and worthwhile material; it is no less entitled to play that role when it collects material from the Internet than when it collects material from any other source.”
The plurality's core reasoning that libraries may treat internet filtering like traditional collection decisions.
How it got here: A three-judge federal district court held the law facially unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement; the government appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Congress created two federal programs helping public libraries pay for internet access. Concerned that libraries were becoming conduits for pornography, including exposure of children to explicit material, Congress passed a law requiring libraries receiving these funds to install filtering software blocking obscene material and, for minors, material harmful to them. A group of libraries, library associations, patrons, and website publishers sued, arguing the law violated the First Amendment.
The question before the Court
Could Congress require public libraries to install internet pornography filters as a condition of receiving federal funding for internet access?
The Court's answer
Yes — the Court ruled that Congress can condition library internet funding on the use of filtering software without violating the First Amendment. The plurality reasoned that a library's decision about what material to make available, including online material, is a collection decision like choosing which books to buy, not a restriction on a public forum, so libraries retain broad discretion over such choices.
Because filtering software does not turn out to violate library patrons' rights, the law does not force libraries into unconstitutional conduct, so Congress's spending condition is valid. The Court also noted that any burden from erroneous overblocking is minimal because librarians can unblock sites or disable filters for adults on request.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Public libraries around the country that accept federal internet-access subsidies must keep filtering software on their computers or lose that funding. Adult patrons who want unfiltered access must ask library staff to unblock a site or turn off the filter, and children's access to online material remains restricted by default.
What changes now
The judgment of the district court is reversed, meaning the law remains in effect and libraries must comply with the filtering requirement to keep receiving federal internet funding. This is a final merits decision, though several justices left open the possibility of a future as-applied challenge if libraries do not actually make unblocking readily available to adults as the government represented at argument.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether the law is constitutional as applied to any specific library that fails to allow easy unblocking for adults; Justice Kennedy's and Justice Breyer's concurrences expressly reserved that question for a future as-applied challenge if the government's assurances about easy unblocking turn out not to be followed in practice.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, emphasizing that the case turns on the government's representation that adults can get sites unblocked or filters disabled without significant delay. He noted the district court's finding about possible delays was not a specific finding and was not the basis of its decision. He said that if some libraries lack the capacity to unblock promptly, that would be grounds for a future as-applied challenge, not this facial one.
Concurrence — Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer agreed the law is constitutional but applied a different, heightened-but-not-strict scrutiny standard rather than treating the case as a pure collection-decision analysis. He found the law's objectives legitimate and compelling, and concluded the burden imposed on patrons seeking unblocking was comparatively small and not disproportionate to the law's goals, given the option to request unblocking.
Dissent — Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens argued the law is an unconstitutional nationwide mandate that improperly forces all libraries to filter, regardless of local circumstances, and that the resulting overblocking of vast amounts of protected speech amounts to a significant prior restraint on adult access to information. He argued the funding condition amounts to an unconstitutional condition because it penalizes libraries' exercise of First Amendment-protected editorial judgment, and that Rust v. Sullivan does not control because these programs do not convey a specific government message.
Dissent — Justice Souter
“This would simply be censorship.”Souter's central objection that library filtering of already-acquired internet access is censorship, not a collection decision.
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, argued that if a library imposed this kind of blocking on its own, unconnected to funding, it would be unconstitutional censorship subject to strict scrutiny, because blocking already-acquired internet access differs fundamentally from a scarcity-driven decision not to buy a book. He argued that historical library practice shows libraries have not traditionally denied adults access to material in their collections, undermining the plurality's collection-decision analogy, and that the law is therefore an unconstitutional condition.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court applied Spending Clause doctrine, which lets Congress attach conditions to federal funding as long as the condition does not force the recipient to do something that would itself be unconstitutional if the recipient did it on its own.
- The Court then asked whether a library's use of internet filtering software would violate patrons' First Amendment rights if the library adopted the practice independently, since that is the real question under spending-power precedent.
- Rather than treating library internet terminals as a public forum -- a government-created space open for public expression that would trigger the toughest free-speech review -- the Court concluded that providing internet access is simply another form of collection decision, akin to choosing which books to buy, and such decisions get only minimal judicial scrutiny.
- Because libraries have always exercised editorial discretion in selecting materials, and have traditionally excluded pornography from their print collections, the Court found it reasonable for libraries to exclude similar material online through filtering software.
- The Court treated any problems from filters mistakenly blocking legitimate content as minor, because the law lets libraries disable the filter or unblock specific sites for adult patrons who ask, without requiring an explanation.
- Concluding that library filtering does not violate patrons' constitutional rights, the Court found no unconstitutional inducement problem, and separately rejected the argument that the funding condition was an unconstitutional condition, since Congress may define the limits of a program it funds.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms South Dakota v. Dole (483 U.S. 203)
The Court relies on Dole's rule that Congress cannot use funding conditions to induce recipients into unconstitutional conduct.
Reaffirms Rust v. Sullivan (500 U.S. 173)
The Court relies on Rust to hold that Congress may define the limits of a program it funds without creating an unconstitutional condition.