In Re Stanford
The Supreme Court denied a death-row inmate's request that it take up an original habeas petition arguing that executing him would be unconstitutional because he was under 18 when he committed his crime.
Four justices dissented, arguing that the Court's recent ruling banning execution of people with intellectual disabilities should logically extend to juvenile offenders, and that the Court should have granted argument on the question.
How it got here: A death-row inmate filed an original petition asking the Supreme Court directly for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his execution as unconstitutional.
The Case in Depth
What happened
A man sentenced to death filed an original petition asking the Supreme Court to declare his execution unconstitutional because he was under 18 when he committed his offense. In 1989, the Court had rejected a similar argument in Stanford v. Kentucky, allowing states to execute offenders who were 16 or older at the time of their crimes.
The question before the Court
Should the Court have reconsidered whether executing someone for a crime committed while under 18 violates the Constitution?
Why it matters
The denial leaves in place the Court's 1989 ruling allowing execution of offenders who were 16 or 17 at the time of their crimes, meaning states can continue seeking death sentences for older juveniles unless and until the Court revisits the issue in a later case.
What changes now
The denial is not a ruling on the merits of whether executing older juvenile offenders is constitutional; it simply declines to take up this particular petition. The underlying legal question remained open for future cases, and the dissent's arguments signaled that at least four justices were prepared to revisit the issue if a proper case arose.
What this does not decide
This order does not rule on whether executing offenders who were 16 or 17 at the time of their crimes is constitutional. It only denies this particular original habeas petition without explanation, leaving the 1989 Stanford v. Kentucky precedent technically intact.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Stevens
“The practice of executing such offenders is a relic of the past and is inconsistent with evolving standards of decency in a civilized society.”Stevens's central objection to allowing executions of juvenile offenders.
Justice Stevens argued the Court should have granted argument on whether executing juvenile offenders is unconstitutional, given the Court's recent Atkins v. Virginia ruling barring execution of people with intellectual disabilities. He contended the same reasoning about diminished culpability applies to juveniles, pointed to a growing state-level trend against juvenile executions since 1989, and cited scientific evidence of adolescent brain immaturity. He would have set the case for argument rather than deny it outright.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court, without issuing a signed opinion, denied the petition for an original writ of habeas corpus, leaving the 1989 ruling in Stanford v. Kentucky undisturbed.
- The dissenting justices argued that the Court's 2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia, which barred executing people with intellectual disabilities on Eighth Amendment grounds (the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment), rested on reasoning that applies equally to juvenile offenders.
- The dissent noted that nearly as many states barred executing juveniles (28) as barred executing people with intellectual disabilities (30), undercutting any distinction between the two groups.
- The dissent pointed to a trend since 1989 of more states and courts barring juvenile executions, plus scientific evidence about adolescent brain development, as signs that national standards had shifted toward finding such executions unacceptable.
- Because the majority did not explain its reasoning in a signed opinion, only the dissent's chain of reasoning is available in the text — the majority simply left the petition, and the 1989 precedent, undisturbed.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Atkins v. Virginia (536 U.S. 304)
The dissent relies on this recent ruling barring execution of people with intellectual disabilities as the basis for revisiting juvenile executions.
Distinguishes Stanford v. Kentucky (492 U.S. 361)
The dissent argues this 1989 precedent allowing juvenile executions should no longer control given later developments.