Crossman v. Burrill
Headline: Maritime ruling reverses demurrage award, limits shipowners’ recovery when enemy firing made unloading impossible, and sends case back for trial to decide who caused the delay.
Holding: The Court ruled that a clause ending the charterers’ responsibility on signing bills of lading does not bar demurrage claims, but delay caused by enemy firing is a defense; the case is reversed and remanded for proof.
- Prevents demurrage recovery when enemy hostilities make unloading impossible.
- Says signed bills of lading alone do not bind consignees to charter demurrage terms.
- Remands case for factual proof about whether firing actually prevented unloading.
Summary
Background
Ship owners of the bark Kate Burrill sued the charterers to recover demurrage after the vessel took fifty-three days to finish unloading lumber at Rio Janeiro. The charter-party required unloading at a set daily rate, promised demurrage for detention by the charterers, and included a clause saying the charterers’ responsibility ceased once bills of lading were signed. The master had signed bills of lading that were later assigned to local consignees who received the cargo.
Reasoning
The Court addressed two main issues in plain terms: whether the cesser clause (ending the charterers’ responsibility when bills of lading were signed) barred demurrage, and whether hostile firing in the harbor could excuse the delay. The Court held that the cesser clause did not automatically defeat a demurrage claim because the bills of lading did not bind consignees to the charter’s specific demurrage terms, and the ship’s lien and charter obligations must be read together. The Court also held that a detention caused directly by enemy firing — an immediate, unforeseeable interruption — is not a “default” by the charterers and therefore can be a valid defense to demurrage.
Real world impact
Because the appellate court had treated the defenses as legally insufficient and prevented any proof, the Supreme Court reversed and sent the case back to allow evidence about whether hostilities actually prevented unloading and whether payment or accord had occurred. The ruling means courts must hear factual proof before awarding demurrage when war or direct hostilities are alleged to have caused delay.
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