OCTOBER TERM 2002 · DECIDED JANUARY 14, 2003 · 9–0

537 U.S. 129 · No. 01-1229

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Pierce County v. Guillen

Reversed and remandedFinal ruling
highway safetyfederal preemptionevidence privilegeCommerce Clausetraffic accidents

Opinion of the Court by Justice Thomas

The Court upheld a federal law that shields information gathered for a federal highway-hazard program from being used as evidence in state or federal lawsuits, ruling that Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to pass it.

The decision means local governments can keep collecting candid data on dangerous roads without fear that the information will be turned against them in accident lawsuits, but the Court also narrowed which records the shield actually covers.

A statute granting a privilege is to be strictly construed so as ‘to avoid a construction that would suppress otherwise competent evidence
Justice Thomas

Explains why the Court read the highway-safety records privilege narrowly rather than broadly.

How it got here: The Washington Supreme Court held part of the federal privilege statute unconstitutional and ordered further proceedings; the county sought Supreme Court review.

The Case in Depth

What happened

A woman died in a car accident at an intersection in Pierce County, Washington, shortly after the county's second application for federal hazard-elimination funding for that intersection was approved. Her husband and other survivors sued the county for negligence and sought accident records, but the county refused, citing a federal statute that shields information gathered for federal highway safety programs.

The question before the Court

Can Congress bar accident and safety records collected for a federal highway-safety program from being used as evidence in state court lawsuits?

Why it matters

State and local governments can continue compiling thorough hazard surveys for federal highway funding without worrying that the raw data will be used as ammunition in negligence suits over accidents at those locations. At the same time, accident victims can still obtain records that agencies created or held for reasons unrelated to the federal program, so the shield is not absolute.

What changes now

The case goes back to the Washington courts to apply the Court's narrower reading of the statute to the specific documents at issue, and to resolve the still-outstanding attorney's fees question in the public-records portion of the case. The Court dismissed the separate negligence lawsuit's discovery dispute for lack of jurisdiction because that case was not yet final, so it continues in the state courts. This is a final merits ruling on the statute's meaning and constitutionality, not a temporary order.

What this does not decide

The Court did not decide whether the statute could also be justified under the Spending Clause or Necessary and Proper Clause, since the Commerce Clause was enough. It also did not resolve a Tenth Amendment argument about state sovereignty or whether private plaintiffs could raise a "states' rights" claim, since the lower court never addressed those issues.

Concurrences and dissents

How the Justices voted

Majority (1). Justice Thomas (author).

How the Court got there

The legal reasoning, step by step

  1. The Court first had to pin down what the statute actually protects, since three different readings were offered by the county, the accident victims, and the federal government as intervenor.
  2. Because the statute creates an evidentiary privilege — a rule that keeps otherwise relevant material out of court — the Court applied its long-standing rule that privileges must be read narrowly so they don't unnecessarily block the search for truth.
  3. The Court rejected the narrowest reading because it would have made a 1995 change to the statute (adding the word 'collected') meaningless, and courts presume Congress intends amendments to actually change something.
  4. The Court also rejected the broadest reading, favored by the county, because it would extend the privilege too far beyond the statute's text, sweeping in records an agency never used for the federal program.
  5. Settling on a middle reading, the Court held the privilege covers information actually gathered or collected for the federal hazard-identification program, but not information an agency holds for unrelated reasons even if a copy later reaches the program.
  6. Turning to Congress's power to enact this rule, the Court applied its established Commerce Clause principle that Congress can regulate the channels of interstate commerce and protect the safety of activity happening in them, and found that shielding this safety data encourages more honest data collection and safer roads nationwide.

Doctrinal impact

Laws and provisions at issue

23 U.S.C. § 409

Federal law shielding certain highway-hazard records from being used as evidence in court.

Commerce Clause

Constitutional provision letting Congress regulate interstate commerce, including its channels and safety.

Hazard Elimination Program (23 U.S.C. § 152)

Federal program funding fixes to the most dangerous sections of state and local roads.

Supreme Court Opinion

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